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Abstract
This thesis considers the defensive surveillance of multiple public areas which are
the open, exposed targets of adversarial attacks. We address the operational prob-
lem of identifying a real time decision-making rule for a security team in order to
minimise the damage an adversary can inflict within the public areas. We model
the surveillance scenario as a multiclass queueing system with customer abandon-
ments, wherein the operational problem translates into developing service policies
for a server in order to minimise the expected damage an adversarial customer can
inflict on the system.
We consider three different surveillance scenarios which may occur in real-
world security operations. In each scenario it is only possible to calculate optimal
policies in small systems or in special cases, hence we focus on developing heuristic
policies which can be computed and demonstrate their effectiveness in numerical
experiments. In the random adversary scenario, the adversary attacks the system
according to a probability distribution known to the server. This problem is a
special case of a more general stochastic scheduling problem. We develop new
results which complement the existing literature based on priority policies and an
effective approximate policy improvement algorithm. We also consider the scenario
of a strategic adversary who chooses where to attack. We model the interaction of
the server and adversary as a two-person zero-sum game. We develop an effective
heuristic based on an iterative algorithm which populates a small set of service
policies to be randomised over. Finally, we consider the scenario of a strategic
adversary who chooses both where and when to attack and formulate it as a robust
II
optimisation problem. In this case, we demonstrate the optimality of the last-come
first-served policy in single queue systems. In systems with multiple queues, we
develop effective heuristic policies based on the last-come first-served policy which
incorporates randomisation both within service policies and across service policies.
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The threats faced on a daily basis from adversarial agents are a prominent feature
of the modern world. Criminals wish to evade the authorities, thieves seek to steal
valuable commodities, immigrants look to illegally cross borders, and terrorists
hope to cause mass damage and disruption to daily life. When these threats
become reality, the impact can be devastating. This is especially evidenced in the
notorious terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, as well as the terrorist bombings in Bali
in 2002 and 2005, the 7/7 2005 London bombings, and recently the 2013 Boston
marathon bombing. Given the potentially significant impact of adversarial threats,
together with the fact that threats grow and evolve through time as adversaries
become more capable, there is a real need for defensive efforts to mitigate these
threats both now and in the future.
The abilities of authorities to engage in defensive efforts have been greatly
enhanced by technological innovation. This trend is expected to continue into
the future. Surveillance cameras, either static or as part of an unmanned aerial
vehicle, enable the screening of public areas consisting of many people. Pictures
or video-feeds can be relayed to a control centre in real time whereby subjects
can be matched against a database by means of their biometric signatures to
determine their identity or possible intentions. Use of such surveillance resources
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for defensive purposes can be referred to as defensive surveillance. Central to
the idea of Homeland Security, a term coined in the United States in response
to terrorist threats, is that preventing threats from maturing or minimising their
impact is certainly preferable to responding to events which do occur. For example,
defensive efforts which prevent a terrorist from detonating a bomb in a public area
are better than responding to the mass damage caused and subsequent retaliation.
Defensive surveillance is part of a wider strategy to realise this goal.
The strong capabilities of surveillance resources are paired with the drawback
that they are finite in nature. In a public area, such as a train station, consisting
of a crowd of people, it is only possible to screen a finite number of individuals,
often one, at any given time. Screening is not instantaneous as it requires some
processing time. The only way every member of the crowd could be screened is
if they all stayed in the public area for the necessary length of time needed to
screen every person. However, the nature of public areas reveals that this is not
realistic. In reality, people arrive into a public area and stay there for some finite,
random period of time before leaving. Public areas evolve somewhat randomly,
wherein the people within them have a finite lifetime. It is clear then that the
choice to screen one individual ahead of many others presents an opportunity cost
of not being able to screen the individuals who leave the area during the screening
of the chosen individual. However, it is not known who will leave or how many.
Typically, screening every individual is an impossible task. Fundamentally then,
at a given point in time, which individual should be screened? This reflects one
of the major challenges of defensive surveillance, management of a scarce resource
in the context of screening subjects who have a finite lifetime.
A pertinent example of an adversarial threat is that of a terrorist attack. These
attacks often take place in crowded, everyday locations or public areas. For exam-
ple, tourist spots, transportation hubs, and organised public events. This indicates
the carefully planned nature of the adversary. The first trait of this planning is
that terrorists wish to strike in places which allow for enhanced impact. These
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places are open, exposed, and not too difficult for the adversary to penetrate. In
this sense, public areas are somewhat soft targets in comparison to a well defended
and fortified military base, for example. The second trait is that terrorists wish
to remain covert and avoid detection by defensive forces. Crowds within public
areas facilitate this function, as the surveillance resource is drawn to other people
the adversary is able to carry out and complete an attack before the surveillance
resource is able to screen the terrorist. Alternatively, an immigrant could use the
crowd in a public area to provide coverage whilst he passes across a border illegally.
Given the limitation of the surveillance resource, such outcomes are possibilities.
These possibilities are enhanced when the adversary is capable of behaving as
a decision-making agent, choosing which area to attack. Consequently, this ad-
versarial capability must be recognised by the defensive forces. Hence, another
major challenge in the process of defensive surveillance is controlling surveillance
technology in the presence of an adversary capable of making strategic decisions.
The main motivation of this thesis is to consider the operational challenges
posed by defensive surveillance: How should a surveillance resource be utilised in
real time to minimise the impact of adversarial threats? In particular, we wish
to consider relevant scenarios within the context of the threats faced in public
areas as described above. We will develop multiclass queueing system models for
the defensive surveillance scenarios. The queueing systems will contain the main
features of the scenarios; the notion of customer abandonment or impatience, and
the notion of an adversarial customer seeking to enter the system among other cus-
tomers, conduct an illicit activity, and leave without detection. The operational
challenges of defensive surveillance then become the challenges of developing con-
trol policies within the queueing systems with respect to some stated objectives.
Variation of assumptions and objectives in each model will give rise to different
defensive surveillance scenarios in practice. Furthermore, even in the absence of an
adversarial threat, the challenge of developing control policies in multiclass queue-
ing systems with customer abandonments is an interesting and relevant problem
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in other application areas such as the operation of call centres. Consequently,
through consideration of the main defensive surveillance motivation we also hope
to shed light on these more general problems.
1.2 Challenges and Objectives
In this section, we develop the defensive surveillance scenarios motivated previously
and which will be the focus of the thesis. We consider a large public area which
can be divided into multiple sub-areas. As such, we refer to k public areas to
actually mean the sub-areas which aggregate to the original larger area. When we
refer to public areas, we mean areas in which people are free to come and go at
their own will. For example, a train station which could be divided into sub-areas
of different platforms, ticketing lobbies, and walkways. Our description of the
surveillance process in these public areas follows the one given by Lin et al. (2009)
in their work which uses a queue to model an antiterrorist surveillance system.
Arrays of video cameras monitor the areas continuously, relaying video-feeds
in real time to a control centre operated by a security team. The security team
uses the video-feeds to screen people within the areas in two phases: an initial
classification phase, and a screening phase. In the first initial classification phase,
as soon as people arrive into an area they are assessed visually and classified as
members of one of two groups: nonsuspects and suspects. In this classification,
some civilians and all adversaries will be classified as suspects, while all nonsus-
pects are civilians. Nonsuspects are not subject to any further screening and are
subsequently ignored by the security team. Suspects become eligible for second-
phase screening. In second-phase screening, biometric signatures are extracted
from a suspect, for example face structure and hair characteristics, and matched
against a database. If no match is found the suspect is reclassified as a nonsuspect
and is subsequently ignored. However, a positive match yields the identity of the
suspect and appropriate action can be taken. If this identity is not of relevance
to the security team then the suspect is reclassified as a nonsuspect and is subse-
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quently ignored. However, if this identity is of relevance, for example the suspect
is a known criminal or terrorist, then security forces can be notified to intervene.
People arrive at random into each of the k public areas which immediately
initiates the first phase of the screening process. We assume that this phase is fast
and so the time taken is negligible. The first phase screening identifies a set of
suspects in each area. Whilst in an area, suspects conduct their own daily busi-
ness and leave the area when this concludes. Since some suspects are potentially
adversaries, this daily business could be something harmful. We say that each
suspect has a lifetime in the area and the length of this lifetime is random and
independent for each suspect. Expiration of the lifetime for a suspect corresponds
to the suspect leaving the area. During this lifetime, each suspect is available for
second-phase screening. The security team is only able to engage in second-phase
screening for one suspect from one of the k areas at any given time. The process-
ing time taken to complete second-phase screening is random and independent for
each suspect. Lifetimes can expire during second-phase screening, in which event
the screening is incomplete and the security team moves onto another suspect.
Each public area represents a target for an adversary such as a terrorist or
illegal immigrant. The public area itself and people within it may be the target,
or infrastructure located within an area may be the target, or indeed the area
may provide passage to the target. The objective of the adversary is to enter one
of the public areas, conduct an illicit activity such as planting or detonating a
bomb, and leave (if applicable) before second-phase screening of the adversary can
be completed. If an adversary enters an area, they are inconspicuous, appearing
to the security team to be just like every other person in the area. The random
time taken to conduct the illicit activity is the lifetime of the adversary within the
area, and hence the time for which they are available for second-phase screening.
The only way the security team is able to uncover the identity of each suspect
is by full second-phase screening and so there is no way to know a priori when
the adversary is in an area or which suspect it is. The purpose of surveillance
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is then to screen suspects across all public areas in order to successfully identify
an adversary before he is able to achieve his goal. The operational problem is to
identify a decision-making rule which declares which suspect should be engaged in
second-phase screening at each point in time to ultimately minimise the probability
of evading detection or damage inflicted by the adversary.
We now develop a mathematical model for the surveillance problem faced by the
security team. The scenario described can be modelled as a multiclass queueing
system with customer abandonments and a single server. The k public areas
are modelled as k parallel queues and the people classified as suspects in the
areas as customers in the queues. We can also refer to the parallel queues as
customer classes. Customers arrive into queue i according to a Poisson process
with rate λi. The security team controlling the surveillance resource is modelled
as the server, where service of a customer is equivalent to second-phase screening.
Each queue i customer has two random quantities: a service requirement and a
lifetime. Service requirements in queue i represent the time taken for the server
to successfully serve a customer or equivalently the time taken to successfully
complete second-phase screening of a suspect. These are given by independent and
identically distributed random variables. Lifetimes in queue i represent the lengths
of time customers stay in the queue and are given by independent and identically
distributed random variables. Note that we allow the stochastic distributions of
the arrival rates, service requirements, and lifetimes to differ between queues to
represent areas with different characteristics. For example, longer lifetimes may
reflect suspects waiting on a train platform as opposed to walking down a hall and
longer service requirements may reflect the longer time needed to extract biometric
signatures from suspects walking rather than standing. Expiration of a customer
lifetime before completed service is referred to as a customer abandonment, where
abandonment can occur before or during service.
After customers have arrived into a queue they queue for service until ulti-
mately either service completion or abandonment occurs, after which they are
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considered as having left the system regardless. Although suspects would not
physically form a queue in practice, when we model them as customers we adopt
the convention of a queue to refer to the order in which they arrived. Service of a
customer can either be preemptive or nonpreemptive. Preemptive service means
that the server can stop a service at any time and switch to another customer,
which is equivalent to the second-phase screening process being stopped and an-
other beginning on another suspect. Nonpreemptive service means that once the
server begins a service, this continues until it is either completed or the customer
abandons. In other words, the second-phase screening can only be stopped by the
suspect leaving the area.
We do not model the adversary as a customer who actually enters the system,
but rather as a potential customer possessing the ability to join or attack any of
the k queues. If the adversary attacks queue i then his service requirement is
identically distributed to that of every other queue i customer, and similarly for
the lifetime of the adversary. In other words, when attacking queue i the adversary
behaves like every other customer in that queue. Once in the system there are two
possible outcomes, service completion and abandonment representing unsuccessful
and successful attacks respectively. The goal of the adversary is to abandon his
queue before being served to completion. If the adversary is able to abandon a
queue, he is able to incur a fixed amount of damage in the process.
At any given point in time, the number of customers currently in each queue
gives the state of the system. A service policy is a rule which uses the system
state to decide which customer to serve from which queue at each point in time.
Clearly, we have implicitly assumed here that the server always knows the state
of the system in real time. The service policy adopted by the server reflects the
way in which the security team controls the surveillance resource. Use of a specific
service policy directly determines the probability of each outcome available to
the adversary should he attack a specific queue. The choice of service policy is
the mechanism through which the security team can affect the probability of the
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adversary being able to abandon each queue and so complete a successful attack.
Importantly, the information available to and capability of the adversary dic-
tates his decision-making ability. Moreover, the information the server has re-
garding the capability of the adversary affects the choice of service policy. In
this thesis, we consider different surveillance scenarios based on three variations of
information available to both the server and adversary and the capability of the
adversary. The scenarios are as follows:
• Random adversary : The adversary attacks the different queues randomly
according to a probability distribution which is known to the server.
• Strategic adversary who chooses where to attack : The adversary attacks the
different queues according to a probability distribution under his control,
which the server does not know.
• Strategic adversary who chooses where and when to attack : The adversary
attacks the system based on knowledge of the state of the system. The server
does not know where or when the adversary will attack.
The objective throughout this thesis is to develop service policies and surveil-
lance strategies which minimise the probability of abandonment experienced by the
adversary in each scenario. When the adversary can inflict different amounts of
damage in each queue, the objective generalises to minimising the expected damage
inflicted by the adversary. We will often use the two objectives interchangeably
throughout the thesis.
In the random adversary scenario, the decision of the adversary is known to
the server. The defensive surveillance problem can be seen as a special case of a
more general stochastic scheduling problem in which a server attempts to maximise
the average reward rate in a system affected by abandonments. This stochastic
scheduling problem and other variants have been studied in recent years by nu-
merous authors including Glazebrook et al. (2004), Atar et al. (2010), and Down
et al. (2011) to name just a few. We develop new results and approaches for this
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problem which complement the existing literature. In the strategic adversary sce-
narios, the unknown decision of the adversary poses a different problem which can
be addressed using ideas from game theory or by formulation as a robust optimi-
sation problem. These scenarios share a similar motivation to a number of other
defender-attacker problems, see for example Lin et al. (2013). It is our belief that
the strategic adversary scenarios within this thesis, in particular the use of a mul-
ticlass queueing system with abandonments to model the defensive surveillance of
public areas, are novel and have not been previously studied. The closest known
work is that of Lin et al. (2009) who model the defensive surveillance of a single
public area as a single queue with impatient customers. However, the authors
do not consider the case of multiple areas and an adversary capable of making
strategic decisions which is the major feature of the strategic adversary scenarios
within this thesis.
1.3 Thesis Structure
In this section, we provide an outline of the remaining chapters of the thesis,
highlighting the main features, approaches, and contributions of each chapter. A
paper based on the combined work of Chapters 3 and 4 has been published in
INFORMS Journal on Computing; see James et al. (2016). We begin in Chapter
2 with a comprehensive review of the literature relevant to the subsequent chap-
ters of the thesis. The literature review first considers broad theoretical areas
which underpin the methods used within the thesis. We then consider literature
concerning stochastic scheduling with customer abandonments as this is highly
relevant to the problem formulated to address the random adversary defensive
surveillance problem. Finally, we consider a class of related literature we refer to
as defender-attacker problems as this shares similar motivations to the strategic
defensive surveillance problems.
The remainder of the thesis studies the three defensive surveillance scenarios
described in Section 1.2, each sharing the common foundations outlined. We dis-
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tinguish between the scenarios based on the capability of the adversary and the
knowledge of the server regarding the adversary. Together these form a set of de-
fensive surveillance models which cover a number of potential scenarios which may
occur in real-world security operations. We will see that the operational strategies
suggested in each scenario are different, indicating the importance of identifying
which scenario prevails before identifying the appropriate defensive actions.
Chapter 3 - Defence against Random Adversaries: Priority Policies
In Chapter 3 we study the problem of a single server faced with impatient cus-
tomers spread across k customer classes. Each customer class can be seen as a
separate queue, each containing customers of the same type. Each customer has
a random lifetime during which he is available for preemptive service. Should a
customer be served to completion before this lifetime expires, a reward is received;
otherwise, the customer abandons the system and a penalty is inflicted. In ad-
dition, each customer in the system incurs a holding cost at a fixed rate. The
random lifetimes, random service times, rewards, penalties, and holding costs are
dependent upon the customer class. The goal of our analysis is to determine a
service policy to maximise the long-run reward rate net of penalties and holding
costs incurred. We show that the three parameters in the reward structure can be
consolidated into a single parameter through a proper transformation and without
loss of generality we are able to consider a pure-reward problem by ignoring the
abandonment penalty and holding cost. The problem is studied with respect to
arbitrary rewards and so in this sense is rather general.
As previously discussed, the principle motivating application of our model is
to defensive surveillance. We consider the scenario of a random adversary who
attacks the system in its long-run steady state conditions at random according to
some probability vector p which assigns probability pi to attack of queue i. The
adversary could have chosen p entirely at random, or through some knowledge
of the system in an attempt to maximise the damage he can inflict. In either
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case, p is known to the server. By expressing the class dependent rewards for
service completions in terms of the probability vector p, the goal of maximising
the long-run reward rate is equivalent to maximising the probability of serving an
adversary. This objective is consistent with our general objective throughout the
thesis of developing service policies which minimise the probability of abandonment
experienced by the adversary, or minimising the expected damage inflicted. The
random adversary scenario is hence studied in Chapter 3 as a special case of a
more general stochastic scheduling problem featuring customer abandonments.
We model the problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and use standard
methods of Dynamic Programming (DP) to compute the optimal service policies.
However, the computational burden of such methods make them only practical in
most problems with up to three customer classes. Hence, our focus is on the devel-
opment of strongly performing heuristic policies with a preference for operationally
simple policies with strong reward rate characteristics.
We consider a set of priority policies which are effective across much of the
problem’s parameter space. Such policies serve customers according to a strict
priority ordering among the customer classes. In the case where the system is
overloaded, it has been shown in the literature that the Rµ rule, a priority policy
that ranks all customer classes based on the product of reward R and service rate
µ, performs well, since it maximises the instantaneous reward rate (Atar et al.,
2010; Ayesta et al., 2011; Verloop, 2014; Larran˜aga et al., 2014). To complement
the Rµ rule in the light-traffic case, the main contribution of Chapter 3 is to
present the Rµθ rule, which ranks all customer classes based on the product of
R, µ, and the abandonment rate θ. This ranking was proposed in Section 2 of
Glazebrook et al. (2004) for batch problems, and we extend its application to
systems with customer arrivals. We prove that the Rµθ rule is asymptotically
optimal as customer abandonment rates approach zero in light traffic systems.
This result sheds light on cases where the time spent by individuals in the public
areas tends to be large relative to the time taken to surveil them. Extensions of this
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result are discussed for other model classes of interest, namely a multiserver version
of our system and in Klimov Networks (see Klimov (1974) and Klimov (1978)).
Further to this we develop a priority policy known as the PaS policy by applying
a pairwise swapping mechanism to both the Rµ and Rµθ rules to search for an
improved policy. Finally, we compare the Rµ and Rµθ rules both analytically and
numerically in light traffic systems in a set of numerical experiments.
Chapter 4 - Defence against Random Adversaries: Approximate Policy
Improvement
In Chapter 4, we further study the problem of developing effective service policies
for multiclass queueing systems with customer abandonments, wherein the random
adversary defensive surveillance scenario is a special case. Whereas Chapter 3 con-
siders priority policies, Chapter 4 considers an approach which aims to overcome
the computational intractability of DP methods in larger systems. This is consis-
tent with the objective in the research field of approximate dynamic programming
(ADP). In particular, we consider the policy iteration method (see Howard (1960))
in which the difficulty of utilising this method lies in the computation of bias func-
tions at each state of the system under a given service policy. The main contribu-
tion of Chapter 4 is to develop an approximate policy iteration (API) method for
the problem. For a given policy, the API method uses simulation to estimate bias
values for a set of carefully chosen states, and then uses these values to interpolate
the bias function for all states. This approximate bias function allows us to run
policy improvement to obtain a new policy. The logic which underlies this method
is that if the approximate bias functions are accurate representations of the true
bias functions then the new policy will be at least as good as the initial policy.
Our API approach can be viewed as a refined ADP implementation with two
distinctive features: (1) a suite of strongly-performing priority policies to initialise
the API algorithm, and (2) a simulation / interpolation methodology to fit the
bias surface by estimating biases both at states that are frequently visited, and also
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at a carefully chosen set of widely spread states. Our numerical results indicate
that, in most cases, the best priority policy is nearly optimal in systems with 2 or 3
customer classes and we have an effective service policy of simple structure. In the
cases where it is not, the API method invariably tightens up the gap substantially
and provides an improved policy, albeit of more complex structure. The structure
and performance of API brings to light a trade-off between policy simplicity and
quality, which potentially has useful managerial implications. In our motivating
random adversary defensive surveillance application, even small improvements in
reward rate performance can be of high practical importance. In Chapter 4 we also
conduct an extensive numerical study to compare the performance of a range of
heuristic policies, notably the API approach and the priority policies of Chapter 3.
To assess the closeness to optimality of a given policy, we use a linear programming
relaxation to develop upper bounds for the reward rate achievable in the system.
The upper bounds are used to evaluate our heuristics in systems with 5 customer
classes.
Chapter 5 - Defence against Strategic Adversaries Who Choose Where
To Attack
In Chapter 5 we consider the defensive surveillance scenario in which a strategic
adversary chooses which queue to attack. We adopt the same model as in the
random adversary scenario of Chapters 3 and 4. Once more, the adversary attacks
the system in its long-run steady state conditions according to some probability
vector p which assigns probability pi to attack of queue i. The difference in this
scenario is that p is not known by the server. Given the capability of the adversary
to choose any p, the server wishes to find a robust service policy which achieves
a low expected damage, regardless of the choice of p. Whilst the server does not
know the decision of the adversary, namely p, the adversary does not know the
decision of the server of which service policy to use. The objective of the adversary
is to maximise the expected damage he can inflict on the system by deciding which
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queue to attack. The objective of the server, on the other hand, is to determine a
randomised service policy which minimises the expected damage inflicted. Given
the lack of knowledge of each others decision, we model the interaction of the server
and the adversary as a simultaneous move two-person zero-sum (TPZS) game.
We develop an optimal solution to the TPZS game from both the perspective
of the server and the adversary, where in each case the optimal decision for each
player is independent of the optimal decision of the other. We show that we
can determine the optimal randomised policy of the server by formulating and
solving an appropriate linear program. However, this is only possible for most
systems of up to three queues. Subsequently, there is a need to develop heuristic
approaches to the problem which can be used in larger systems. Our heuristic
approach is motivated by our consideration of the problem from the perspective
of the adversary. We show that the optimal probability vector p for the adversary
can be found by formulating a convex optimisation problem which can be solved
through Kelley’s cutting plane (KCP) method (see Kelley (1960)). The KCP
method provides a strong link to the random adversary scenario of Chapters 3 and
4. We restrict the server to a finite set of service policies which consists of the
optimal service policies against given choices of p by the adversary. We see that
the KCP method is equivalent to an iteratively expanding finite matrix game in
which the server is restricted to using only policies in this set and more policies
are added to the set. The value of the matrix game converges to the optimal
expected damage as the policy set increases and the server can achieve this by
adopting a mixed strategy over the policy set. However, the KCP method is
computationally intractable for systems of more than three queues. Our heuristic
approach is a heuristic application of the KCP method. We formulate a finite
matrix game between the server and adversary and iteratively populate a finite
set of service policies using the strongly performing heuristic policies developed
in Chapters 3 and 4 for the random adversary scenario. This yields the heuristic
cutting plane (HCP) method and an enhanced version of this method. We assess
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the performance of our heuristic methods in a set of numerical experiments which
indicate strong performance with favourable amounts of computation.
Chapter 6 - Defence against Strategic Adversaries Who Choose Where
and When To Attack
In Chapter 6 we extend the strategic adversary scenario of Chapter 5. In addition
to choosing which queue to attack, the adversary can also choose when to attack the
system. In this case, the server wishes to find a robust service policy which provides
a performance guarantee against any choice of queue and time the adversary could
make. We first study a single queue system in which the adversary does not have
a set of queues to choose from and only chooses the time at which he attacks
the queue based on the state of the system. The state consists of two elements:
the volume state which represents the number of customers in the system, and
the server state which represents which customer is in service and how long that
customer has been in service. We consider two scenarios in which the adversary
chooses when to attack based on both the volume and server states or only the
volume state. We refer to these as the full and partial information scenarios
respectively. The first contribution of this chapter is to show that the last come first
served (LCFS) policy, namely the policy which serves the most recently arrived
customer, is optimal in a number of versions of the single queue problem. The
strength of the LCFS policy is based on the fact that the abandonment probability
of the adversary depends on the arrival process after the adversary has joined
the queue, and not on the state of the system. In practice, the server may or
may not know the capability of the adversary and the adversary may or may not
know the state of the system. If the adversary is not as capable as assumed, our
analysis provides an upper bound on the abandonment probability of a less capable
adversary.
We generalise the problem to systems with multiple queues and consider two
ways in which the security team is able to control the system. With decentralised
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control, the decision of which queue to serve and which customer to serve are sep-
arate. The choice of which customer to serve is made locally, once the server is
allocated to a queue. With centralised control, the server can decide which cus-
tomer to serve from all customers in the system. In both cases, the objective of the
server is to determine a robust service policy which provides the best performance
guarantee against the best decision the adversary could make. However, in both
cases it is very difficult to solve the optimisation problem. Hence, our goal is to
develop heuristic approaches to the problem which provide strong upper bound
performance guarantees for the server.
The first step is to simplify the optimisation problem by arguing that the
worst case for the server occurs when the adversary attacks when the number of
customers in each queue approaches infinity. In designing a heuristic decentralised
policy, we develop heuristics based on the strong performance of the LCFS policy
in a single queue system. We develop the Departure Reselection (DR) and Service
Reselection (SR) policies which both allocate the server to a queue according to a
probability vector (called the reselection vector) and then serve according to the
LCFS policy within that queue. We seek to find the best performance guarantees
for the server from within the classes of DR and SR policies by optimising the
reselection vector. We define a method based on the work by Regis & Shoemaker
(2005) which intelligently utilises simulation within a response surface method for
global optimisation problems.
In the case of centralised control, the server knows and can compare the arrival
times of all customers in the system. The server can build this information into
the service policy, providing greater capability than in the case of decentralised
control, hence the server can achieve better performance guarantees. In a multiple
queue system, we extend the definition of the LCFS policy to be the policy which
serves the most recently arrived customer into the system. In a symmetric mul-
tiple queue system, we show that the LCFS policy provides the best performance
guarantee as a consequence of our analysis of single queue systems. We would
16
not expect the LCFS policy to provide the best performance guarantee in general
asymmetric systems, so we develop a heuristic approach based on the LCFS pol-
icy. We develop the Last Come First Served with Probabilistic Skipping (LCFS-PS)
policy to improve upon the LCFS policy. The LCFS-PS policy is parametrised by
a vector of probabilities (called the skipping vector). The server orders the most
recent arrivals in each queue and attempts to serve the first customer, but has the
potential to skip over this customer. The server repeats this down the order until
a customer is selected for service. The rationale is to reduce the abandonment
probability in the most damaging queue under the LCFS policy by providing more
service to that queue, at the expense of the other queues. We seek to find the best
performance guarantees for the server from within the class of LCFS-PS policies
by optimising the skipping vector. We adopt a similar approach to that taken for
the DR and SR policies. We demonstrate the superior performance of the heuristic
approach based on LCFS-PS over the decentralised approaches based on DR and
SR in sets of numerical examples. We show that our carefully designed heuristics
achieve large performance improvements over simpler policies such as the LCFS




In this chapter we provide a review of various fields of literature which are relevant
to the defensive surveillance problems and models studied within the thesis. We
begin by reviewing the three subject areas of Markov decision processes, approx-
imate dynamic programming, and game theory under the heading of theoretical
underpinnings. Much of the modelling framework and many of the methodolog-
ical tools within the rest of the thesis are provided within these areas. Hence,
the review mainly focuses on aspects closest to the needs to the thesis from these
otherwise vast subject areas. We then consider literature concerning stochastic
scheduling, with particular emphasis on customer abandonment in the context of
stochastic scheduling. This area is relevant to Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis. Fi-
nally, we consider the literature related to defender-attacker problems. This area
is relevant to Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis.
2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings
2.1.1 Markov Decision Processes
There are many situations in which a decision-making agent wishes to make a
sequence of decisions in order to optimise some previously stated objective. In
such a sequential decision process, decisions are made based upon the information
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available at a point in time, under the uncertainty of the future effect of those
decisions. That is, each decision incurs an immediate contribution to some ongoing
objective, but also affects the ability to make future decisions and so indirectly
affects future contributions. Optimal decision-making must balance the trade-off
between immediate effects and possible future effects.
Elements of Markov Decision Processes
Consider a system in which decisions are to be made at evenly spaced discrete
points in time, known as decision epochs, over an infinite time horizon. At a
given decision epoch t the system occupies one of a number of possible states.
The set of possible states available is known as the state space S. The state s
allows the decision-maker to choose an action a from a finite set of feasible or
allowable decisions As in that state. As a result of choosing action a ∈ As in state
s at decision epoch t, then independent of the past, two things occur. Firstly,
a non-negative expected reward R(s, a) is received. Secondly, the system moves
to a new state s′ according to some transition probability p(s′|s, a). From this
new state, this process repeats. A policy pi is a sequence of rules or procedures
for action selection in each state at all decision epochs. A stationary, Markovian
policy selects actions based only on the current state and not time, always selecting
the same action in the same state. The policy is deterministic when actions are
selected with certainty. Following such a policy through time yields a sequence of
rewards for the decision-maker. The objective of the decision-maker is to determine
a policy which maximises some function of the reward sequence generated. The
dependence of expected rewards and state transitions only on the current state and
action and not the prior history of the process means that such sequential decision
processes are known as Markov Decision Processes (MDP). Whilst it is possible
to adopt non-stationary policies where actions in states can change through time,




Over an infinite horizon the objective can take three main forms: maximising the
expected total reward (assumed finite), maximising the expected total discounted
reward, and maximising the average reward rate over all policies. In the latter
two cases rewards R(s, a) are assumed to be bounded and finite. Consider the
case of an expected total discounted reward criterion in which rewards R(s, a) are
discounted at rate α, 0 < α < 1. Denoting the state and action at decision epoch t
by st and at respectively, the objective of the decision maker is to maximise among
all policies pi








This limit is guaranteed to exist when the rewards are bounded. The value of
policy pi for initial state s is given by V pi(s) and the corresponding value of the
MDP is given by
V ∗(s) = sup
pi
V pi(s).
A policy pi∗ is said to be discount optimal if for every initial state s we have that
V pi
∗
(s) = V ∗(s). An effective method for solving MDPs first developed by Bellman
(1957) is known as dynamic programming (DP). The idea of DP is reflected in the
Principle of Optimality which states that:
“An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial
decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with
regard to the state resulting from the first decision.”
This can be formulated as an equation which links the decision at the current
epoch with the decision at the next epoch. The resulting equation is known as the
Bellman equation or optimality equation:
V ∗(s) = max
a∈As
(







The theory of MDPs is given excellent coverage in the book by Puterman
(1994). This theory shows the existence of a deterministic, stationary optimal
policy which corresponds to selecting actions in states which maximise the right
hand side of (2.1). The value function V ∗(s) captures the value of being in state
s and following an optimal policy forward.
Average Reward Criterion
In the case of an average reward criterion, in an analogous way, the objective is to











This limit exists when the rewards are bounded, the state space is finite, and the
policy is stationary. When the Markov chains induced by deterministic, stationary
policies are unichain or ergodic, the average reward or gain gpi(s) of policy pi is
constant and equal to gpi for all states. The average reward version of the optimality
equation is given by









The quantity g∗ is the optimal gain or maximum average reward rate and the
function h∗(s) is known as the bias function of state s under the optimal policy.
The bias function measures the asymptotic relative difference in total reward which
results from starting in state s as opposed to some other reference state. Another
interpretation is that the bias is the expected total difference between reward
received starting from state s and the stationary reward received starting from
a steady state system. This difference occurs in the early phase of the decision-
making process. A deterministic, stationary policy which maximises the right hand
side of (2.2) is said to be bias-improving and is an average optimal policy.
From the previous discussion, in the expected total discounted reward and av-
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erage reward cases respectively, if the optimal value function V ∗(s) or optimal
bias function h∗(s) was known for each state then an optimal policy can be de-
termined from the actions which maximise the right hand side of (2.1) and (2.2)
respectively. However, these quantities are unknown and difficult to calculate and
so there is a need for other ways to identify optimal policies. The two main ap-
proaches are known as value iteration and policy iteration and were introduced
by Bellman (1957) and Howard (1960) respectively. Both iterative methods have
proven convergence properties. Other approaches such as modified policy iteration
and relative value iteration are variants of these two main approaches, with the
former being a cross between value and policy iteration. Another method based
on a linear programming reformulation of the optimality equation was proposed
by d’Epenoux (1963).
Value Iteration
In the expected total discounted reward case value iteration begins with a set
of initial arbitrary bounded functions V0(s) for each state and finds V1(s) as the
solution of (2.1), using V0(s) in the right hand side. In general, for n > 1, Vn(s)
is the solution of (2.1), using Vn−1(s) in the right hand side. In theory Vn(s)
converges uniformly to V ∗(s) as n→∞. In practice, this procedure is repeated for
a finite number of iterations until a termination criterion is met. The termination
criterion holds that largest difference in the value functions between successive
iterations across all states, as measured by the supremum norm, is smaller than
some threshold controlled by a small parameter . This condition guarantees an
error of less than /2. For further details, see Puterman (1994, p161). The
deterministic, stationary policy which solves the optimality equation in the final
iteration is said to be -optimal. In the average reward case the algorithm is similar
with termination occurring when the increase in the value functions for all states
is close to constant. This constant increase approximates the gain g∗, the relative
difference in value functions approximate the bias functions h∗(s), and again the
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deterministic, stationary policy which solves the optimality equation in the final
iteration is said to be -optimal. Note, the gain is guaranteed to be positive due
to the assumption of a non-negative expected reward.
Policy Iteration
Policy iteration consists of two main steps: policy evaluation and policy improve-
ment. Suppose there is an arbitrary initial stationary policy pi. Policy evaluation
calculates the value functions or bias functions associated with pi using a version of
the optimality equation which drops the max operator, prescribes actions accord-
ing to pi, and replaces (∗) with pi. Policy improvement uses these value functions
or bias functions to define a new policy pi′ which is at least as good as pi. This
is done by determining actions which maximise R(s, a) +
∑
p(s′|s, a)hpi(s′) in the
case of average rewards. This procedure iterates through the class of deterministic,
stationary policies until no further improvements can be made, at which point the
current policy is optimal.
Continuous-time MDPs and Uniformisation
Standard MDP theory assumes that decision epochs occur at a discrete set of
time points which are evenly spaced. However, there are many situations in which
the times between successive decision epochs are random. These random times
are dependent upon the states and actions. This naturally occurs in the control of
queueing systems whereby state transitions occur at the random arrival instants or
random departure instants of customers. Sequential decision processes of this form
are considered in continuous time and are more generally known as semi-Markov
Decision Processes. The special case in which the times between decision epochs
each follow an exponential probability distribution is known as a continuous-time
Markov Decision Process. It is possible to analyse these decision processes within
the discrete-time framework outlined through the use of uniformisation, notably
first applied by Lippman (1975) and Serfozo (1979). Uniformisation converts the
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original continuous-time process into an equivalent discrete-time process. Suppose
decision epochs occur at state transitions and the time taken to transition from
state s into a new state under action a is exponentially distributed with rate ∆s(a).
The uniformisation defines a new transition rate ∆ such that ∆s(a) ≤ ∆ for all
s and a and allows fictitious transitions from a state to itself. A transition out
of state s at rate ∆s(a) in the original process is statistically identical to leaving
at faster uniform rate ∆, but returning back to it with probability 1 − ∆s(a)/∆
in the uniformised process. Transition probabilities in the uniformised process are
denoted p˜(s′|s, a), rewards are denoted R˜(s, a), and in the case of average rewards
the gain is denoted g˜. These elements allow the formulation of a uniformised
discrete-time MDP with optimality equation given by:









In this uniformised decision process the unit of time is the expected transition
time ∆−1 and the so the optimal gain is interpreted as the maximum average
reward per transition. Multiplication by ∆ converts this back into unit time. For
a more comprehensive coverage of MDP theory, the reader is once more referred
to the book by Puterman (1994).
2.1.2 Approximate Dynamic Programming
The formulation of a sequential decision problem as an MDP provides a powerful
framework from which to identify optimal decision-making strategies. The stan-
dard approach of DP to solving such problems comes in the form of value iteration
or policy iteration. These algorithms require the evaluation of value functions at
every state in the state space, an assessment of all feasible actions which can be
taken from each state, and consideration of all possible outcomes following each
action. Identification of optimal policies through these methods in most sequential
decision problems which occur in practice is typically not feasible, even with the
most powerful computers. This issue was famously referred to by Bellman (1957)
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as the curse of dimensionality. As the dimension of the number of variables within
the problem grows, the actual size of the problem grows exponentially. For ex-
ample, if the state space has n dimensions with each dimension taking m possible
values, then there can be up to mn states. Alternatively, if the action space has k
dimensions with each dimension taking l possible values, then there can be up to lk
possible actions. When these values are large, tasks such as considering the value
of all states or considering all actions are not achievable. Aside from the curse
of dimensionality, DP requires that almost all aspects of the system are known,
specifically a reward function and a set of transition probabilities under each state
and action. In many settings these are not known, adding another issue to the
solution of an MDP. However, despite these restrictions, there is still a need for
near yet suboptimal policies or policies which simply improve existing strategies of
decision-makers. Building upon the framework set out by DP, this has motivated
the research field of Approximate Dynamic Programming (ADP).
ADP is a term which collectively describes methods designed to solve large,
complex sequential decision problems to near optimality. It is not readily defined
given the vast array of different approaches which can be taken, each with differ-
ent components. Methods which originated in the artificial intelligence community
are termed Reinforcement Learning in that systems “learn how to make good deci-
sions by observing their own behaviour, and use built-in mechanisms for improving
their actions through a reinforcement mechanism” (Sutton & Barto, 1998). This
statement captures the essence of ADP since most methods are founded on the
integration of four main themes: the framework and methods of DP for solving
MDP problems; the use of simulation to replicate the behaviour of a stochastic sys-
tem; the idea of learning from observations made within simulated environments;
and the use of function approximations as means of representing value functions.
Synthesis of these ideas within ADP presents the opportunity to identify strongly
performing suboptimal policies. However, the vast range of ways in which algo-
rithms can be designed is often the central challenge in ADP, and focus lies in
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finding methods which work harmoniously together. The books by Bertsekas &
Tsitsiklis (1996), Sutton & Barto (1998), Bertsekas (2012), and Powell (2011) give
the best extensive coverage of ADP methods.
In an MDP the value functions V ∗(s) or V pi(s) of an optimal policy or policy
pi in state s are of fundamental importance. Knowledge of these value functions
allows for improvement of policies and the identification of optimal policies. The
curse of dimensionality renders methods for evaluating these functions infeasible
and so central to ADP are value function approximations V˜ ∗(s) or V˜ pi(s). Approx-
imate policy iteration (API) is an approach to ADP based on the policy iteration
algorithm. It takes suitable approximations V˜ pi(s) of policy pi and using an ex-
pected total discounted reward criterion as an example, identifies an improved










This performs an approximate policy improvement step based on an implicit set
of approximate policy evaluations V˜ pi. If the approximations are accurate, similar
actions will be taken to those taken if the true value functions were known. Much
of the difficulty in ADP lies in performing accurate approximate policy evaluations.
The case in which there is a value function approximation stored in memory for
every state is known as a lookup table representation. Lookup table representations
are not practical in the case of massive state spaces and so compact representations
are used. A compact value function approximation for policy pi is written V˜ pi(s|θ)
and represents the true value function through some function with relatively few
parameters θ. With this scheme, only the parameters and functional form need
to be stored in memory and estimates can be readily computed for every state
when required. This is a key idea in circumventing the challenge of a massive
state space.
The use of a compact value function approximation requires the selection of an
approximation architecture which defines the class of parametric functions which
26
can be used for V˜ pi(s|θ). Architectures can be broadly separated into two main





This expresses the value function approximation as a linear function of K + 1
parameters and basis functions. Examples of architectures include polynomial
regression, kernel regression, neural networks, radial basis functions, splines, and
interpolation schemes to name a few. A challenge in ADP is finding an architecture
which is rich enough for accurate approximation at all states. Once an approxi-
mation architecture is fixed, the idea is to find the best approximation within the
defined class through the choice of parameters so that the true value function is
accurately represented. This is referred to as training the approximation. How-
ever, it is not possible to train with respect to the true value functions. There is
a need for estimates with which to train the approximation. Simulation can be
used to directly obtain samples of value functions at a set of representative states
S˜. Suppose for each s ∈ S˜ there are M(s) samples of V pi(s) and the mth such
sample is denoted v(s,m). The approximation is trained by solving the following











This naturally poses the following questions: How can the least squares prob-
lem be solved? How are the representative states identified? How are samples
obtained? One possibility is to simulate the system using actions derived from pi
and observe those states visited most often by the simulation and let these com-
prise the representative set S˜. Then simulate trajectories or episodes starting from
initial states within S˜, observe the rewards accumulated, and let the average over
many trajectories form sample estimates. This results in a set of training pairs,
state and sample estimates. The least squares problem can be solved using stan-
27
dard optimisation techniques. Alternatively, these issues are often addressed in
a simultaneous manner. A simulated trajectory will reveal a sequence of states
visited by policy pi. All states within the trajectory comprise S˜ and the rewards
accumulated from intermediate states along the trajectory can be used as sample
estimates starting from those intermediate states. The least squares problem can
be solved by iterative gradient methods, either in batch mode at the end of a
trajectory or incrementally along the trajectory. These methods have roots in the
stochastic approximation method of Robbins & Monro (1951). A popular way to
implement iterative gradient methods is through temporal difference (TD) learn-
ing (see Sutton (1988)). Fitting an approximation through simulated observations
can be seen as a learning procedure. Often the choice of architecture is coupled
with the learning procedure. Other practical considerations involve the choice of
step-sizes and the number and length of trajectories to ensure convergence to the
solution of the least squares problem. API requires that the least squares problem
is solved to deem the approximate policy evaluation step complete and allow for
an update to the policy.
The fitted approximation V˜ pi(s|θ) depends both on the set of representative
states and the quality of the sample estimates at each state in this set. Iterative
gradient methods will inherently give more weight to those states which are visited
most frequently within the simulated trajectories, hence the least squares solution
will provide better approximations for these states as opposed to those states less
frequently visited. Furthermore, simulating trajectories under a specific policy
pi will drive the system towards certain parts of the state space upon which the
approximation will be fitted. Consequently value function approximations at less
visited states or in fact those states not visited at all may not be accurate which
may cause errors in the approximate improvement step. This is a generic potential
issue known as inadequate exploration which must be carefully considered when
designing an ADP algorithm based on approximate policy iteration.
A variant of approximate policy iteration is known as optimistic policy itera-
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tion. This is an ADP implementation of the modified policy iteration algorithm.
Optimistic policy iteration follows the same approach as API, using an iterative
gradient method within simulated trajectories. However, it does not wait until the
least squares problem has been solved before implementing an approximate policy
improvement step. Instead, the system makes a finite number of transitions under
policy pi, over which the parameter vector of the approximation is updated. The
approximate policy improvement step is performed with respect to the current
approximation and this process is repeated. API is an extreme case. Optimistic
policy iteration is sometimes viewed as an Actor-Critic system. The actor uses
policy pi to make decisions within the system and the critic observes the outcomes
of these decisions and maintains an evaluation of the policy. The critic provides
feedback to the actor every so often and the actor subsequently attempts to im-
prove his actions in light of this feedback. The choice of method for solving the
least squares problem associated with a fixed policy controls how the critic views
the system and the frequency of feedback provides a trade-off between being able
to evaluate more policies at the expense of their true value functions not being
approximated accurately.
Approximate value iteration is another approach to ADP based on the value
iteration algorithm. This is also another extreme case of optimistic policy iteration.
This method aims to directly approximate the optimal value functions V ∗(s) as
opposed to the value functions of a fixed policy. Instead of simulating trajectories
according to a fixed policy, they are simulated according to a greedy policy. In a
given iteration n of the algorithm, suppose V˜ ∗n (s|θ) is the current approximation
of the optimal value function. Select a set Sn of representative states, perhaps by
simulation under the current greedy policy. Using the expected total discounted
reward criterion as an example, compute estimates of the optimal value functions





R(s, a) + α
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)V˜ ∗n (s′|θ)
)
, ∀s ∈ Sn. (2.4)
These estimates vn+1(s) are used to update the value function approximation
to V˜ ∗n+1(s|θ) by solving a least squares problem with respect to them. This pro-
cess is then repeated for many iterations and finally actions can be determined at
any state through greedy decision-making with respect to the final approximation.
Approximate value iteration lends itself to iterative methods such as TD learning
whereby the parameter vector of the value function approximation can be itera-
tively updated. Although this method can work well, it also suffers from the same
potential issue of inadequate exploration as approximate policy iteration.
The methods discussed all rely upon an explicit model of the system which
allow the expectation within (2.3) or (2.4) to be calculated. Alternatively this
expectation may be intractable if the state space or action space or both are too
large. A method which circumvents the need to compute an expectation is known
as Q-learning (see Watkins (1989)). This method can be seen as a combination of
approximate value iteration and simulation. This method uses an approximation
architecture to represent the optimal Q-factor function Q∗(s, a) which denotes the
value of being in a particular state and taking a certain action. Value functions
are defined as V ∗(s) = maxaQ∗(s, a). In each iteration of Q-learning in state s an
action is taken greedily with respect to the current approximation Q˜∗(s, a|θ) and
a transition of the system to a new state s′ is simulated under this greedy action.
An estimate of the Q-factor associated with this state-action pair is calculated,
taking the observed new state into account, and is then used to update the func-
tion approximation. This process is repeated. As a contrast, under approximate
value iteration the new value function estimates are obtained before the transition
with respect to an expectation over the current value function approximations.




The interaction of multiple decision-making agents in a given situation has long
been a problem of interest. Individual agents must not only consider their pursuit
of some objective, but crucially the potential decisions of other agents and their
impact on this pursuit. In a competitive environment, decision-making strategies
of one agent towards attractive options may have undesirable outcomes if another
agent engages in opposing decision-making strategies. With all agents analysing
the situation in the same strategic fashion, agents can be thought of as playing a
game against each other when making decisions. Game theory provides a language
to formulate, structure, analyse, and understand such strategic scenarios.
The simplest strand of game theory considers strategic scenarios in which there
are two decision-making agents engaged in competition or conflict with one an-
other. Each agent is referred to as a player in a game, whereby each player has an
objective. When the objectives of each player are completely opposed the game is
said to be zero-sum and the situation is described as a two-person zero-sum game
(TPZS). In contrast a scenario concerning n agents whose objectives are not com-
pletely opposed is described as an n-person general-sum game. A TPZS game in
strategic form or normal form consists of players A and B, each with a nonempty
set of strategies X = {x1, ..., xn} and Y = {y1, ..., ym} respectively. These strategy
sets represent the set of choices available to each decision-maker. Elements of these
sets are known as pure strategies. The game is played simultaneously such that A
chooses x ∈ X and B chooses y ∈ Y which results in player A receiving a payoff
M(x, y). This payoff is a function of the strategies played by A and B and can
be represented by a rectangular matrix. This is referred to as the payoff matrix
M whose entries are given by mij = M(xi, yj). This is sometimes called a matrix
game wherein the rows of the matrix correspond to the pure strategies available
to player A, columns correspond to the pure strategies of player B, and entries
represent the payoff of a simultaneous row and column selection. Good coverage
of the general theory on TPZS games is given by Washburn (2014).
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In the game, the objective of player A is to maximise his payoff through his
choice of strategy, whereas player B similarly wishes to minimise this payoff. An-
other interpretation is that player B views the payoff as his own loss and so wishes
to minimise his loss. It is assumed that both players are rational, always choosing
the best strategy to achieve their objective. It is also assumed that both players
know the set of pure strategies available to the other player and the corresponding
payoffs when chosen joint with their own pure strategies. However, due to simul-
taneous play each player does not actually know which strategy will be chosen
by the opposite player. This is also equivalent to a situation in which one player
announces his strategy first, but this is not revealed to the opponent. This kind
of sequential play is equivalent to simultaneous play. Generally, if the announced
strategy was known to the opponent this gives rise to an extensive form of the
game. Two examples of simultaneous play matrix games with 3 pure strategies of












In matrix games, it is important to consider which strategy should be played
if the strategy of the other player was known. In matrix game M1, if player A
knew that player B would play y1 then A should play x1 to maximise the payoff.
However, if B actually played y2 then playing x2 would be the best strategy to
maximise payoff. Similarly, play x3 for y3. Conversely, B could conduct the same
thought experiment to reason the best strategy to play if A chose certain strategies.
In this game, by choosing x2 player A maximises the payoff he can be guaranteed
to receive. Similarly, choosing y2 player B minimises the loss he can be guaranteed
to incur. This is an example of the important concept of worst case analysis,
each player does as well as they can under the assumption that the other player
will know their strategy and maximise or minimise against this strategy. If either
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player announced this strategy in advance, the other player cannot improve his
position. This represents an equilibrium solution of the game known as a saddle
point and the resulting payoff of 2 is known as the value of the game V . When
saddle points exist in TPZS games, each player has an optimal pure strategy. A
saddle point does not exist in matrix game M2 and there is no pure strategy which
either maximises or minimises the guaranteed payoff for either player.
In general, we do not restrict the choice of players to elements within their
sets of pure strategies. A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution
over their set of pure strategies. A mixed strategy for player A is given by p =
{p1, ..., pn} such that pure strategy xi is selected with probability pi and
∑
pi = 1.
Similarly, a mixed strategy for player B is given by q = {q1, ..., qm} such that
pure strategy yj is selected with probability qj and
∑
qj = 1. Any pure strategy
can be written as a mixed strategy by specifying one non-zero element equal to
one. Considering mixed strategies, the objective of each player is to maximise or
minimise their expected payoff through their choice of mixed strategy. Suppose
that player A uses mixed strategy p and player B uses mixed strategy q, then the




j pimijqj. If the
mixed strategy of player B was known to be a fixed q then player A would seek
a mixed strategy p to maximise K(p,q). Alternatively, if the mixed strategy of
player A was known to be a fixed p then player B would seek a mixed strategy
Q to minimise K(p,q). These are known as best response strategies to particular
mixed strategies of the opposing player. A maximin strategy for player A is one
which maximises the expected payoff under the assumption of a best response
strategy of player B. Likewise, a minimax strategy for player B is one which
minimises the expected payoff under the assumption of a best response strategy
of player A. The maximin and minimax strategies give the lower and upper values
of the game respectively representing the maximum and minimum players A and
B can guarantee the expected payoff to be no matter what the other player does.
Conventionally, although maximin seems an appropriate term for the strategy of
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player A, it is often also referred to as a minimax strategy since we could reverse
the roles of players A and B and then player A would seek a minimax strategy.
The terminology minimax is used to convey the idea that each player optimises
their own expected payoff under the assumption of a best response strategy of the
other player.
When the lower and upper values of the game are equal, the value of the game
is said to exist and is equal to the common value V . The Minimax Theorem of
von Neumann (1928) is one of the most fundamental results in game theory and
states that every finite TPZS game has a value and both players have minimax
strategies which are optimal. This theorem is powerful in that it guarantees the
existence of a solution to every finite TPZS game in terms of mixed strategies.
Moreover, it states that the optimal mixed strategies p∗ and q∗ are minimax
strategies, which gives an indication of how to find these strategies. The solution
(p∗,q∗) is an equilibrium solution known as a Nash equilibrium. The concept of
a Nash equilibrium is that assuming each player knows the strategies of the other
players, no player can benefit by unilaterally changing strategy. This concept arose
through the work of John Nash in studies of n-person general-sum games. Nash
(1950) proved the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium for every finite game
and the Minimax theorem is simply a special case of Nash’s theorem.
The theory underlying Linear Programming (LP) is intertwined with the theory
of TPZS games. During the inception of LP, in a meeting between George Dantzig
and von Neumann (see Dantzig (2002)), the latter pointed out that the Minimax
Theorem is equivalent to the concept of duality. A TPZS game can be transformed
into a pair of primal-dual LP problems (see Dantzig (1951)). As such, there is
an equivalence between the Minimax Theorem and the LP Duality theorem. This
transformation of a TPZS game into an LP problem enables the use of LP methods
to solve such games. In the general TPZS game described, the objective of player
A is to find a mixed strategy p which maximises the minimum expected payoff
when player B uses mixed strategy q. It can be shown that for a given p the best
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response strategy of B is some pure strategy j. Regardless of the pure strategy of
B, player A is guaranteed an expected payoff of minj
∑
imijpi and let this lower
bound be v. The objective of A is then to maximise v and so an LP for player A









pi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n
Here, the first set of constraints correspond to one constraint for each pure strategy
of player B. Based on an analogous argument, from the perspective of player B,










qj ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,m
Suppose that LP1 has an optimal solution p∗ with objective function v∗. Also
suppose that LP2 has an optimal solution q∗ with objective function u∗. Then by
the LP Strong Duality theorem v∗ = u∗, the optimal expected payoff to player A is
equal to the optimal expected payoff to player B. This is precisely the result of the
Minimax Theorem and so this shows its equivalence to the LP Duality theorem.
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Thus by solving LP1 or LP2, whichever is easiest, the value of the game can be
found.
It is widely recognised that transformation of a TPZS game into an LP problem
is an efficient way to obtain optimal mixed strategies for each player, provided the
game is not too large. In larger games with vast numbers of pure strategies for
one or both players the dimensions of the resulting linear programs are too large
to be solved. An alternative procedure for finding optimal mixed strategies in
TPZS games called Fictitious Play (FP) was originally proposed by Brown (1949).
Convergence of FP in finite TPZS games to the optimal mixed strategies and value
was shown by Robinson (1951) and hence it is sometimes referred to as the Brown-
Robinson method. However, this convergence is slow. Although FP is applicable
in any finite TPZS game, it can be particularly appealing in larger games where
LP methods no longer work.
The FP procedure is an iterative method in which both players are assumed to
be fictitiously playing the game over a sequence of rounds in which they are able
to learn and adapt their choices accordingly. The description of the procedure
which follows is based on the article by Zafra (2010). Denote row i of M by M i
and column j by M j and let k be the index count of the number of iterations.
Define two vectors v(k) = (v1(k), ..., vn(k)) and u(k) = (u1(k), ..., um(k)) as payoff
vectors for players A and B respectively. For k = 0, set v(0) = (0, ..., 0) and
u(0) = (0, ..., 0). For k = 1, player A plays pure strategy i arbitrarily and the
payoff vector is updated as u(1) = u(0) + M i. In response player B plays pure
strategy j according to j = argmin(u1(1), ..., um(1)). The other payoff vector is
then updated as v(1) = v(0) + M j. In subsequent iterations, player A plays
pure strategy i according to i(k) = argmax(v1(k − 1), ..., vn(k − 1)) and player
B responds according to j(k) = argmin(u1(k), ..., um(k)). The payoff vectors are
updated according to v(k) = v(k − 1) +M i(k) and u(k) = u(k − 1) +M j(k).
In each iteration of the FP algorithm, player A selects row i which maximises
the payoff against the empirical mixed strategy so far of player B. Conversely, player
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B does the opposite. Let ai(k) and bj(k) be the number of times pure strategies i
and j are played in k iterations by player A and B respectively. Then after k iter-
ations estimates of the mixed strategies of both players are given by the empirical
distributions p(k) = (a1(k)/k, ..., an(k)/k) and q(k) = (b1(k)/k, ..., bm(k)/k). The
quantities maxi v(k)/k and minj u(k)/k give upper and lower bounds respectively
for the value of the game. As the number of iterations increase these bounds con-
verge to the value of the game and the empirical mixed strategies converge to the
optimal mixed strategies. In practice, the algorithm continues until an iteration
limit has been reached or the difference in the bounds is sufficiently small. Even
though this convergence can be slow, the FP algorithm can be useful in identify-
ing good mixed strategies which guarantee an expected payoff close to the optimal
value.
The discussion in this section has concerned classical results and concepts from
game theory, most notably from the theory of TPZS games. Recent applications of
game theory are to security and defence related problems wherein another problem
such as a scheduling problem is contained within the context of a game. For
example, Lin et al. (2014) and Alpern et al. (2011) use game theory to model and
analyse a patroller defending a network against an attacker. Brown et al. (2006)
study the defence of critical infrastructure from adversarial attacks using game
theory. Further examples include the Bayesian Stackelberg games for security
studied by Paruchuri et al. (2008) and the stream of related applications Pita
et al. (2008), Tsai et al. (2009), Pita et al. (2011), and Shieh et al. (2012). These
and further applications will be discussed more comprehensively in Section 2.3
under the label of defender-attacker problems.
2.2 Stochastic Scheduling with Abandonment
Scheduling problems concern the allocation of a resource within some system to a
set of competing tasks over time to optimise some stated objective. The resource
could refer to a machine on which jobs are processed, a server dealing with cus-
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tomers, or a worker faced with a series of tasks. In each case there is a processing
or service requirement of each job, customer, or task. When there are sources of
randomness attached to elements of the system, the scheduling problem is stochas-
tic. For example, the processing time of a job on a machine may not be known
exactly, but instead only probabilistically over a range of possible values. In a
queueing system, new customers may arrive adding to the workload of a server
who does not know how long service of a given customer will take or indeed when
these new arrivals will occur.
In the control of a stochastic system actions are applied at various time in-
stances to adjust the behaviour of the system and directly impact upon some
performance measure of interest. In a clearing system, which concerns the pro-
cessing of a finite set of n jobs, actions relate to which job is selected for processing,
for instance, each time a machine becomes available. If each job j incurs a holding
cost cj for each unit of time spent in the system and has expected processing time
µ−1j , then a classic scheduling result asserts that with a single machine, processing
jobs in decreasing order of the index cjµj minimises the total expected holding
cost. Such a scheduling policy is known as an index policy, which typically inde-
pendently calculates a set of indices for competing jobs or job classes and uses an
ordering of these to determine how processing should be prioritised. Index policies
are common in many scheduling problems. In a single server multiclass queueing
system in which customers arrive according to independent Poisson processes into
one of k queues, incur holding costs cj in queue j, and have expected service times
µ−1j , the cµ-rule is again optimal under nonpreemptive service for minimising the
average holding cost per unit time, see Cox & Smith (1961). An extension of the
cµ-rule to a single server multiclass queueing system with Bernoulli feedback is
attributed to Klimov in his seminal work (see Klimov (1974) and Klimov (1978))
which establishes an index policy for minimising the long-run average holding cost
in the system.
Related to stochastic scheduling problems, which are the main focus in this
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thesis, are those of routing control and admission control in queueing systems.
Routing control problems invariably concern which queue an arriving customer
should be sent to upon arrival into a queueing system whereas admission control
problems concern whether arriving customers should be permitted entry into the
system. In some classic control problems in these areas we often see that optimal
policies are quite simple. For example, in an admission control problem of deciding
whether an arriving customer should be admitted into a G/M/1 queue, Stidham
(1985) showed that a threshold policy maximises the total expected net benefit over
an infinite horizon. That is, reject customers who arrive when the queue length
exceeds some threshold N . In a routing control problem of routing customers to
one of many identical queues, the join-the-shortest-queue policy maximises the
discounted number of jobs to complete service in any specified time interval (see
Winston (1977)). Ephremides et al. (1980) also showed that it minimised the
expected total time to complete the service of all jobs that arrived before some
fixed time. The literature on queueing control problems, in fact in a wider sense the
design, analysis, and control of queueing systems is vast. We refer to the excellent
summaries given by Walrand (1988) and Stidham (2002) for further reading.
One important stream of work in the field of stochastic scheduling is bandit
models. The multi-armed bandit problem is concerned with the optimal sequential
allocation of resources between projects which require them and only yield rewards
and change state when active. It is a classic problem of stochastic scheduling which
has at its heart the trade-off between exploitation (obtaining the highest immediate
reward) and exploration (learning about the system). The problem of maximising
the expected total discounted reward was first solved and published by Gittins &
Jones (1974). The optimal policy for this problem takes the form of an index policy
which chooses at each time the project with maximal Gittins index, each computed
as a function of its current state. The major success of this result is that it reduces
an n-dimensional problem into a collection of n one-dimensional problems which
can be solved. One extension of the multi-armed bandit problem is known as the
39
restless bandit problem in which projects evolve even when a control is not applied
to it and further evolve differently when the control is applied. Control of queueing
systems often fall into this class of problems. The restless bandit problem has been
shown to be computationally intractable (see Papadimitriou & Tsitsiklis (1999)).
See Whittle (1988) for a discussion of this problem in which he proposes a class of
index heuristics. Unified coverage of bandit problems, as well as their relation to
the control of queueing systems is given by Gittins et al. (2011).
There are many real-world scenarios in which tasks, jobs, customers, or items
do not have limitless availability for processing or service. For example, in a mil-
itary setting, targets may move out of the range of defensive forces and become
unavailable to attack. In a call centre, customers placed on hold may hang up if
made to wait too long. In a medical emergency, the condition of patients requiring
treatment may deteriorate the longer they wait and indeed they may die if treat-
ment is not provided in time. In a healthcare setting, blood passing through blood
screening procedures with the aim of stocking a blood bank may become unusable
if it not passed within a certain timeframe. In telecommunications, transmitted
messages or data may be lost if it is not sent or received in time. In a surveillance
setting, suspects subject to screening by a security team may leave an area be-
fore screening is completed. It is the latter application which is the focus of this
thesis. In all applications this limited availability is referred to as impatience or
abandonment. It is a key feature of many stochastic scheduling problems, having
a major impact on the control strategies applied. Indeed there is now an extensive
literature concerning optimal scheduling in the presence of abandonment.
Abandonment can be modelled as a deadline applicable to each job or customer.
In the literature these deadlines are either applicable to the beginning of service
or the end of service. The first case means that abandonments will not occur once
service has commenced, whereas in the second case they can also occur during
service. It is the second variation which we consider within the models in this
thesis, namely abandonments may occur during service.
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There is a large collection of work which must be distinguished from the mod-
elling approach adopted within this thesis. In this work the notion of limited
availability of a collection of jobs is modelled as a set of hard deadlines known to
the controller of the system. These deadlines are either announced upon arrival
into the system in the case of queueing systems or announced at the beginning
of the scheduling horizon in the case of a clearing system. The system controller
takes these deadlines into account when considering scheduling policies, often as
the objective reflects some measure of missed deadlines or tardiness. For impor-
tant examples, see Liu & Layland (1973), Glazebrook (1983), Panwar et al. (1988),
Bhattacharya & Ephremides (1989), Bhattacharya & Ephremides (1991), De et al.
(1991), Jiang et al. (1996), Doytchinov et al. (2001), Jang & Klein (2002), and
Van Mieghem (2003).
From these works, Panwar et al. (1988) study the transmission of voice packets
over a packet-switched network. They model the problem using a single server
queue in which service times of customers are i.i.d random variables and service
is nonpreemptive. Each customer upon arrival announces a deadline which is
randomly drawn from a general probability distribution, independent of other
customer deadlines. This gives rise to an extinction time for each customer whereby
if their service has not begun by this extinction time this is equivalent to a voice-
packet being deemed useless. They showed that the shortest time to extinction
(STE) policy maximises the long-run fraction of successful customers if the server
is prohibited from idling. Each time the server is available for service this policy
schedules the customer closest to its extinction time. When the server is allowed
to idle, they also show that when it exists the optimal policy belongs to the class
of policies which are shortest time to extinction with unforced idling (STEI). This
problem is also studied by Bhattacharya & Ephremides (1989), wherein they show
that STE minimises the expected number of lost customers over any time interval
within the class of nonpreemptive and non-idling policies under exponential service.
They also show that the optimal policy with permitted idling belongs to the class
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of STEI policies when available. The STE policy is also shown to be optimal in
the case of preemptive service. In this case idling is never preferable. In a similar
problem, Bhattacharya & Ephremides (1991) also show that a form of the shortest
time to extinction policy minimises the average tardiness per customer in a two-
queue problem where customers remain in the queue and are scheduled beyond
their deadline, but incur a penalty for doing so.
In contrast to the case of known deadlines of jobs or customers, there are
many situations in which availability is unknown prior to service. Work exhibiting
this feature of unknown and random deadlines until abandonment is of particular
interest in this thesis given the lifetimes of suspects in surveillance applications are
generally unknown. In the literature, typically deadlines of jobs are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed random variables, with this distribution
known by the system controller, and exact realisations of which are not known
until the deadline passes. There are three examples of this feature in the papers
by Pinedo (1983), Boxma & Forst (1986), and Emmons & Pinedo (1990) which
study clearing systems. Pinedo (1983) considered a problem in which a collection of
jobs are to be processed on a single machine. Processing times are i.i.d exponential
random variables with rate µi, deadlines are i.i.d random variables, and processing
is nonpreemptive. Each job has a weight wi which can be interpreted as a penalty
paid for completion after its deadline. Static list scheduling policies are considered,
which means that all jobs are ordered at time zero and scheduled according to this
order. The order is never changed which means all jobs, including those whose
deadline has passed, must be processed. Processing jobs in decreasing order of wiµi
was shown to minimise the expected weighted number of tardy jobs. Boxma &
Forst (1986) studied further variations of this problem. Emmons & Pinedo (1990)
extend this problem to multiple servers and also consider dynamic policies which
can modify scheduling decisions in light of new information. Both papers identify
optimal dynamic or list policies subject to certain conditions. An example from a
queueing system is found in Bhattacharya & Ephremides (1989). An extension to
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the known deadline problem in the same paper discussed previously, for i.i.d service
times and i.i.d random unknown deadlines with increasing failure rate, the earliest
arrival (EA) policy minimises the expected number of lost customers over any time
interval when deadlines apply to the beginning of service. The same result holds
when deadlines apply to the end of service provided the common distribution of
service times is exponential.
In the clearing models studied by Pinedo (1983) and Boxma & Forst (1986) jobs
did not depart the system upon expiration of their deadlines, but instead were still
processed with a penalty for tardiness. This clearing model is further studied by
Glazebrook et al. (2004) with the exception that jobs are lost from the system as
soon as their lifetime expires. A collection of n jobs, present at time zero, are to be
processed nonpreemptively on a single machine. The processing time of each job is
an arbitrary random variable and jobs remain in the system for an exponentially
distributed period of time unless processing begins first, meaning jobs do not
abandon during service. A reward is received upon completion of a job and the
objective is to find a scheduling policy which maximises the total expected reward
earned. The authors develop a permutation policy which orders the jobs according
to decreasing values of an index which favours large reward-rate losses and small
mean processing times. This index is given by Rjθj/E(Xj), where Rj, θj, and Xj
represent the reward, abandonment rate, and processing time of job j respectively.
This policy is shown to be asymptotically optimal as abandonment rates all go
to zero. Motivated by the use of limited medical resources in a mass casualty
emergency, Argon et al. (2008) also study this problem, assuming jobs are placed
into a number of priority classes after a triage assessment of patients is conducted.
With the objective of maximising the number of jobs taken into service, if lifetimes
admit the same hazard rate ordering as a likelihood ratio ordering on service times,
the optimal policy gives priority to the job with shortest lifetime and service time.
Such jobs are referred to as time-critical. For the case of exponential lifetimes and
service times in which jobs with shorter lifetimes have longer service times, the
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authors note that the optimal policy has a more complex structure. They develop
a state-dependent heuristic known as the triangular heuristic which at each point
prioritises the job class with the smallest mean number of abandonments during
the next service.
One further contribution to the clearing model discussed is by Li & Glazebrook
(2010). In this paper the authors note that the static priority policy proposed in
Glazebrook et al. (2004) and the heuristic policy proposed in Argon et al. (2008)
both perform well in certain parameter regimes, but are not robust, performing
poorly in other parameter regimes. The authors take a somewhat different ap-
proach in their design of a heuristic policy. Allowing for arbitrary i.i.d service
times and lifetimes within job classes, they use the concept of policy improve-
ment from the field of stochastic dynamic programming in order to define a policy
which improves the static priority policy in Glazebrook et al. (2004). Such a
method quickly becomes computationally intractable with many job classes and
certain distributional assumptions. Instead they adopt an approximate policy im-
provement step to define a heuristic policy, using a fluid model to approximate
necessary quantities. The resulting heuristic policy is shown to be both robust
and outperform the competitor policies in all parameter regimes over an extensive
set of numerical experiments. One final application of scheduling in a clearing
system with abandonment worth considering is by Glazebrook & Mitchell (2002).
In this paper, jobs in the system improve while being processed and deteriorate
while not being processed, hence affecting the reward yielding characteristics of
job completion. With an objective of maximising the total discounted reward from
job completions, this problem can be modelled as a restless bandit problem. A
variation of the model covers the situation where jobs abandon the system once
they reach a certain state. The authors show that the problem is indexable in the
sense of Whittle and develop an index policy with strong performance. It must be
highlighted here that the models studied in Glazebrook et al. (2004), Argon et al.
(2008), and Li & Glazebrook (2010) are all similar to the model which we study in
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Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. However, one key difference is that these models
consider a finite set of jobs to be processed as opposed to allowing for the arrival
of jobs over time. Hence we will now restrict attention solely to queueing systems
with abandonment.
There have been a number of contributions in the areas of admission and
routing control problems which feature customer abandonments. Ward & Ku-
mar (2008) study admission control in a G/G/1 queue in which customers have
i.i.d exponential patience times until the end of service. With the objective of min-
imising the long-run discounted cost from penalties for refusing to admit arriving
customers plus costs from customer abandonments, a barrier policy is shown to be
asymptotically optimal in an appropriate heavy traffic regime. Movaghar (1998)
and Movaghar (2005) study two variations of a routing problem which concerns
the routing of a stream of Poisson arrivals with exponential service requirements
and random deadlines to a collection of identical queues. With exponentially dis-
tributed lifetimes, the policy of joining the shortest non-full queue minimises the
number of customers lost by any time. With generally distributed lifetimes a con-
dition is provided under which the policy of joining the shortest queue minimises
the number of lost customers during any finite period in the long-run. Glazebrook
et al. (2009) study a problem of both admission and routing control in which a
Poisson arrival stream is either refused entry to the system or routed to one of
a number of heterogeneous service stations. The model incorporates rewards for
service completions, penalties for denied admissions, and costs for customer aban-
donments. An approach founded on the restless bandit problem is used to derive
an index policy for maximising the net of rewards minus penalties and costs. This
index policy is shown to be optimal in a number of asymptotic regimes.
In the context of the vast literature related to call centre applications, Bas-
samboo et al. (2005) study a problem of admission control of impatient customers
to a collection of customer classes whilst simultaneously controlling the alloca-
tion of a group of identical server pools to the set of customer classes. Arrival
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rates are permitted to vary and the skills of servers in each pool determine which
customer classes they are able to serve in. There are penalties incurred for each
customer refused admission to the system, penalties for abandonment, and holding
costs whilst waiting for service. The objective is to find dynamic controls which
minimise the expected total cost incurred over a finite horizon. In an asymptotic
parameter regime, an approximating stochastic fluid model is solved by means
of a linear program and shown to give an asymptotically optimal control in the
original problem. Similar methods and results are found in the subsequent paper
by Bassamboo et al. (2006) which replaces the admission control problem with
a staffing problem relating to how many servers should be employed within each
server pool at the expense of associated personnel costs. Jouini et al. (2010) study
an interesting problem of a call centre with two queues and many parallel servers
populated by two types of impatient customer, premium and regular. The objec-
tive is to develop scheduling policies which satisfy a target ratio constraint on the
abandonment probabilities of premium customers to regular ones. Two paramet-
ric families of scheduling policies are developed with respect to this aim, the first
being based on routing of customers under a fixed server allocation policy, and the
second based on allocation of servers to waiting customers under a fixed routing
policy.
An example application related to Homeland Security is presented by Lin et al.
(2009). In this paper, a single server queue with abandonment is used to model
an antiterrorist surveillance system in which suspects arriving into a public area
are subject to screening by a security team. There are two types of customer, each
with their own random variable representing their lifetime in the system during
which they are available for service. One type represents terrorist suspects which
are the sole interest of the security team, whereas the other type are civilians
and are not of interest. Each arriving customer is independently a terrorist with
some probability and the server receives a reward for serving this customer type
before their lifetime expires. The objective of the server is to find a scheduling
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policy which maximises the expected reward received. The authors show that the
optimal policy in the case of exponentially distributed lifetimes is to serve first
come first served (FCFS) or last come first served (LCFS) dependent on the ratio
of the mean lifetime of the terrorists compared to the civilians. Gaver et al. (2006)
consider a multiclass queueing system in a military setting. Customers arrive
at random into one of a number of customer classes with i.i.d random service
requirements and i.i.d exponential lifetimes. These customers represent enemy
targets who may move out of range of a defensive force. Service completions yield
rewards and the objective is to maximise the long-run average reward earned by the
server. Versions of the model are presented which allow for the cases where both
abandonments and/or service completions are not observed by the server during
service. The main challenge in this paper is to decide both which customer to serve
next and how much processing time to allocate to that customer. For the case of
a single customer class the authors propose a heuristic which allocates a constant
processing time to each customer. For the case of multiple customer classes the
authors propose three heuristics, two of which extend the constant processing time
idea, and one which myopically maximises the ratio between the expected reward
received and expected reward lost during the next service. Glazebrook & Punton
(2008) further study the problem of allocating processing times in a single customer
class with the objective of maximising the throughput of the system. The authors
develop two heuristic dynamic scheduling policies which allocate processing times
based on the state of the system using DP policy improvement. These heuristics
are shown to be near-optimal and improve upon the static policy in Gaver et al.
(2006) in a number of numerical experiments.
There are a number of papers which are of direct relevance to this thesis as they
study either the same model or minor variations of the scheduling model featured in
Chapters 3 and 4. Glazebrook et al. (2004) study the same model in which a single
server provides preemptive service to customers across k classes. Customers arrive
according to independent Poisson processes with rate λj with class dependent
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exponentially distributed service requirements and lifetimes, with corresponding
rates µj and θj respectively. If a customer is served before his lifetime expires,
a reward Rj is received, otherwise the customer departs the system both before
or during service. The objective is to find a service policy which maximises the
long-run average reward earned per unit time. In principle it is possible to find
the optimal policy from the methods of DP, but in practice this is unrealistic
for problems with many customer classes. The authors develop a heuristic policy
via a two stage process. The first stage analyses a policy which allocates a fixed
service effort to each class at all times, and computes the optimal allocation,
and the second stage second stage performs an exact policy improvement step.
The parametric optimisation involved at the first stage can pose computational
challenges, especially for large k, and was only implemented for cases with k = 2.
However, the approach does have the advantage that the structure of the resulting
heuristic policy is simple to recover.
A variation of this model with many servers is studied by Atar et al. (2010)
and further in Atar et al. (2011). In addition, as opposed to rewards for service
completion, each customer incurs a class-dependent holding cost cj for each unit
of time spent waiting in the queue and the objective is to minimise the long-run
average holding cost. In their model, customers cannot abandon during service
and holding costs do not apply during service. This stands in contrast to the model
in this thesis and are features of their model. The authors use a fluid scaling in
an overload setting and show that the cµ/θ rule is asymptotically fluid optimal
under both preemptive and nonpreemptive service. Here overload refers to the
workload defined as ρ =
∑
j λj/µj being greater than one. This rule calculates
the index cjµj/θj for each queue and prioritises customers according to decreasing
values of this index. This index rule is remarkably simple and independent of the
arrival rates, resembling and modifying the cµ rule which is optimal in the case
of no abandonments. The index rule easily extends to the case where additional
penalties are incurred for abandonments. Ayesta et al. (2011) study a single server
48
version of this model in discrete time with no arrivals, but allow the customer in
service to contribute a holding cost. The authors find the optimal solution to
a relaxed version of the problem via Lagrangian methods which yields an index
policy referred to as the AJN rule. The AJN rule has a similar form to the cµ/θ rule
and is used as a heuristic for the continuous-time problem with arrivals, exhibiting
strong performance numerically in overload scenarios.
A version of the model with two customer classes was studied by Down et al.
(2011). Abandonments may occur during service which is preemptive and pro-
vided at rate 1. Two problems were studied, firstly maximising average rewards
received from service completions, and secondly minimising average net holding
costs plus penalties from abandonment. In both cases, a priority policy is shown
to be optimal if parameters of the system are agreeably ordered in an underloaded
regime. However, more generally numerical examples illustrate that optimal poli-
cies can exhibit a threshold structure, leading to the poor performance of priority
policies. Verloop (2014) studies a k class multiserver version of the model as a
special case of a more general restless bandit model. In addition to the model in
Atar et al. (2010), a more general framework is presented in which customers can
abandon during service at different class dependent rates and also incur different
class dependent holding costs and abandonment penalties whilst in service. An
index policy is derived which is shown via fluid-scaling techniques and LP results
to be asymptotically optimal in overload for minimising the long-run average cost.
In special cases this index policy coincides with both the cµ/θ rule and the AJN
rule. The latter coincidence provides a proof of asymptotic optimality of the AJN-
rule in overload for a continuous-time system with arrivals. A single server version
of the full holding cost and abandonment penalty model in Verloop (2014) with
preemptive service is studied by Larran˜aga et al. (2014). In terms of the restless
bandit literature, the problem is shown to be indexable and the corresponding
Whittle index (see Whittle (1988)) is derived, allowing for convex holding costs.
In the case of linear holding costs the Whittle index policy is equivalent to the in-
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dex policy derived by Verloop (2014) which subsequently shows that the cµ/θ rule
and the AJN rule are themselves Whittle index policies which are asymptotically
optimal in overload.
In an earlier paper, Larran˜aga et al. (2013) study the same problem through a
fluid control problem. The optimal solution in an overload setting coincides with
the same index policy derived in Larran˜aga et al. (2014). In underload where ρ < 1,
the fluid control problem is solved optimally for the case of two customer classes.
The optimal solution exhibits a switching curve structure whereby service is decided
through the cµ rule when the system is closer to being empty, whereas service is
decided through the cµ/θ rule when the system has many customers. Numerical
evidence suggests that the optimal policy in the original stochastic problem also
exhibits this structure and the switching curve is well approximated by the fluid
model. This motivates a heuristic policy based on this observation for systems
with more customer classes. There are further contributions in the papers by
Harrison & Zeevi (2004), Ata & Tongarlak (2013), and Kim & Ward (2012) which
study approximating Brownian control models in different heavy traffic limits. The
latter article considers general arrival, service, and abandonment processes. These
papers show that optimal policies in the Brownian control problems are state
dependent and assign service based on the changing workload in the system. This
is opposed to static priority rules such as the cµ rule and index rule derived by
Verloop (2014) which use fixed indices at all time points to assign service and the
only state information used is knowledge of whether a queue is empty.
In the model which will be the focus of Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, the
literature suggests that although the cµ/θ rule will perform well in highly loaded
systems which will contain many customers in steady state, it is not guaranteed
to perform well across all loads. Alternatively, comparatively little is known about
lighter loaded systems. The observed structure of the optimal policy suggests good
performance of the cµ rule, although there are no results which guarantee this
apart from in the case of no abandonments. Furthermore, there is potential value
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in developing service policies which are not simply priority policies, induce the
potential for state dependent decisions, and work well in all parameter regimes.
The model and analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis will shed further light
on these observations.
2.3 Defender-Attacker Problems
There are many scenarios in which defensive agents are faced with adversarial
attacking agents. Patrollers, security forces, or the government may all be seen
as defensive agents whereas terrorists, smugglers, and criminals are examples of
attacking agents, each within a given context. The term we adopt here to refer to
such scenarios is defender-attacker problems. This is an umbrella term designed
to refer to scenarios in which there are two decision-making agents with opposed
objectives, one looking to protect or defend and the other looking to attack, dam-
age, evade, or destroy. The context in which different scenarios arise describes
the domain in which these agents operate and over which there is mutual inter-
est. The domain can often lead to alternative and sometimes more informative
descriptions such as security games, interdiction games, patrol games, and search
games and can be found across a wide range of fields such as computer science,
artificial intelligence, machine learning, operations research, and game theory.
In many systems, the decisions required from a defensive perspective occur
under the uncertainty of future events and the effect of making certain decisions.
This is of particular importance when uncertainty characterises some form of risk,
threat, or vulnerability in the system which the defender wishes to protect against.
In order to best account for the uncertainty of events outside his control, a defen-
sive agent must also consider how such uncertainty occurs and hence the type of
threat being faced. For example, a defensive agent seeking to protect infrastructure
from the effects of an accident or natural disaster is faced with a random event.
Alternatively, when protecting infrastructure from an attack, the defensive agent
is faced with an intentional event. In these two situations Bier (2006) argues that
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“protecting against intentional attacks is fundamentally different from protecting
against accidents or acts of nature”. Furthermore, this paper discusses the fact
that intentional attacks are the product of intelligent and adaptable adversaries
who take defensive efforts into account when planning their attacks. The role of
game theory is highlighted as an essential tool for modelling and analysing such
strategic threats. Unsurprisingly then, game theoretic ideas form a critical part
of most defender-attacker problems in the literature. The paper by Golany et al.
(2009) shares this view, stating that decision-making is somewhat different when
faced with probabilistic and strategic risk, where the latter type can be addressed
using game theory. The authors illustrate this through a case study of home-
land security grant allocations in the United States. They consider the problem
of a decision-maker allocating a fixed budget over many sites to reduce the ex-
pected damage from uncertain events when this uncertainty is either probabilistic
or strategic. No allocation to a site results in maximal probability of an undesired
event, whereas increasing an allocation reduces this. The probabilistic and strate-
gic risk problems are shown to have similar formulations, but a stark difference in
the optimal allocations made. Under probabilistic risk, the decision-maker must
prioritise his budget and allocate in the highest impact sites. Under strategic risk
it is best to spread the budget among sites, decreasing the damage levels of the
most vulnerable sites first.
The vulnerability of critical infrastructure in the United States is considered
in the paper by Brown et al. (2006). Given the scale of investment in critical
infrastructure systems and their importance, any disruption to a system can have
a substantial impact. The authors state that “random component failures offer a
poor paradigm in a world with intelligent adversaries”, which is consistent with
the view expressed by both Bier (2006) and Golany et al. (2009). Moreover, the
authors discuss the ability of terrorist organisations to collect relevant informa-
tion about a range of features and use this to plan devastating attacks on an
infrastructure system. The observation is made that most civilian infrastructure
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is “soft” and so vulnerable. Golany et al. (2009) share this observation, referring
to exposed homeland security assets whereby terrorists can attack in amongst the
public, move around like ordinary citizens, and conduct valuable surveillance of
defensive operations which allows them to assess with high accuracy their own
chances of causing damage. Brown et al. (2006) state the importance of worst
case analysis in defender-attack problems. Given the uncertainty over the exact
knowledge and capabilities of attackers it is prudent to assume the attacker will
act to maximise damage and has all the information and capabilities needed to do
so.
This paper considers three variations of the general defender-attacker problem.
Defender-attacker problems or conversely attacker-defender problems are formu-
lated as bilevel programs which themselves are a type of Stackelberg or sequential
game. In a Stackelberg game, one agent makes the first decision and hence is
referred to as the leader and the other agent makes the second decision and is
referred to as the follower. Having observed the first decision, the follower opti-
mally decides upon a best response. Importantly, the leader possesses a perfect
model which anticipates how the follower will best respond to his decision and
consequently make his decision to his own best advantage. This setup is con-
sistent with the observation that an attacker is able to conduct surveillance of
defensive decisions before attacking. A defender-attacker-defender problem is a
three stage sequential game in which, for example, the defender makes an initial
decision which precedes the final two stages. The paper gives details of how to
model these problems and illustrates their use through three examples: protection
of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, border control on the US/Mexico border,
and protection of an electric power grid. On reflection the authors highlight the
potential significance of deception and secrecy as a tool for successful defence.
A three stage sequential game between a defender and an attacker is studied
by Carlyle et al. (2011). A defensive planner wishes to design parallel service
channels knowing that an intelligent attacker will attempt to maximise disruption
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in the system. For example, should a community have one large hospital with
economies of scale in operating costs or a few smaller hospitals which may be
more resilient to disruption. The problem models the service channels as parallel
M/M/1 queues and the ultimate decision for the defender is how to allocate a fixed
service capacity to these queues. After this allocation is made an attacker disrupts
the system by reducing these service capacities, then finally the defender routes
jobs through the system under the reduced capacities to maximise throughput of
jobs. When attacks are incremental in nature, meaning that service channels are
not fully destroyed, it is optimal to concentrate service capacity in one large server
to exploit associated economies of scale. This would be equivalent to planning a
single large hospital. When attacks are more destructive, such that an attack can
destroy an entire service channel, planning is more difficult. Under certain con-
ditions the attacker wishes to concentrate attacks whereby the defender responds
by completely distributing capacity, for example by planning many smaller hospi-
tals. Under other conditions the attacker wishes to distribute attacks and so the
defender responds by concentrating capacity in one large server. Here a detailed
understanding of attacker capabilities is imperative for optimising defence plans.
An interesting example of a defender-attacker problem is due to Wein & Baveja
(2005) who studied the potential security threat of visitors entering the United
States. Under the US-VISIT Program, visitors are fingerprinted when they enter
the United States and matched and scored against a watchlist containing millions
of fingerprints of known criminals and suspected terrorists. When a fingerprint
closely matches with one on the watchlist, the visitor is further investigated. The
performance of the biometric matching system is known to be dependent upon the
image quality of the fingerprint. The authors identify an opportunity for terror-
ists to exploit this fact by sending people with either worn fingers or deliberately
altered fingers in order to have low image quality fingerprints and more chance of
evading a match. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the
biometric identification strategy is first set to maximise detection probability sub-
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ject to a constraint on processing times of visitors and the terrorist then chooses his
image quality to minimise his detection probability. The results suggest alternative
strategies for the defender which lead to large increases in detection probability
when compared to the existing strategy in use under the assumption of a strategic
attacker. Another interesting defender-attacker problem is studied in Brown et al.
(2009). In this paper a proliferator seeks to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as
possible and an interdictor wishes to maximally delay this project. In some sense
the roles of attacker and defender are reversed in this problem since the interdictor
corresponds to a nation attempting to delay the project through seemingly attack
like actions. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game since the prolifer-
ator is able to observe the interdiction plan and adjust his own plan accordingly,
hence the interdictor must take this into account. An algorithm based on Benders
decomposition (see Benders (1962)) is presented to solve a detailed model which
incorporates case study data.
It is evident from the literature previously discussed that Stackelberg games are
commonly adopted to model defender-attacker problems since they can account for
the ability of an attacker to gather information about defensive strategies before
initiating their attack. Stackelberg games have been used extensively to model
defender-attacker problems in security domains and consequently the term security
game is often used here. In security domains, defensive measures often take the
form of a schedule which is repeated over time. For example, a police patrol around
an urban area looking for a criminal may take a specified route around a set of
locations every few hours and repeat this schedule. To guard against an intelligent
attacker observing and hence exploiting this deterministic behaviour, the patroller
may decide to randomise his route. However, Ordo´nez et al. (2013) discuss the
difficulty in effectively randomising, citing the potential for humans to fall into
predictable patterns and so the need for game theoretic approaches to finding good
randomisation strategies.
The objective in Stackelberg games is to find the optimal mixed strategy for
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the leader to commit to given an optimal response of the follower. Conitzer &
Sandholm (2006) state that in the special case of zero-sum games, the optimal
mixed strategy to commit to is a minimax strategy. This means that zero-sum
Stackelberg games can be considered as standard simultaneous move games and
hence solved through LP methods. This is no longer true for general-sum games.
In the extension to general-sum games, the authors show that LP can also be
used to compute the optimal mixed strategy to commit to. This amounts to solv-
ing multiple linear programs in which the leader maximises his payoff under the
constraint of a pure strategy response of the follower. A further extension is the
concept of a Bayesian Stackelberg game in which there are multiple leader and
follower types, where the leader has incomplete information regarding the follower
type and subsequent payoffs in the game. Paruchuri et al. (2008) study Bayesian
Stackelberg games for security in which there is a single defender type and multi-
ple attacker types. Pita et al. (2008) illustrate that defender-attacker problems in
security domains are well modelled as Bayesian Stackelberg games, owing to their
flexibility in capturing multiple attacker types and the ability to weigh different
targets according to their significance. Whereas the method of Conitzer & Sand-
holm (2006) is computationally intractable for these security games, Paruchuri
et al. (2008) develop an efficient exact algorithm known as DOBSS (Decomposed
Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver) for finding the optimal mixed strategy to
commit to. This method involves formulating and solving a single mixed integer
linear program.
There have been some notable examples of the Bayesian Stackelberg game ap-
proach to defender-attacker problems in real-world security domains. Pita et al.
(2008) developed a software assistant known as ARMOR which has been deployed
at LAX airport in Los Angeles since 2007 to randomise checkpoints on inbound
roads to the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals. These
problems are modelled alongside security experts as Bayesian Stackelberg games
and subsequently solved using the DOBSS algorithm. The system enumerates
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every possible pure strategy in the game for both defender and attacker, which
for the defender corresponds to how resources can be allocated among targets.
Subjective assessments of the rewards to each player of each pure strategy combi-
nation and attacker type embeds the ability to weigh the significance of each event.
These rewards are not equal in magnitude and so the game is general-sum. Tsai
et al. (2009) developed a software scheduling assistant known as IRIS for the Fed-
eral Air Marshal Service to randomise air marshal schedules aboard United States
commercial flights. In this security domain, the set of attacker targets corresponds
to tens of thousands of commercial flights each day and the set of defender strate-
gies is how to schedule a fixed number of air marshals over all flights. Alongside
scheduling constraints specific to the transportation network domain, this scale of
problem cannot be addressed using the approach in ARMOR. In a closely related
paper, Kiekintveld et al. (2009) study large Bayesian Stackelberg games motivated
by the same security domain. The key idea is to consider a compact form of the
game which subsequently scales well to large problems. The authors develop ef-
ficient algorithms for these compact form games, exploiting payoff structure and
incorporating realistic scheduling constraints. The IRIS system uses this modelling
approach together with a preference elicitation system for experts to determine the
general-sum payoffs in the game. The algorithms from Kiekintveld et al. (2009)
solve the resulting game efficiently. Pita et al. (2011) developed an application
called GUARDS for the United States Transportation Security Administration to
assist in randomising security resource allocation to tasks in the protection of over
400 airports. This problem considered heterogeneous security activities, for ex-
ample perimeter patrols or baggage screening, as well as heterogeneous attacker
modes, for example an outside attack or a suitcase bomb. The approach involved
detailed modelling of strategies and payoffs using expert knowledge as well as a
compact form representation which enabled solution through the DOBSS algo-
rithm. Shieh et al. (2012) developed a system called PROTECT for scheduling
randomised patrols for the United States Coast Guard in the port of Boston. This
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problem divides the port into a number of patrol areas over which a patroller must
decide both an order to visit and a set of activities to perform over this route,
ensuring the route starts and ends with the same area. The authors determine a
method for a compact form representation for increased computational efficiency.
A key feature of this problem is the assumption of an attacker who is not per-
fectly rational in his choices, for which an optimal randomised patrol schedule is
computed using the work of Yang et al. (2012).
A common feature of these real-world security systems (ARMOR, IRIS, GUARDS,
PROTECT) is the considerable amount of calibration required to formulate a rel-
evant Bayesian Stackelberg game which accurately represents the respective secu-
rity domain. Critical to the success of those systems was the integration of expert
knowledge of each domain to reduce the size of each problem and specify the
required general-sum payoffs in the game. In contrast, the defensive surveillance
scenarios we consider within Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis involve an infinite num-
ber of unique pure strategies available to the defender, each with its own unique
impact upon targets in the system. Consequently there is no obvious possibility
of representing the problems there in a compact form to ease the computational
challenge. Furthermore, the complex nature of both the domain and the defensive
pure strategies is such that subjective assessment of payoff values is unlikely to be
possible. Subsequently, payoff values under the joint pure strategies of defender
and attacker are given as probabilities which must be either computed exactly or
accurately estimated within a queueing system model of the domain of interest.
Even for a finite set of defender pure strategies this can be time consuming. Al-
though the models in this thesis allow for the ability to weigh targets differently
dependent on their significance, the valuation of these targets is common to both
the defender and attacker and hence we consider zero-sum games. Furthermore,
in the surveillance scenarios considered in this thesis, the attacker is unable to
observe the defensive strategies deployed, hence we analyse them as simultaneous
move games.
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An example of a zero-sum defender-attacker problem with simultaneous moves
is studied by McMahan et al. (2003). This paper considers planning a route for
a robot to navigate a known environment to reach a goal location whilst avoiding
detection by sensors placed within the environment by an adversary. A MDP
model describes the movement of the robot through the environment, whilst a
specific placement of sensors imposes a specific cost vector upon the MDP. For
a known set of placements, and so known cost vector, the planner (defender)
can determine a route which minimises the observability through MDP methods.
However, the adversary chooses a sensor placement to maximise the observability.
The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game in which the pure strategies of
the adversary correspond to a finite set of cost vectors and the pure strategies
of the adversary correspond to a finite set of deterministic policies for the MDP.
The authors develop an iterative algorithm based on Benders decomposition which
utilises what they term an Oracle. Given any cost vector, the Oracle provides an
optimal policy with respect to that cost vector. The iterative algorithm finds an
optimal mixed strategy for the adversary given a subset of policies available to the
planner and then uses the Oracle to provide a best response policy for the planner
to this adversarial mixed strategy and adds this new policy to the policy set. The
algorithm proceeds in this way, trading best responses back and forth, until the
Oracle provides a policy the planner already has. The algorithm converges to the
optimal mixed strategies for each player due to the corresponding convergence of
Benders algorithm. This is referred to as a single Oracle algorithm since only the
planner possesses an Oracle. In the case where the set of cost vectors available to
the adversary is large, the authors develop and prove convergence of an analogous
double Oracle algorithm in which both players possess an Oracle. Another example
of use of a double Oracle algorithm is found in Tsai et al. (2014) in a problem in
which a defensive force attempts to prevent the spread of a malign influence in a
social network. Here approximate Oracles are used since computing best responses
is not practical.
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A paper which provides strong motivation for methods within this thesis is due
to Lin et al. (2013). They consider a patrol problem in which a patroller traverses
the edges of a graph whose nodes are potential targets for an attacker. The pa-
trol problem reflects real scenarios such as a security guard patrolling a museum
or soldiers patrolling borders and the structure of the graph model reflects the
underlying topology of the domain in question. Attacks at nodes take random
amounts of time to complete and costs are incurred if they are not detected by the
time they complete. The objective is to design a patrol policy which minimises
the expected cost incurred by the attacker. The approach of the authors is first to
model the case of random attackers who choose which node to attack according
to a probability distribution known to the patroller. They then consider the case
of strategic attackers who intelligently choose which node to attack in a zero-sum
game with the patroller. The insights and methods derived from the random at-
tacker case lead to effective methods for the strategic attacker case. In the random
attacker case, the problem is formulated as a MDP which can be solved optimally
for small size problems, but larger problems become computationally intractable
due to the exponential growth of the state space with an increasing number of
nodes. Consequently, the authors develop effective index-based heuristic policies.
In the strategic attacker case, similar computational problems exist for finding
an optimal patrol policy and so an effective heuristic policy is proposed which
randomises over a feasible set of patrol policies. The feasible set is constructed
in an iterative manner based on Fictitious Play (FP). In a given round, the at-
tacker identifies a mixed strategy based on a best response to the history of patrol
policies used by the patroller in previous rounds. The patroller interprets this
mixed strategy as the attacker choosing which node to attack according to the
corresponding probability distribution. This relates to the random attacker case
in which the best response of the patroller is given by the index-based heuristic.
The set of patrol policies revealed by this iterative procedure is used in a matrix
game with the attacker, the solution of which gives a heuristic randomised patrol
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strategy which is shown to exhibit near-optimal performance in numerical exper-
iments. An extension to this work by Lin et al. (2014) allows for the possibility
of overlooking, whereby there is a chance the attacker is not detected, even if the
patroller inspects the node under attack. The authors adopt the same approach
of random and strategic attacker problems in this more difficult problem. In the
strategic attacker problem, the iterative method of constructing a feasible patrol
set is more efficient than the method based on FP. The method used is analogous
to the single Oracle algorithm of McMahan et al. (2003), since the mixed strategy
of the attacker in a given round is now computed as the best response to the patrol
policies currently available to the patroller. The difference with the algorithm of
McMahan et al. (2003) concerns the use of a heuristic as opposed to a best response
Oracle.
Although the inherent features of the defensive surveillance scenarios we con-
sider within this thesis are somewhat different to the patrol scenarios considered
by Lin et al. (2013) and Lin et al. (2014), there are elements which are similar.
For example, a specific patrol policy will have some performance impact upon each
target in the system in terms of what the adversary will achieve if he attacks that
target. The patroller is concerned with protecting against any possible decision
the adversary could make. Embedded within the strategic attacker problem, the
random attacker problem was a mechanism with which to best protect against a
variety of adversarial decisions. In essence, this is similar to the defensive surveil-
lance scenario in Chapter 5 of this thesis and so we adopt the same paradigm of
utilising a random adversary problem within a strategic adversary problem. Chap-
ters 3 and 4 are analogous to the random attacker problem and are interesting
within their own right. Chapter 5 is analogous to the strategic attacker problem
and draws upon the insights of the random adversary case in earlier chapters.
The work by Lin et al. and Shieh et al. are examples of patrol games, a
further example of which is given by Alpern et al. (2011). There are a number of
other notable related problems worthy of consideration which use a game-theoretic
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framework to study the interaction between forms of defenders and attackers. In
search games, a searcher wishes to minimise the time taken to find a hider who does
not want to be found on a network or in a region, for example see Alpern & Gal
(2003). In inspection games (see Avenhaus & Canty (2002)), an inspector wishes
to verify that an inspectee adheres to certain legal rules, for example in an arms
control treaty which the inspectee may benefit from violating. In interdiction or
infiltration games, an intruder wishes to maximise his probability of penetrating
a sensitive area protected by a guard who wishes to minimise this probability,
see Washburn & Wood (1995), Auger (1991), and Alpern (1992) for examples.
In accumulation games, a hider distributes material over a set of locations and
a seeker searches over these locations to confiscate the material, for example see
Kikuta & Ruckle (2002). These are selected examples of what is a large and






In this chapter we consider a stochastic scheduling problem with customer aban-
donments based upon the mathematical model outlined in Chapter 1 for defensive
surveillance. We describe the model in this chapter for clarity. We consider a set-
ting in which a single server must preemptively serve impatient customers spread
across k customer classes. We can imagine every customer class residing in one
queue or equivalently the case where each class corresponds to a separate queue.
Different classes of customers arrive according to independent Poisson processes,
with the arrival rate being λj for class j customers, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The service time
for a class j customer is given by a random variable which follows an exponential
distribution with rate µj. A class j customer, however, will only remain available
for service for a random time that follows an exponential distribution with rate
θj, after which the customer will abandon the system, whether the customer is
still waiting in the queue or already in service. If a class j customer is served
to completion, then a reward Rj is earned, but if he abandons the system before
service completion, then a penalty Dj is incurred. In addition, each class i cus-
tomer in the system incurs a linear holding cost at rate cj per time unit. All of the
parameters listed are assumed to be strictly positive, unless stated otherwise. We
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seek to determine a service policy that maximises the long-run reward rate earned
net of penalties and holding costs incurred.
The random adversary defensive surveillance scenario presented in Chapter
1 will be shown to be a special case of this model in which the penalties for
abandonment are viewed as damages the adversary can inflict. Minimising the
probability of abandonment or expected damage inflicted by the adversary is shown
to be equivalent to minimising the long-run pure penalty rate, which itself is a
special case of the general reward, penalty, and holding cost model described.
This is achieved through a suitable definition of the penalty Dj, related to the
random attack configuration of the adversary. We will discuss this connection
and further the equivalence of finding a policy which maximises the long-run pure
reward rate with similarly suitably defined rewards, which will be the main focus
of this chapter.
3.1 Model and MDP Formulation
We develop further the problem of the optimal preemptive scheduling of the mul-
ticlass queueing system described above and formulate it as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP). Recall that our model has three reward parameters. For a class j
customer, there is a reward Rj for service completion, a penalty Dj for customer
abandonment, and a linear holding cost rate cj per unit time, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. If





respectively, the rate of class j service completions and abandonments under pol-
icy pi in steady state, then the optimal long-run system reward rate net of holding












However, the guaranteed stability of the system implies that, for all choices of class
















































(Rjλj − ((Rj +Dj)θj + cj)E[Npij,θ]
)
. (3.6)
Equation (3.4) transforms the original model into an equivalent pure reward model
with Rj + Dj + cj/θj earned upon every class j service completion. Similarly,
equation (3.5) shows an equivalent pure penalty problem with penalty Rj +Dj +
cj/θj incurred upon every class j customer abandonment. Finally, equation (3.6)
shows an equivalent pure holding cost problem with holding cost (Rj+Dj)θj+cj per
unit of time and per class j customer present in the system. Although expressed
as maximisation problems, we could have expressed our original model as one
of minimising the long-run holding cost and penalty rate net of rewards and the
transformed pure forms would then be minimisation problems. Objective values of
policies in the equivalent maximisation and minimisation problems would be equal
up to a sign change. From this discussion we see that any model which features any
combination of rewards, penalties, and holding costs can simply be transformed
into one of the pure forms of the problem and the parameters consolidated into a
single parameter. Without loss of generality, we shall focus on the pure reward
maximisation problem (Dj = cj = 0 for all j) for (almost all of) the remainder of
the chapter.
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We now formulate the pure reward problem as a MDP. Denote the system state
n = (n1, . . . , nk), with nj the number of class j customers present in the system.
We further write n (t) for the system state at time t. Further details of the model
are as follows:
1. Decision epochs occur at time zero and at all transitions of the system state.
2. At each decision epoch, the server must decide which waiting customer to
serve next across all customer classes. The set of admissible actions for state
n 6= 0 is given by
A (n) = {a : na ≥ 1, 1 ≤ a ≤ k} .
Note, A(n) is not defined for n = 0. An action a ∈ A(n) denotes the service
of a class a customer. We use ej for the system state in which only a single
customer of class j is present in the system. We assume the server never
idles when there are customers waiting in the system.
3. In state n 6= 0 under admissible action a ∈ A(n), the effective transition
rate is Λ(n, a) = µa +
∑k
j=1(λj + njθj). Transitions to states n + ej,n− ea,
and n− ei, i 6= a, respectively, occur with probabilities λj{Λ(n, a)}−1, (µa +
naθa){ Λ(n, a)}−1, and niθi{Λ(n, a)}−1. The effective transition rate in the
empty state 0 is Λ(0) =
∑k
j=1 λi with a transition from 0 to state ej occurring
with probability λj{Λ(0)}−1. When a transition from n to n− ea occurs at
a class a service completion, a reward Ra is earned.
4. A service policy is a rule for choosing admissible actions using the history of
the process (past states and actions) only. An admissible, deterministic, sta-
tionary, and Markov policy is determined by a function pi : Nk → {1, . . . , k}
satisfying pi (n) ∈ A (n) ,∀n. The theory of MDPs (see, for example, Chapter
8 of Puterman (1994)) implies that, to determine the optimal policy, it is
sufficient to consider only policies in this class.
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5. The goal of analysis is to choose a policy that will maximise the long-run
reward rate earned or that will come close to doing so.
A standard approach to the determination of -optimal policies is through
the application of DP to a version of the above system with finite state space
×kj=1{0, 1, . . . , Nj}. In this truncated version of the above model, new class i
customers are blocked from entering the system when Ni are already present. The
Nj must be chosen large enough to ensure that this system approximates that
in 1 − 5 well enough for the purpose at hand. This reduction of the state space
facilitates the conversion of the problem to one in discrete time through the process
of uniformisation (see, for example, Lippman (1975) and Serfozo (1979)). We write
∆ =
∑k
j=1 (λj + µj +Njθj), a uniform upper bound on the rate of state transitions
in the finite state system. By the addition of fictitious transitions from a state
to itself, we develop a uniformised system that makes transitions at a uniform
rate ∆. We write V pi (n, t) and V (n, t) for the expected reward earned under the
application of policy pi and an optimal policy, respectively, over t transitions of the
uniformised process, beginning at time zero in system state n. Standard theory
enables us to write V pi (n, t) = g
pi
∆
t+ωpi (n)+o (1) and V (n, t) = g
∆
t+ω (n)+o (1)
as t→∞, where gpi and g are the long-run reward rates or gains earned, and ωpi
and ω the bias functions under application of pi and an optimal policy, respectively.
Bias functions yield an estimate of the transient effect on rewards of the starting
state n and will be further discussed in Chapter 4. Bellman’s equation for the
finite state system can now be written
g
∆











where the p (n′ | n,a) are transition probabilities under the uniformisation. It is
now possible to compute the optimal gain and associated optimal policy for the
finite state approximation by a recursive scheme such as DP value iteration or by
LP. Further details may be found in Chapter 8 of Puterman (1994).
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Although it is possible to formulate our model as a MDP and use standard
methods of DP to compute the optimal policy, since the state space grows expo-
nentially in k, in practice, the computations quickly become intractable for k ≥ 4.
Hence, our focus is to develop strongly performing heuristic policies that require
much less computation, with a preference for operationally simple policies with
strong reward characteristics. The first element of our approach, featured in this
chapter, is the development of a suite of simple priority policies which are effec-
tive across much of the problem’s parameter space. Such policies serve customers
according to a strict priority ordering among the customer classes. An additional
attraction of priority policies is their simple structure, making them operationally
desirable. The second element of our approach which follows from this will be the
feature of Chapter 4. This involves the development of an effective approximate
policy improvement method.
In general, good policies will achieve an appropriate trade-off between securing
high returns from the customers currently available, while avoiding inefficiencies
in processing, most especially when the server is idle. In the case of an overloaded
system, there are almost always many customers present in the system. It is
therefore intuitive that the server should pay little attention to the possibility
of idling, and focus on continuously maximising the instantaneous reward rate.
This can be done by serving according to the Rµ rule, a priority policy that
ranks all customer classes based on the product of reward R and service rate µ,
namely the instantaneous reward rate. The strong performance of this rule in
heavy traffic is shown in the literature in the work of Atar et al. (2010), Ayesta
et al. (2011), Verloop (2014), and Larran˜aga et al. (2014). Although this work
considers variations of the cµ/θ rule in linear holding-cost only models, it is a
consequence of our analysis in equations (3.4) and (3.6) that this is equivalent to
the Rµ rule in our pure-reward model. We must recall here that when we refer to
a rule, we simply refer to a service policy, as discussed on page 66.
Away from heavy traffic, lost reward opportunities due to an empty system
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become a much more important concern. To complement the Rµ rule in the light
traffic case, we present the Rµθ rule which ranks all customer classes based on
the product of R, µ, and the abandonment rate θ. This policy incorporates the
effect abandonments have on each class. This ranking was proposed in Section 2
of Glazebrook et al. (2004) for batch problems and shown to be effective, and we
extend its application to systems with customer arrivals.
Section 3.3 considers the Rµθ rule in greater detail and establishes its asymp-
totic optimality as θ → 0. Section 3.4 describes the extension of this result to
other complex service situations. Section 3.5 compares the Rµθ and the Rµ rules.
Finally, Section 3.6 presents a mechanism to explore local improvements on a given
priority policy. We first discuss in Section 3.2 how the random adversary defensive
surveillance scenario in Chapter 1 is a special case of our model.
3.2 Special Case: Random Adversaries
Recall the mathematical model underlying the three defensive surveillance models
in Chapter 1. An adversary is a potential customer possessing the ability to join
any of the k queues. If the adversary joins queue j then he behaves like every other
customer in the queue, carrying an exponential service requirement with rate µj
and having an exponential lifetime with rate θj. The goal of the adversary is to
abandon the queue he joins before being served to completion; if this occurs a
fixed amount of damage dj is inflicted.
In the three different surveillance scenarios identified in Chapter 1, we denoted
the random adversary scenario by one in which the adversary decides which queue
to join at random according to a probability vector which is known to the server.
We assume the adversary decides which queue to join according to a fixed prob-
ability vector p = (p1, ..., pk), such that queue j is joined with probability pj and∑
j pj = 1. We assume that the server knows the probability vector p used by
the adversary, perhaps gathered through intelligence operations. We can imagine
two situations in which this situation may occur. Firstly, the adversary may have
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generated p entirely at random, without any knowledge of the system. Alterna-
tively, the adversary may have chosen p based on knowledge of the system and the
potential service policies which could be in use in order to maximise the expected
damage he can inflict. In either case, the objective of the server is the same.
The server does not know when the adversary will enter the system or indeed
exactly in which queue, and even then cannot uncover the identity of the adversary
until he has completed service or abandoned. However, the server does know that
the adversary will enter at some point and the probability of entering each queue
when this occurs. We assume that the adversary will join the system at some
random point in time while the system is in its long-run steady state position under
a given service policy pi. The objective of the server is to determine a service policy
which minimises the expected damage conditional on p. If the adversary joins
queue j at some point while the system is in its long-run steady state position
under a given service policy pi, the damage which will be inflicted is a discrete
random variable with two outcomes: damage dj if he abandons before completing
service or zero if he completes service. The probability of each outcome depends on
the service policy pi. Recall αpij and β
pi
j for, respectively, the rate of class j service
completions and abandonments under policy pi in steady state. The probability
of abandonment of the adversary is the same as every other arbitrary class j
customer and is equal to βpij /λj. Similarly, the probability of service completion
is equal to αpij /λj. It is a consequence of (3.2) that these probabilities sum to
one. Therefore, the expected damage inflicted by the adversary under policy pi
conditional on joining queue j is given by djβ
pi
j /λj. Subsequently, using the law
of total expectation we have that the expected damage inflicted by the adversary




j /λj)pj. It is easy to see that
when dj = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the expected damage simply equals the abandonment
probability of the adversary. We can now express the optimal expected damage

































which expresses the problem as one of minimising the long-run penalty rate, where
penalties Dj = djpj/λj are incurred for class j abandonments. From our earlier
discussion, from a policy perspective, this pure-penalty problem is equivalent to
a pure-reward problem in which the server maximises the long-run reward rate
where rewards Rj = djpj/λj are received for service completions.
Remark. Suppose that adversaries arrive into the entire system as a Poisson
process with rate λA, then the total arrival rate into queue j would be λj + pjλA.
Each customer in queue j would independently be an adversary with probability
(pjλA)/(λj + pjλA). Given that adversarial arrivals would be very rare, we can
safely assume that λA would be very small. Each time a customer is served in
queue j, the probability this customer is an adversary would then be approximately
equal to (pj/λj)λA. We can trivially set the quantity λA equal to one given the
common scaling effect on these probabilities in each queue. We can then interpret
the class j reward Rj = djpj/λj as the expected damage avoided by the server in
each class j service completion. Maximising the long-run reward rate is equivalent
to maximising the long-run rate at which expected damages are avoided, which is
intuitively equivalent to minimising the long-run rate at which expected damages
are inflicted.
We have shown in this section that the random adversary defensive surveil-
lance scenario in which the single server wishes to minimise the expected damage
inflicted by an adversary who attacks randomly is a special case of a more gen-
eral stochastic scheduling problem with customer abandonments in which a server
wishes to maximise the long-run reward rate from service completions. It is the
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latter problem which is the main focus of this chapter and so in what follows we
will consider this problem with arbitrary rewards Rj and note that it is possible
to realise the former problem through the definition Rj = djpj/λj.
3.3 The Rµθ Rule
If a system is not overloaded with customers, then it becomes important to take
into account the lost reward opportunities when the system becomes empty due to
customer abandonment. For example, consider a two-class system, with R1µ1 =
R2µ2, and θ1 < θ2. If there is one customer present from each class, then intuition
suggests that the server should first serve the class 2 customer, since there is a
better chance that the class 1 customer will still be available upon the other’s ser-
vice completion. Consequently, a class’s priority should go up as its abandonment
rate θ increases. We call the rule in which the server always serves a customer
having the maximal Rµθ value among all customers present in the system, the
Rµθ rule. As seen in equations (3.4) and (3.6), the Rµθ rule in our pure-reward
model is equivalent to the cµ rule in the linear holding-cost only model. Whereas
the cµ rule is optimal in queueing systems with no customer abandonment (see,
for example, Section 5.2 in Gittins et al. (2011)), it is not optimal in systems with
customer abandonment (see Down et al. (2011)). To the best of our knowledge,
the asymptotic optimality of this rule in systems with customer abandonment has
never been established in the literature.
The main result of this section is to show that the Rµθ rule is asymptotically
optimal as θ → 0. In the random adversary surveillance scenario, this result sheds
light on cases where the time spent by individuals in the area of interest tends to be
large relative to the time taken to surveil them. First, write Rpi(θ) for the reward
rate achieved by policy pi, and RRµθ(θ) for the reward rate achieved by the Rµθ
rule. To describe the limiting regime simply, we suppose that the abandonment
rate of each customer class is the multiple of some underlying rate θ such that








Proof. Consider the k-class queueing system under stationary nonidling service





< 1 in which the system is
stable under nonidling policies in the absence of abandonments. We shall consider
the system in the limit as θ → 0.
The reward rate under policy pi
Under policy pi and with abandonment parameter θ write W pij,θ for the waiting time
of a class j customer in steady state, to be understood as follows: W pij,θ is the time
needed for a class j customer arriving at the system in steady state and with zero
personal abandonment rate to complete its service. An arriving class j customer
in steady state will actually complete its service if this waiting time is no greater
than Yj ∼ exp (θj) , the time available to the customer in the system prior to her
abandonment. The quantity E
(
exp
(−θjW pij,θ)) = E (P (W pij,θ < Yj)) is the long-
run proportion of class j customers who achieve service completion under policy







(−θνjW pij,θ)) . (3.8)
Lower bound for the reward rate
Now consider any priority policy $, namely any policy which operates a fixed
priority ordering among the customer classes. The Rµθ and Rµ rules are such
policies. We shall assume without loss of generality that $ chooses individual
customers from the chosen class for service in a first-come-first-served fashion.
Now write W$j for the waiting time (time to achieve completed service) of a class
73
j customer in steady state under priority policy $ for the no abandonment case
with θ = 0. It is clear from a simple argument based on realisations of the system
that the total workload (uncompleted service) in the system from customers in
the l classes which have top priority under $ (for any 1 ≤ l ≤ k) when θ = 0
stochastically bounds above the corresponding quantity when θ > 0. Since epochs
at which any class j customer enters service are those at which the workload from
higher priority classes is zero, it follows straightforwardly that for priority policies























Upper bound for the reward rate
In (3.9), we have established a lower bound for the reward rate R$ (θ) for any
priority policy $. We now develop an upper bound for Rpi (θ) for any pi. To
achieve this, we consider first a realisation of the system under nonidling policy
pi and with no abandonments (θ = 0). This realisation will be determined by pi
and a given set of arrival times A and service durations S. We write the lengths
of successive busy periods for this realisation as Bn, and the number of customers
served in successive busy periods as Mn, n ∈ N. Write lnj for the number of class j
customers in period n, and W
pi(n)
jl for their waiting times, for 1 ≤ l ≤ lnj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
where
∑
j lnj = Mn.
We now apply abandonment to this realisation. Hence we consider the stochas-
tic process generated when the realisation determined by pi,A, and S is modified
by random abandonments with class-specific rates θνj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. It is trivial that
at all epochs at which the system is empty for the no abandonment realisation,
it will also be empty when abandonments are applied. Expressed differently, the
busy periods for the process without abandonments contain (one or more) busy
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periods for any generated process with abandonments. When abandonments are
applied to the realisation with waiting times W
pi(n)
jl , 1 ≤ l ≤ lnj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, n ∈ N,
then it is easy to show that the probability that none of the customers served in
busy period n is abandoned is bounded below by exp (−θν∗BnMn) ≥ 1−θν∗BnMn
where ν∗ = maxj νj.
Use W pij− for the collection of waiting times for class j customers of the non-
abandonment realisation, namely W pij− := {W pi(n)jl , 1 ≤ l ≤ lnj, n ∈ N}. We
now seek a lower bound for the conditional expectation E(W pij,θ | W pij−), which
is the mean class j waiting time (after abandonments) conditional on this no-
abandonment realisation. To compute this conditional expectation we use X(n)
for the collection of exponential random variables which determine the available





, 1 ≤ l ≤ lnj, n ∈ N} for the new (random) class j waiting times
which result from the abandonment process when applied to successive busy peri-






jl , 1 ≤ l ≤ lnj) ≥ exp(−θν∗BnMn)
from which it follows that



































= E(W pij )−O(θ),
where the equality follows from the ergodicity of the system, and the lower bound
E(W pij ) − O(θ) is a uniform one that does not depend on W pij−. Unconditioning,
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we infer that
E(W pij,θ) ≥ E(W pij )−O(θ).











Please note that in (3.9) and (3.10), all theO (θ2) terms, upon division by θ2 involve
expectations which are uniformly bounded as $, pi range over their respective
policy classes.
Inference from the lower and upper bounds


















Rpi (θ) , (3.11)
where the maxima in (3.11) are over all policies pi. Making the Rµθ rule the choice
of priority policy $ in (3.9), using the fact that maxpi R
pi(θ) ≥ RRµθ(θ), and using
(3.11) it follows that
max
pi






















Little’s Law and conclusion
We finally observe that the minimisation in (3.12) can alternatively be written,








with Npij the number of class j customers in the system (without abandonments)
in steady state under policy pi. The minimisation in (3.13) is of a holding cost
rate for the system, with cost Rjνj incurred per class j customer and per unit
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of time. A classical queueing control result (the cµ rule) asserts that for the no
abandonment system, this holding cost rate is minimised by the Rµν rule which
provides service according to a priority policy with class ordering determined by
(decreasing) values of Rjµjνj. Upon multiplication of these values by θ it is clear




as required, which concludes the proof.
In heavy traffic, the Rµ rule appropriately greedily chooses processing actions
to maximise the instantaneous reward rate achieved. In the regime of Theorem
1, the focus is on choices that minimise reward rate loss from the system through










The strong performance of the Rµθ rule resides in its minimisation of the dominant
O(θ) component of this loss rate—a consequence of the optimality of the cµ rule
for linear holding costs in the absence of abandonments.
3.4 Extensions
Close inspection of the proof of Theorem 3.1 reveals that we make little use of the
stochastic structure of the system’s service mechanism. The Rµθ rule emerges
as a priority policy, which minimises a holding cost-type objective for the no
abandonment system (θ = 0). It is therefore unsurprising that the result can
be generalised to more complex service situations, provided that a priority policy
continues to optimise an appropriate holding cost type objective in the absence of
abandonments. We now give some examples.
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3.4.1 Klimov Networks
Consider a multiclass M/G/1 queueing network with Bernoulli feedback, known as
a Klimov Network ; see Klimov (1974) and Klimov (1978). Exogenous arrivals to
the system form independent Poisson streams, with λi the rate for class i, 1 ≤ i ≤
k. With each class i is associated a collection Ji of service stations with Sij ∼ Gij a
generic class i service time at station ij, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ji. All service times are mutually
independent and are assumed to have finite second moment. Each class i customer
begins service at station i1 and is thereafter routed for further service according
to the Markovian routing matrix P i or exits the system. Hence the sequence of
stations visited by each class i customer forms a Markov Chain with departure
from the system represented by entry into an absorbing state. A single server is
available to provide service at all service stations, namely those in the collection
∪1≤i≤k ∪j∈Ji {ij} . This service is provided nonpreemptively in the case of general
service times, which is the case we now consider.
We write Si ∼ Gi for the total service requirement of a class i customer, namely
the aggregate of all individual service times until the system is exited. We suppose
that the
∑k
i=1 λiE (Si) < 1 and hence that the system is stable under nonidling
service. If we write Ni for the total number of class i customers present in the





by a service policy which imposes a priority ordering KR (C) among the stations,
where C = (C1, C2, . . . , Ck). See Klimov (1974) and Klimov (1978) for details.
We modify the above Klimov Network by imposing customer abandonment.
Hence all class i customers have their sojourn in the system terminated at a time
after entry which has an exponential distribution with rate θi = θνi, unless the
customer has already exited the system upon completion of all service. We suppose
that each class i customer who completes all service prior to abandonment earns
a reward Ri. As before we write R
pi (θ) for the reward rate achieved under service
policy pi. We write Rθ = (R1θ1, R2θ2, . . . , Rkθk) and KR (Rθ) for the Klimov
ordering determined by Rθ. The proof of the following result is in all essentials
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unchanged from that of Theorem 1.
Corollary 3.1. For the above Klimov Network, if
∑k
i=1 λiE (Si) < 1, then
max
pi
Rpi(θ)−RKR(Rθ)(θ) ≤ O (θ2) .
Remark. Our assumption that all service times Sij have finite second moment and
are mutually independent is important in completing the proof of Corollary 3.1 in
the manner of the proof of Theorem 1. This enables the use of the approximation
E(e−θνjW
pi
j ) = 1− θνjE(W pij ) +O(θ2). (3.14)
To see why this is true, let B denote the busy period of an M/G/1 queue without
abandonments, where the arrival rate is
∑k
i=1 λi, and the service time S is given
by S ∼ ∑ki=1 λiΛ ⊗ Si, where Si = ∑Jij=1 Sij. The busy period B is invariant to
service discipline. Hence, for any policy pi, the waiting time of class j customers
W pij is stochastically smaller than B and we can write E[(W
pi
j )
n] < E[Bn], for all
n ∈ N.
We require conditions which allow us to write f(θ) := E(e−θB)−(1−θE(B)) =
O(θ2). This is equivalent to limθ→0
f(θ)
θ2
<∞. To compute this limit, we use Takacs
functional equation (see Taka´cs (1962)) for the Laplace Transform (LT) of the busy
period given by
E(e−θB) = B∗(θ) = S∗(θ + λ− λB∗(θ))
where B∗ and S∗ denote the LT of the busy period and service time distributions
respectively. To find the limit, use l’hoˆpital’s rule twice by taking the derivative of











Hence the limit exists if the second moment of the service time distribution is finite.
Since S ∼ ∑ki=1 λiΛ ⊗ Si, we know that E[S2] is finite because of our assumption
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that the second moment of each class i, station j service time distribution is finite.
Consequently we are able to write
E(e−θB) = 1− θE(B) +O(θ2),
which enables us to establish Equation (3.14). This completes the proof of Corollary
3.1 in the case of generic service times.
A version of the above result also holds for Markovian Klimov Networks in
which all individual service times are exponentially distributed and priorities be-
tween customers are imposed preemptively. Please also note that trivially the
above also provides an analysis for a version of the model in this chapter with gen-
eral service times and nonpreemptive service, i.e., a conventional multiclass M/G/1
queueing system with no feedback.
One application of the above network structure has all customers of class i
needing an initial period of service of exp (µi1) duration. This service is conclusive
with probability αi. Should the first phase of service not prove conclusive, a
second phase of service of exp (µi2) duration is provided prior to exiting the system.
Priorities are imposed preemptively. In the context of defensive surveillance, this
may represent a situation in which a security team splits its second-phase screening
into two phases, the first which quickly screens suspects but may not be as accurate
and the second which takes longer but is more accurate.
Following the approach taken in Glazebrook (1996), in this case the Klimov






µ−1i1 + (1− αi)µ−1i2
}
,
while the station i2 has an associated index
ηi2 = Riθiµi2.
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In this case the Klimov Rule orders the stations according to the values of the
indices {(ηi1, ηi2) , 1 ≤ i ≤ k} , with highest priority accorded to stations of highest
index.
3.4.2 Multiserver Systems
Consider a multiserver version of our system with abandonments, with m servers






m and the Rµθ rule now allocates preemptive service to the m customers present in
the system whose associated Rjµjθj are maximal. The proof of a suitable version
of Theorem 1 for this system goes through up to (3.12). However, it is no longer
true that the Rµθ rule achieves the minimum in (3.12), though it does come close
to doing so. To give a theoretical result for this system we need the quantity






I (m > 1) ,
where I is an indicator and the maxima in the expression are taken over the
customer classes. The following result makes use of Theorem 3 in Glazebrook &
Nin˜o-Mora (2001), which shows that B(m) bounds above the quantity multiplying
θ on the right-hand side of (3.12) when there are m servers. It generalises Theorem
3.1 to multiserver systems.








Rpi (θ)−RRµθ(θ) ≤ θB (m) +O (θ2) .
3.5 Numerical Study: Comparing Rµθ and Rµ
In this section we present a set of numerical experiments which both illustrate the
performance of the Rµθ rule as described in Theorem 1, and also enable us to draw
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comparisons between its performance and that of the Rµ rule in the corresponding
asymptotic regime. It is worth noting that we are now back in the single server
case (m = 1).
It follows from calculations in the proof of Theorem 1 that when
∑k
j=1 λj/µj <
1, we have Rpi(θ) → ∑kj=1 λjRj, as θ → 0, for all priority policies (and hence
both the Rµθ and Rµ rules). Unsurprisingly, all priority policies achieve the
maximal reward rate
∑k
j=1 λjRj in the no abandonment limit, since in the limit
all jobs are served. Think of the random adversary surveillance problem in which
abandonments of the system are rare, but very damaging, and attention focuses on
making the O (θ) loss rate from abandonments as small as possible. Now consider
a situation in which the class orderings determined by the Rµθ and Rµ rules are
distinct. Recall from page 75 the definition of hpi as the reward rate loss due to
abandonments when using policy pi. It follows from (3.9) and (3.10) that
RRµθ (θ)−RRµ (θ) = θ(hRµ − hRµθ) +O (θ2) .
When Rµθ and Rµ are distinct, the quantity that multiplies θ in the above ex-
pression is strictly positive. Consequently, there exists θ∗, such that for θ < θ∗, we
have that RRµθ (θ) > RRµ (θ). Therefore,
maxpi R
pi(θ)−RRµθ(θ)
maxpi Rpi(θ)−RRµ(θ) → 0, as θ → 0.
It follows that the percentage loss of reward rate due to abandonment from the
use of Rµθ relative to that experienced from the use of Rµ becomes negligible in
the limit θ → 0.
We illustrate the convergence of the Rµθ and Rµ rules in Table 3.1. Reward
rates for the Rµθ and Rµ rules to a given accuracy are obtained by truncating the
state space and using the uniformisation technique to facilitate the deployment of
value iteration. Truncation levels are set so that the resulting finite-state model
provides a sufficiently good approximation to the original model. All results con-
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cern k class systems, where k = 2, 3. We use Nj = 100 for each class j. Problems
were randomly generated with respect to assumptions on system parameter values.
In light of the discussion in the preceding paragraph, care was taken to ensure that
the problems generated were such that Rµθ and Rµ rules were distinct. As in the
preamble to Theorem 1, abandonment rates are expressed as a multiple of some
underlying abandonment rate, θj = θνj and all problems studied are such that
ρ =
∑
j λj/µj < 1. Problems were randomly generated as follows:
µj ∼ U [0.2, 5] (all cases); (3.15a)
λj ∼ U [0.2, 5] (all cases); (3.15b)
ρ ∈ [0.5, 0.9] (light traffic); (3.15c)
Rj ∼ U [1, 3] (all k = 2 system cases); (3.15d)
Rj ∼ U [1, 5] (all k = 3 system cases); (3.15e)
νj ∼ U [1, 3] (all cases); (3.15f)
In the parameter generation, the µj and λj were generated according to (3.15a)
and (3.15b) by means of a rejection algorithm until the desired ρ condition (3.15c)
was met. For each system, 100 problems were generated at random according to
(3.15a) to (3.15f) for a given set of abandonment rates. For each problem, value
iteration was used to compute the gains of the Rµθ and Rµ rules and an optimal
policy.
As seen in Table 3.1, the results reflect and illustrate the above observations
concerning the relative reward rate performances of the Rµθ rule and Rµ rule. It
is evident from the table that the percentage suboptimality of both policies go to
zero in the limit θ → 0. As stated above, this would indeed be the case for any
priority policy. However, it is evident that this convergence is much more rapid
(of order θ2) in the case of Rµθ, where it is already the case at θ = 0.1 that the
median percentage suboptimality of Rµθ is zero (to 2 d.p.) for both k = 2 and
k = 3. The much slower O (θ) convergence of the percentage suboptimality of the
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Rµ rule is particularly clear from the ‘median’ columns of the Rµ part of Table
3.1.
Rµθ Rµ
k = 2 k = 3 k = 2 k = 3
θ Median 90th Median 90th Median 90th Median 90th
5 0.28 1.26 0.10 0.78 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.14
2.5 0.23 1.37 0.06 0.87 0.00 0.39 0.02 0.36
1 0.16 1.36 0.02 0.67 0.00 0.79 0.06 0.68
0.5 0.06 0.97 0.01 0.76 0.07 1.06 0.15 0.94
0.1 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.27 0.22 1.09 0.18 0.84
0.05 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.20 1.08 0.15 0.72
0.025 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.80 0.12 0.56
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.47 0.05 0.39
0.005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.28 0.04 0.20
0.0025 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.12
0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.06
0.0005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03
0.00025 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
0.0001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Table 3.1: Percentage suboptimalities of the Rµθ rule and Rµ rule in sets of 100
randomly generated problems in k = 2 and k = 3 class systems. Median and 90th
percentiles are shown.
3.6 The PaS Class of Priority Policies
In the parameter space we know that the Rµ rule is effective in heavy traffic and the
Rµθ rule is effective in the regime of Theorem 1. Hence for much of the parameter
space at least one of Rµ and Rµθ will be effective. We conclude this chapter by
developing a simple pairwise-swapping mechanism to explore local improvements
in any given priority policy.
Given any class ordering (pi1, pi2, . . . , pik), we take the classes in order from pi2
to pik and explore, in turn, whether each class should be promoted up the order.
This is achieved for each class by a sequence of pairwise comparisons with the next
highest class in the list to determine how high up the list the class can be promoted.
In comparing classes i and j, we consider the two-class subsystem comprising them
alone (with their class parameters inherited from the full problem) and use value
iteration to compute the respective performance of the two priority policies i→ j
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and j → i. If the better policy contradicts the current class ordering, then a
pairwise swap is performed, and the procedure is repeated until a comparison does
not result in a swap. We then examine the potential promotion for the next class
on the original list pi2 to pik. This process ends once all classes in the original list
have been considered. The resultant class ordering prescribes a priority policy we
refer to as PaS. The acronymn PaS refers to the Pairwise Swapping procedure
used to derive the policy. The derivation of PaS via this procedure is shown in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to derive PaS from a given priority policy.
Given a class ordering (pi1, pi2, . . . , pik), take a copy given by the vector A.
Let Aj denote the customer class of element j such that A1 is the top customer
class.
Set i = 2;
Set j = i;
while i ≤ k do
Formulate a two-class problem with class a = Aj and b = Aj−1;




Swap customer classes Aj and Aj−1
if j > 1 then







The resultant ordering (A1, A2, . . . , Ak) defines PaS.
This approach is founded on the observation that the evaluation of priority
policies in a k = 2 class subsystem through DP methods is a relatively cheap
computational operation. The pairwise-swapping mechanism is analogous to an
insertion sort which has best and worst case performance of O(k) and O(k2) re-
spectively in terms of the number of operations. These reflect the number of k = 2
subsystems which must be evaluated to obtain the final PaS ordering. The compu-
tational cost of these evaluations is low. Although there is no guarantee that the
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PaS policy is indeed an improvement on the initial priority policy, our basic guid-
ing principle is that prioritising one class above another in the two-class subsystem
comprising them alone may suggest that this prioritisation should be retained in
the full system. Pairing this insight with the low computational expense suggests
PaS as an effective heuristic priority policy.
We now illustrate the pairwise-swapping mechanism through a numerical ex-
ample.
Example 3.1: Consider a system with k = 5 queues. The class j parameters of
the example system are as follows
(λj, µj, θj, Rj) =

(3λ/5, 3, 0.1, 7.5) j = 1
(λ/5, 5, 1, 2.5) j = 2
(4λ/5, 4, 5, 1) j = 3
(3.5λ/5, 3.5, 0.2, 5) j = 4
(4.5λ/5, 4.5, 1.5, 2) j = 5




j λj/µj and in this example we have
λ = ρ = 1.1, with equal traffic intensity in each class ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = ρ4 = ρ5. The
Rµθ rule prescribes the priority policy 35241 whereas the Rµ rule prescribes the
priority policy 14253. Intuitively it may be better to give higher priority to class
2 and class 5. The low abandonment rates in classes 1 and 4 mean that customers
are likely to stay in the queue for a long time, meaning that a class 2 or 5 customer
could be served and the high reward class 1 or 4 customers will still be be available
to serve. The high abandonment rate and low reward in class 3 suggests a lower
chance of obtaining a lower reward if a class 3 customer were served ahead of a
class 2 or 5 customer for example.
We take an initial class ordering from the Rµθ rule, hence 35421. In Table 3.2
we show the reward rates under priority policies i→ j in the two-class subsystems
comprising classes i and j alone. Typically, these reward rates would be computed
as required, but for illustrative purposes we have computed these in advance for
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j
1 2 3 4 5
i
1 7.310 5.506 8.905 6.511
2 7.505 2.767 6.221 3.822
3 5.550 2.749 4.279 1.898
4 8.958 6.073 4.248 5.265
5 6.655 3.813 1.911 5.374
Table 3.2: Reward rates of priority policies i → j in two-class subsystems com-
prising classes i and j alone in Example 3.1.
every i, j combination. The pairwise-swapping mechanism proceeds as follows:
• We begin by comparing class 5 with class 3. The reward rate of 1.898 for
3→ 5 is less than 1.911 for 5→ 3, so we swap the order of these two classes.
No further comparisons of class 5 can be made as it occupies the top position.
The order is 53241.
• We next consider class 2 and first compare it with class 3. Priority policy
2 → 3 is better than 3 → 2, so we swap the order. We now compare class
2 with class 5. Priority policy 2 → 5 is better than 5 → 2, so we swap the
order. Class 2 now occupies the top position and no further comparisons can
be made. The order is 25341.
• We next consider class 4 and first compare it with class 3. Priority policy 4→
3 is worse than 3 → 4, so we do not swap the order. Since the comparison
did not yield a swap, we end consideration of class 4. The order is 25341.
• We finally consider class 1 and first compare it with class 4. Priority policy
1 → 4 is worse than 4 → 1, so we do not swap the order. Since the com-
parison did not yield a swap, we end consideration of class 1. The order is
25341.
• All classes in the original order have been considered so the resultant ordering
defines PaS to be 25341. This final order would also have been obtained had
the Rµ rule been used to define the initial ordering.
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The reward rates of the Rµθ rule, the Rµ rule, and PaS cannot be computed
through DP methods due to computational intractability. However, we compute
Monte Carlo estimates of the reward rates through discrete event simulation of
each policy. These reward rate estimates are 11.14, 10.91, and 11.26 for the Rµθ
rule, the Rµ rule, and PaS respectively, where each estimate is the mean of 1000
independent replications. In this example we estimate the percentage improvement
of PaS over the Rµθ and Rµ rules to be 1.1% and 3.2% respectively. This demon-
strates, at least in this case, the potential for PaS to deliver improvements over a
given priority policy. In this example we were only able to compare performance
between policies and on this basis, together with its computational feasibility, it
appears that PaS is a potentially effective heuristic policy. However, we were un-
able to ascertain the performance of any policy relative to the optimal policy, which
would be the basis on which to assess the actual effectiveness of any service policy.
In Chapter 4 we conduct an extensive numerical study to assess the performance
of a range of heuristic policies, including Rµθ, Rµ, and PaS, with respect to opti-
mality or an appropriate upper bound for a variety of k = 2, 3 and 5 class systems
for a wide range of system parameters. Hence, we refer the reader to Chapter 4
for further numerical examples and a more in-depth numerical assessment of the
priority policies in this chapter.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied a stochastic scheduling problem with customer
abandonments, of which the random adversary surveillance scenario is a special
case. In this scenario, the security team knows the decision of the adversary in
a probabilistic sense and we found that it is very effective for the security team
to use a single, deterministic service policy in response to this. The service poli-
cies proposed within this chapter are priority policies. In a defensive surveillance
setting, a priority policy would translate into the security team ranking suspects
from the different target areas according to some rule. Screening would then be
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provided according to this ranking. In a heavy traffic system, the Rµ rule is shown
in the literature to perform well and would be the suggested policy to minmise the
expected damage inflicted by the adversary. In a light traffic system, with small
abandonment rates, we showed the strong performance of the Rµθ rule and this
would be the suggested policy. Furthermore, we suggest that the security team
could perhaps improve performance by using another priority policy known as the
pairwise swapping (PaS) policy. In this chapter we also discussed how results asso-
ciated with the Rµθ rule could be extended into some more general problems. For
example, multiserver systems and Klimov Network models. The literature would
suggest that a generalisation of the Rµ rule would also perform well in heavy traf-
fic in multiserver systems. In any more general versions of the random adversary
surveillance problem, extensions of the priority policies discussed in this chapter






In Chapter 3 we considered a stochastic scheduling problem with customer aban-
donments with a focus on developing strongly performing heuristic policies. We
developed the first element of our approach, a suite of simple priority policies which
are both operationally simple and could be effective over much of the problem’s
parameter space. In this chapter we study this stochastic scheduling problem fur-
ther and develop the second element of our approach, an effective approximate
policy improvement (API) method. This approach attempts to improve an ex-
isting candidate policy, in this case one of our simple priority policies, using the
concept of policy improvement from DP. The policy improvement is approximate
due to the computational intractability of DP cited in Chapter 3. Our numeri-
cal results indicate that, in most cases, the best of our priority policies is nearly
optimal in systems with 2 or 3 customer classes and we have an effective service
policy of simple structure. In the cases where it is not, the API method invariably
tightens up the gap substantially and provides an improved policy, albeit of more
complex structure. In one instance, the API method improves our best priority
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policy that is 4.26% suboptimal, to an improved policy that is only 0.04% sub-
optimal. It is for the decision maker to perform the trade-off between simplicity
of policy structure and strength of reward performance. In our motivating ran-
dom adversary defensive surveillance application, even small differences in reward
rate performance can be of practical importance, hence any approach capable of
delivering improvements is valuable to the security team.
There are some recent works on approximate approaches to DP seeking to over-
come computational intractability. See, for example, Powell (2011). Contributions
that deploy value function approximations within a policy approach include those
of Krishnan (1987), Glazebrook et al. (2004), and Li & Glazebrook (2010), while
API methods which utilise simulation are discussed by Powell (2011) and Bertsekas
(2012). Our approach can be viewed as an ADP implementation, where the nov-
elty lies in its special choice of initial policies and its use of simulation to estimate
the bias functions at a set of carefully chosen states, followed by interpolation to
secure estimates elsewhere.
4.1 Heuristic Based on Policy Improvement
Policy improvement develops optimal policies for MDPs by using the DP recursion
to produce a sequence of successively improving policies (Howard, 1960). In our
problem, we truncate the state space and uniformise, as in Section 3.1, to develop
an ergodic system with optimality equation in (3.7). To develop a PI step from
policy pi, let ωpi (n) be the bias associated with system state n under policy pi. A












Accordingly, policy PIpi always takes the current decision optimally, given that
all future decisions are made according to pi. Tijms (1994) noted that the first
few PI iterations usually yield the greatest improvement. Whereas policy PIpi is
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a heuristic policy based on a single, exact, PI step, in principle it is possible to
perform multiple PI steps to determine a heuristic policy with strong reward rate
performance.
The challenge to implementation of PI in large systems lies in the intractability
of the computation of the bias ωpi. Hence, approximations are required, and the












where ω˜pi approximates ωpi.
Recall V pi(n, t) for the expected reward earned under the application of policy
pi over t transitions of the uniformised process, beginning at time zero in system
state n. The bias functions, with respect to a reference state m, are defined as
ωpi(n) = lim
t→∞
{V pi(n, t)− V pi(m, t)}.
The bias function measures the asymptotic relative difference in total reward which
results from starting in state n as opposed to the reference state m. Computation
of the bias ωpi involves specification of the reference state m, which we take to be
one frequently visited under pi. We introduce the following quantities:
• rpi (n) is the expected reward received starting from state n until the system
enters the reference state m for the first time, if policy pi is used.
• tpi (n) is the expected time starting from state n until the system enters the
reference state m for the first time, if policy pi is used.
The system evolving under policy pi is ergodic and so rpi(n) and tpi(n) are guar-
anteed to be finite for all states. Using the fact that the system regenerates upon
entry to the reference state, the theory of regenerative processes (see Tijms (1994))
indicates that
ωpi(n) = rpi(n)− gpitpi(n), (4.3)
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where gpi is the gain of policy pi.
From (4.3), the approximations ω˜pi(n) can then be obtained by approximating
the quantities rpi(n), tpi(n), and gpi. A heuristic policy based on an API step can
then be defined from (4.2).
4.2 The Algorithm
The implementation of an API step depends crucially on the approximation scheme
used for the bias functions. As the bias function does not have an analytical form,
we use discrete-event simulation to estimate it. However, since simulation carries a
computational cost, our constrained computational resource needs to be effectively
managed through a carefully designed algorithm. The algorithm consists of five
sequential, complementary stages, taking an initial policy pi as an input to produce
a new policy APIpi. The five steps are summarised below, with more details to
follow.
1. Pilot : Simulate the steady state of initial policy pi to estimate its gain, and
the frequency each state is visited.
2. Selection: Based on the pilot run, select a set of states at which we estimate
the bias function via simulation.
3. Sampling : For each state n selected, simulate the system under pi from that
state until some chosen reference state m is entered and estimate ωpi (n)
using (4.3).
4. Interpolation: Use the simulation results for selected states to interpolate
the bias functions for all other unselected states.
5. Improvement : Use (4.2) to produce a new policy APIpi.
In step 1, we run a pilot steady state Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the gain
gpi required to estimate ωpi from (4.3). We take the estimate of the gain gpi to be
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the sample average of a fixed number of replications. To facilitate steps 2 and 3,
we also collect data on how often each state is visited in steady state under pi.
Step 2 consists of the selection of a small number of states, denoted Ssel, at
which the bias ωpi will be estimated by simulation in step 3. Interpolation of
ωpi at other states will follow in step 4. Although desirable, estimation of ωpi by
simulation at all states is not feasible given a fixed computational resource, hence
our design manages this resource. The set Ssel consists of the anchor set together
with a support set. The anchor set consists of the states most frequently visited
in the pilot and hence influential to policy performance. However, anchor states
are likely to be tightly grouped together, so alone they will not create an adequate
basis for the construction of an effective interpolation scheme. The support set
will complement the anchor set to ensure adequate coverage and wider exploration
of the state space. Insufficient exploration of the state space is a commonly cited
drawback in API methods (see Bertsekas (2012)) and our support set aims to
address this issue.
To select M support states, we adopt lattice points of the following form:
PM = {((zj modM)/M) = ((z1j modM)/M, ..., (zkj modM)/M) | 0 ≤ j ≤M−1},
where z is an integer vector modulo M . The components of z are chosen to
be relatively prime to each other and to M . In what follows, policies will be
constructed for numerous problems with k = 2, 3, and 5 making use of the choices
z = (2, 3) , (2, 3, 5), and (2, 3, 5, 7, 11), respectively. These lattice points are then
appropriately scaled and rounded from the unit hypercube to the state space to
obtain the support states. Such well-spread points were proposed in the field of
Quasi-Monte Carlo methods for numerical integration and shown to enable good
approximations of integrals (Niederreiter, 1978).
In step 3, we choose reference state m to be the one most visited in the pilot
and use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate rpi (n) and tpi (n) for each n ∈ Ssel.
In what follows, we use n for the size of Ssel and m for the number of simulated
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realisations of the system from each n ∈ Ssel until entry into reference state m.
In each realisation we record the reward received and time taken for the system
to go from each initial state n ∈ Ssel to the reference state m and use the sample
averages of the m realisations to estimate rpi (n) and tpi (n).
If we write Rpi (n) and T pi (n) for the simulation-based estimators of rpi (n) and
tpi (n), respectively, and Gpi for the estimator of gpi available from the pilot, then
from (4.3) our estimator of ωpi (n) for n ∈ Ssel is Ωpi (n) := Rpi (n) − GpiT pi (n).
Since all estimators are unbiased, and Gpi is independent of Rpi(n) and T pi(n), we
conclude by conditioning on Gpi, that
Var {Ωpi (n)} = Var {E(Rpi(n)−GpiT pi(n)|Gpi)}+ E {Var(Rpi(n)−GpiT pi(n)|Gpi)}
= (tpi(n))2Var{Gpi}+ Var{Rpi(n)− gpiT pi(n)}+ Var{Gpi}Var{T pi(n)}
= Var{Rpi(n)− gpiT pi(n)}+ Var{Gpi}E{(T pi(n))2}. (4.4)
Equation (4.4) decomposes the variance of the bias estimators into two terms. The
first term is controlled by the number of replicates m used in the simulation relating
to state n in step 3, and the second term is controlled by the size of the pilot study
in step 1. The computational challenge is dominated by the need to control the
first term in (4.4), as designing a pilot study large enough to control the second
term has not proved to be an issue. One feature that helps reduce the first term is
that Rpi(n) and T pi(n) are positively associated. In addition, our choice of reference
state m means that the biases at anchor states (with smaller Rpi(n) and T pi(n))
tend to be estimated with greater precision than those at support states, which is
a feature shared with other approaches to ADP (for example, see Powell (2011)).
The central trade-off for the quality of the method for given computational effort
is that between large n supporting the quality of the interpolation, and large m
supporting precision at the selected states.
In step 4, we use the bias estimates in Ssel to construct a bias function approxi-
mation for the entire state space. This poses a multivariate function approximation
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problem for which many methods are applicable, for example variations of least-
squares regression (see Powell (2011)). Such parametric approaches to the problem
require the design of an effective parametric model, which can be difficult in prac-
tice. Nonparametric methods, such as interpolation, are an effective alternative.
While there are many interpolation algorithms, we use the radial basis function
method (see Powell (1987)) for its simplicity.
Assume that some function f : S → R has known values at each xi ∈ Ssel. An







βjpj(x), x ∈ Rk, (4.5)
will be designed as a smooth interpolator of f , taking the values f (xi) for xi ∈ Ssel.
From (4.5), h (x) is a weighted sum of n = |Ssel| radial basis functions φ (·), one
centred on each xi ∈ Ssel, together with d low order polynomials pj(·). Note
that ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. For φ (·), we take the thin plate spline
φ (r) = r2 log(r); for low order polynomials, we set d = k + 1 and use p1 (x) = 1,
pj (x) = xj−1, 2 ≤ j ≤ k + 1. These choices produce a surface which minimises a
measure of smoothness (Powell, 1999).
We write A for the n×n matrix with elements Aij = φ (‖xi − xj‖), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
and P for the n× (k + 1) matrix with elements Pij = pj (xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤
k + 1. We write f for the n-vector with fi = f (xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let α and
β be corresponding vectors of coefficients. The matrix form of the interpolation









The equations Aα+ Pβ = f ensure that h (xi) = f (xi), xi ∈ Ssel, while the k+ 1
equations P Tα = 0 take up the extra degrees of freedom in the problem, which
ensures the radial basis function h(·) is conditionally positive definite and the
interpolation problem solvable. Consequently, the interpolation matrix delivers a
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unique solution in the coefficients and hence in h. If we take f (xi), xi ∈ Ssel, in
the above to be the estimates of bias from step 3, we can then use the resulting
h (x), x ∈ S, as bias estimates for all states.
In step 5, we design a new policy APIpi by using the function h from step 4 in












In principle, the above procedure can be repeated multiple times. Although obtain-
ing progressively better policies—a feature of exact PI—can no longer be guaran-
teed, we have generally found that, in practice, improvement in policy performance
is indeed achieved. To highlight key design choices, we denote the above procedure
by API(pi, n,m, r, t). The parametrising arguments offer great flexibility and are
as follows: the initial policy pi, n the number of selected states to run simulation to
estimate the bias function, m the number of replicated simulations at each selected
state, r the fraction of selected states that are included in the anchor set (so 1− r
is the fraction in the support set), and t the number of iterations of the algorithm.
In what follows, we write APIpi for the best-performing policy from t iterations
of the algorithm, including the initial policy, which ensures that we only consider
policies which improve as t increases. The trade-off between different choices of the
parameters will be explored in Section 4.4, where we will give a recommendation
for their selection.
We now present an example to illustrate the algorithm.
Example 4.1: Consider a k = 2 class system with the parameters: λ1 = 2.5, λ2 =
3, µ1 = 3.5, µ2 = 4, θ1 = 0.75, θ2 = 2.5, R1 = 2.5, R2 = 1.7. We use truncation
levels N1 = N2 = 20 throughout. Please note that for this example the Rµ rule
gives priority to class 1, while the Rµθ rule gives priority to class 2. We use






to construct policies. Figures 4.1 to
4.3 illustrate the selection and interpolation stages of the algorithm for the case
m = 105. Figure 4.1 shows Ssel within the selection stage, with anchor states shown
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as diamonds and support states as circles. Figure 4.2 shows the interpolated bias
estimates over the entire state space. Figure 4.3 adds to this the surface of the
exact biases ωpi and plots the absolute difference between the interpolated and
exact biases at each state. Analysing Figure 4.3, although this cannot be observed
clearly, the interpolated surface closely resembles the surface of exact biases ωpi,
capturing its shape and curvature well, especially so around the anchor set. This is
further evidenced by the fact that the absolute differences are small. Although not
shown here, the interpolated surface is also an accurate and smooth reconstruction
of the surface which would have been obtained had simulation been possible at
every state. Figure 4.4 shows the actions taken in each state by the optimal policy
for this example, along with the actions resulting from use of the above algorithm
with m set at 103, 104, and 105. We observe that as m increases, the corresponding
policies approach more closely the switching curve structure of the optimal policy.
This observation is also reflected in the percentage suboptimalities of each policy,
which are 0.33%, 0.24%, and 0.01% for m = 103, 104, and 105 respectively. This
performance can be compared to percentage suboptimalities of 1.56% and 0.34%
for the Rµ and Rµθ rules respectively. This example indicates policy improvement
delivered through the API algorithm, with greater improvement achieved as m
increases.
4.3 An Upper Bound on Achievable Rewards
In order to evaluate heuristic policies when the optimal solution in (3.7) is not
available, we derive an upper bound for the long-run reward rate. For a given
feasible policy, if xj represents the implied fraction of time the server spends serving




is the long-run reward rate for the feasible policy. To compute an upper bound
for the optimal long-run reward rate, we formulate a linear program with the
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the selection stage of the API algorithm in Example 4.1.
variables xj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and the objective function to maximise (4.6), subject
to the constraint
∑k
j=1 xj ≤ 1. The key to get a tight upper bound is to impose
additional constraints on the xj so that the resulting optimal policies come as close
as possible to those implied by a feasible policy.
First, denote by A{j} the long-run fraction of time the server is busy if he
serves only class j customers and ignores all other classes, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Taking the
number of class j customers as the state, we have a birth-and-death process, so it











, 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
We can add xj ≤ A{j} as a constraint in the aforementioned linear program,
1 ≤ j ≤ k, or a total of k constraints.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the interpolation stage of the API algorithm in Example
4.1.
To extend this idea, for T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, we can add a constraint ∑j∈T xi ≤ AT ,
where AT denotes the maximal long-run fraction of time that the server serves
customer classes in T by ignoring all other classes. To compute AT , consider
the same pure-reward MDP model in Section 3.1 with customer class set T , and
substitute Rj = µ
−1
j , j ∈ T , so that the long-run reward rate becomes equivalent
to the long-run fraction of time that the server is busy. Using DP value iteration to












Computing AT when |T | ≥ 4 is computationally infeasible, but we can still
impose constraints derived from relaxed systems. To do so, we create a single
fictitious class by aggregation and relaxation of the customer classes in T . Denote
the arrival, service, and abandonment rates of this fictitious class by λ =
∑
j∈T λj,
µ = minj∈T{µj}, and θ = minj∈T{θj}, respectively. Since the server can only be
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Figure 4.3: Interpolated and exact biases and their absolute difference (crosses) in
Example 4.1.
busier with this fictitious class, the long-run fraction of time that the server is busy
in this relaxed system is a legitimate upper bound for
∑
j∈T xi.
Taking this idea further, we could improve this upper bound by formulating
a number of two-class MDPs. Divide customer classes in T into two groups and
aggregate the classes in each group into a fictitious class, as before. We then use
DP value iteration to compute the maximal fraction of time that the server is
busy dealing with these two fictitious classes. We do this for every way in which
the customer classes in T can be divided into two groups. For example, when
|T | = 4 there are (|T |
1
)
combinations which take one class in the first group with














two-class MDPs. When |T | ≥ 4, we write BT for
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Figure 4.4: Class 1 (diamonds) and class 2 (circles) actions in each state under
various policies in Example 4.1.
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the tightest upper bound for
∑
j∈T xj derived with this method, and add it as
one constraint. Although it is possible to divide T into three or more groups, the
marginal benefit is outweighed by the increased computational burden.
To formulate a linear program to compute an upper bound for the optimal
long-run reward rate, define Sk′ ≡ {T ⊆ {1, . . . , k} : |T | = k′}, which is the set of









xj ≤ 1, xj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ k;
∑
j∈T
xi ≤ AT for all T ∈ Sk′ , k′ = 1, 2, 3;
∑
j∈T
xi ≤ BT for all T ∈ Sk′ , 4 ≤ k′ ≤ k.
We would expect the upper bound to come close to the optimal long-run reward
rate in smaller systems k ≤ 3, mainly because of the optimised upper bounds AT .
The upper bounds BT in subsystems of size k
′ > 3 will worsen as k′ increases,
due to a greater relaxation when creating more fictitious customer classes. Conse-
quently, the quality of the upper bound tends to degrade as the size of the system
k increases.
4.4 Numerical Study
In this section, we conduct extensive numerical experiments to assess the impact
and design of our API method, as well as the performance of a range of heuristics
which includes our suite of priority policies from Chapter 3. Section 4.4.1 uses
a numerical study based on cases with two customer classes to explore design
choices for our API heuristics. We assess, inter alia, the relative performance of the
candidate initialising priority rules Rµ and Rµθ as well as testing different choices
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of parameters for our API method. This test yields a recommended API policy
which we denote rAPI. Using numerical studies based on cases with three and
five customer classes, Section 4.4.2 compares the performance of rAPI with that
of other heuristics. Section 4.4.3 contains a brief discussion of the computational
burden of developing rAPI and the upper bound discussed in Section 4.3.
4.4.1 Selecting Parameters for the API Algorithm
To explore the trade-off between different choices of parameters for our API al-
gorithm, we test the algorithm on systems with k = 2 customer classes. Prob-
lems were randomly generated to reflect a wide range of conditions with regard
to (1) the length of customer lifetimes in relation to service times (reflected in
the categorisation A,B,C in (4.7c)–(4.7e) below); and (2) the traffic intensity or
workload in the corresponding system without abandonments. There are three
categories of traffic—namely light, moderate, and heavy—as determined by the
value of ρ =
∑k
j=1 λj/µj; see (4.7f)–(4.7h) below. For all nine combinations of
A,B,C with the traffic categorisation light, moderate, heavy, 500 problems were
generated at random. Parameters were sampled as follows:
µj ∼ U [0.2, 5] (all cases); (4.7a)
λj ∼ U [0.2, 5] (all cases); (4.7b)
θ−1j µj|µj ∼ U [0.5, 2] (short lifetimes, A); (4.7c)
θ−1j µj|µj ∼ U [5, 10] (moderate lifetimes, B); (4.7d)
θ−1j µj|µj ∼ U [20, 200] (long lifetimes, C); (4.7e)
ρ ∈ [0.6, 0.8] (light traffic); (4.7f)
ρ ∈ [0.9, 1.1] (moderate traffic); (4.7g)
ρ ∈ [1.2, 1.4] (heavy traffic); (4.7h)
In the parameter generation, µj and λj were sampled according to (4.7a) and
(4.7b) by means of a rejection algorithm until a desired ρ condition (4.7f)–(4.7h)
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was met. An additional rejection step ensured that the Rµθ and Rµ rules of
each parameter set were distinct; otherwise, all parameters were resampled. In all
cases, rewards were sampled as follows: R2 ∼ U [1, 3] and R1R−12 |R2 ∼ U [1.25, 2].
To compute the optimal policy, we use DP value iteration by truncating the state
space at Nj = 40 for each class j with case A, and Nj = 60 with cases B and C,
as discussed in Section 3.1.
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 report the numerical results with k = 2 customer classes.
Firstly, Table 4.1 explores the trade-off between parameters n and m within the
API algorithm, representing the number of selected states for simulation and
the number of simulation replications at each selected state respectively. We
considered API variations with the Rµθ rule as the initial policy, t = 1 iter-
ation, and r = 32
45
. We considered all combinations of n ∈ {15, 45, 75} with
m ∈ {m0,m1,m2,m3} where m0 = 102,m1 = 103,m2 = 104, and m3 = 105.
It is important to point out that the results here state the percentage suboptimal-
ity of the policy derived from the resulting API step and do not include the initial
policy. This allows us to observe the underlying impact of different design choices
within the API step, free from any additional effects of the initial policy. The
results indicate that in designing the algorithm to effectively manage a fixed com-
putational resource, increasing m brings larger performance improvements than
increasing n. However, n must be sufficiently large (for example n = 45), as sug-
gested by case {B, Heavy}, whilst increasing this parameter beyond this level does
not yield much improvement.
Table 4.2 explores the trade-off between parameters t and m within the API
algorithm, where t represents the number of iterations of the algorithm. We con-
sidered API variations with the Rµθ rule as the initial policy, n = 45 selected
states, and r = 32
45
. These variations are designed to provide fair comparisons
between choices of t and m which reflect multiple, less detailed iterations and a
single, more detailed iteration, both having the same level of computational effort.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4, and m3 = 10
5. The results here report the performance of the
best performing policy from t iterations of the algorithm and so is consistent with
our definition of the API method. From the results there appears to be a degree of
indifference in performance between multiple, less detailed iterations and a single,
more detailed iteration. In designing the algorithm there is a direct choice between
larger t with smaller m and larger m with t = 1, without any performance lost in
this choice. Given that a single iteration is simpler to implement, this could be
the basis upon which to make this choice.
Table 4.3 reports the performance of a range of heuristic policies. In comparing
the Rµθ and Rµ rules, please recall that we use the descriptors ‘light’, ‘moderate’,
and ‘heavy’ as a shorthand for ranges of the traffic intensity ρ. The actual volume
of traffic in the system will also be strongly influenced by the abandonment rate
θ, with case C (small θ) yielding higher volumes than case A (large θ). Hence,
while the Rµθ rule performs very well in the case {C, light}, as is consistent
with Theorem 1 in Chapter 3, it performs poorly in the heaviest traffic case of
all, namely {C, heavy}. Its performance under A is less variable than under C,
as larger abandonment rates act as a moderator on traffic levels, though it still
performs best under A when ρ is small. The Rµθ rule clearly outperforms the Rµ
rule when ρ is small and θ not too large, while Rµ is the better policy when ρ is
large, increasingly so as θ declines in value and the traffic levels increase. The Rµ
rule performs very well in the case {C, heavy} which is consistent with the work
of Atar et al. (2010), Ayesta et al. (2011), Verloop (2014), and Larran˜aga et al.
(2014). It is worth noting that at least one of these two priority rules delivers a
median performance less than 1% suboptimal across all cases, so they complement
each other well.
Table 4.3 also reports the performance of the policy PI-Rµθ, which is derived
from exact application of a single PI step to the Rµθ rule. The fact that the PI-
Rµθ is nearly optimal shows promise of the API method, if the bias function can be













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with GADL referring to the paper’s four coauthors—requires much computational
effort but is typically not as good as the better between the Rµθ and Rµ rules.
The next seven columns in Table 4.3 further explore the trade-off between dif-
ferent choices of parameters of the API(Rµθ, n,m, r, t) proposed in Section 4.2.
We use n = 45 selected states throughout, with r = 32
45
. As before, we denote
the variations of API by (t,m) where t ∈ {1, 2, 3} and m ∈ {m1,m2,m3} with
m1 = 10
3,m2 = 10
4, and m3 = 10
5. As one would expect, increasing m and t
improves performance whilst increasing computational effort. For a given level of
computational effort, the strong performance of PI-Rµθ suggests that the policy
API(pi, n,m, r, t) may perform better with a single, more detailed iteration. As
discussed, our results in Table 4.2 reveal a degree of indifference in performance
between multiple, less detailed iterations and a single, more detailed iteration.
Further, and unsurprisingly, a strongly performing initial policy pi improves per-
formance. This is shown in the improvement made by the inclusion of the initial
policy when compared to the policy derived from the API step in the relevant parts
of Table 4.1. Based on these observations, to choose parameters in API(pi, n,m, r, t)
for general k class systems, we recommend t = 1, a large value of m (105, say) and
allow n, the number of selected states, to scale roughly linearly with k, so that
20k ≤ n ≤ 25k. Although we have not explored the impact of the parameter r,
we use a proportion roughly equal to 0.7. To choose the initial policy pi, we first
run the pairwise-swapping mechanism in Section 3.6 on the Rµθ rule, and on the
Rµ rule, separately, and it turns out that in all numerical tests in this section, the
final orderings are the same, which we label PaS. The initial policy pi in the API
method is thus set to be the best performing among Rµθ, Rµ, and PaS. Note that
in our systems with k = 2 customer classes, PaS is simply the better performing
policy between Rµθ and Rµ. We shall denote our recommended API policy by
rAPI. As seen in Table 4.3, the rAPI is nearly optimal in all cases.
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4.4.2 Comparing the rAPI and Other Heuristics
This section compares the rAPI and other heuristics in systems with k = 3 and 5
customer classes. Problem parameters were again generated according to (4.7a)–
(4.7h), along with suitable rejection algorithms. We now use Rj ∼ U [1, 4] for
sampled rewards. For each lifetime/traffic combination, 100 problems were gener-
ated at random.
Table 4.4 reports the performance of various service policies against the optimal
solution for systems with k = 3 customer classes. The rAPI was constructed with
t = 1, m = 105, n = 75, and r = 52
75
. As seen in the table, the rAPI delivers near-
optimal performance in all cases, which reaffirms the strength of policies based
on a single, well-estimated (but nonetheless approximate) PI step applied to a
well-chosen priority policy. Table 4.4 also shows that a naive heuristic that always
serves the longest queue (labeled SLQ) can perform poorly. This indicates the merit
in searching for strongly performing heuristic policies. In considering our suite of
priority policies from Chapter 3, the performance of the Rµθ and Rµ rules is much
the same as observed in the k = 2 customer class study results in Table 4.3. In
every case other than {C, Heavy}, PaS improves on both Rµθ and Rµ and is
near-optimal. In the {C, Heavy} case where it is not, the Rµ rule is strong and
rAPI is near-optimal. In all cases rAPI delivers a marginal improvement on PaS.
The quality of the upper bound for k = 3 customer classes is similar to that for
k = 2 customer classes.
Table 4.5 reports the performance of various service policies against an upper
bound on the optimal solution, as discussed in Section 4.3, for systems with k = 5
customer classes. Since value iteration is not computationally feasible, the gain of
each heuristic is estimated as the mean of 1000 Monte Carlo realisations, which is
then compared with the upper bound presented in Section 4.3. The policy rAPI
was constructed with t = 1, m = 105, n = 100, and r = 69
100
. As seen in Table 4.5,
the relative quality among Rµθ, Rµ, PaS, and rAPI, is consistent with that in
Table 4.4. The PaS typically improves Rµθ and Rµ, and then the rAPI further
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Case Workload Rµθ Rµ PaS SLQ rAPI UB
A Light 90th 0.76 0.46 0.01 5.54 0.00 1.03
75th 0.23 0.23 0.00 3.29 0.00 0.70
Median 0.03 0.07 0.00 1.20 0.00 0.34
Moderate 90th 1.30 0.75 0.01 6.64 0.00 1.25
75th 0.62 0.39 0.00 3.25 0.00 0.94
Median 0.11 0.03 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.51
Heavy 90th 1.32 0.86 0.02 8.52 0.00 1.54
75th 0.62 0.32 0.00 5.28 0.00 0.99
Median 0.11 0.02 0.00 2.41 0.00 0.61
B Light 90th 0.26 0.69 0.04 3.39 0.01 1.15
75th 0.07 0.24 0.01 2.32 0.00 0.76
Median 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.43 0.00 0.45
Moderate 90th 0.85 0.89 0.08 6.03 0.02 1.58
75th 0.38 0.30 0.01 4.27 0.00 0.92
Median 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.58 0.00 0.55
Heavy 90th 1.52 0.86 0.16 10.10 0.03 1.65
75th 0.84 0.32 0.04 7.15 0.01 1.03
Median 0.13 0.02 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.58
C Light 90th 0.01 0.97 0.00 1.44 0.00 0.63
75th 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.29
Median 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.14
Moderate 90th 0.67 1.52 0.29 4.76 0.10 1.51
75th 0.24 0.70 0.07 3.28 0.02 0.93
Median 0.02 0.22 0.00 1.88 0.00 0.56
Heavy 90th 6.62 0.45 3.02 13.48 0.09 0.80
75th 2.78 0.13 1.03 8.83 0.01 0.38
Median 0.76 0.00 0.09 5.23 0.00 0.17
Table 4.4: Percentage suboptimalities in k = 3 class systems of various traffic and
abandonment level combinations. In the last column, we report the percentage
above the optimal policy of the upper bound. Median, 75th, and 90th percentiles
are shown.
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Case Workload Rµθ Rµ PaS SLQ rAPI
A Light 90th 3.86 4.05 3.76 7.95 3.72
75th 3.40 3.43 3.24 6.28 3.23
Median 2.88 2.89 2.73 5.46 2.73
Moderate 90th 5.47 4.91 4.91 11.63 4.89
75th 4.08 3.92 3.86 9.86 3.86
Median 3.32 3.19 3.13 7.38 3.13
Heavy 90th 6.00 5.86 5.52 13.39 5.52
75th 5.16 4.97 4.80 10.60 4.80
Median 4.38 4.05 3.94 8.79 3.94
B Light 90th 3.76 3.97 3.74 7.85 3.74
75th 3.25 3.51 3.25 6.52 3.25
Median 2.74 2.88 2.70 5.36 2.70
Moderate 90th 5.76 5.96 5.73 13.30 5.73
75th 4.77 5.15 4.71 11.34 4.67
Median 3.40 3.41 3.37 9.30 3.37
Heavy 90th 6.45 6.29 6.08 17.56 6.07
75th 4.86 4.94 4.75 14.64 4.74
Median 3.87 3.82 3.78 11.66 3.64
C Light 90th 1.00 1.55 1.00 2.85 1.00
75th 0.80 1.23 0.80 2.32 0.80
Median 0.59 0.77 0.59 1.81 0.59
Moderate 90th 3.85 4.09 3.85 9.21 3.65
75th 2.53 3.29 2.53 7.23 2.51
Median 2.03 2.25 2.03 5.82 2.02
Heavy 90th 4.73 1.77 4.40 19.11 1.51
75th 2.92 1.01 2.24 15.09 0.88
Median 1.20 0.48 1.04 11.03 0.41
Table 4.5: Percentage below the upper bound in k = 5 class systems of various
traffic and abandonment level combinations. Median, 75th, and 90th percentiles
are shown.
improves the PaS, although the improvement, on average, is rather marginal. The
rAPI is the best-performing policy in all cases, and its median performance is
within 4% of the upper bound derived in Section 4.3. Although it is difficult to
judge how the rAPI compares with the optimal policy, the fact that the rAPI is
much closer to the optimal value than it is to the upper bound in Tables 4.3 and
4.4 suggests that the figures in Table 4.5 are a conservative statement of where the
policies stand in relation to the optimal value.
Whereas our numerical experiments in Tables 4.1 to 4.5 show that the suite of
priority policies (Rµ, Rµθ, and PaS) generally perform very well and, in several
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cases the API method offers only marginal improvement on average, it is not
always the case. To conclude our numerical study, we offer one example where the
improvement of the rAPI method is substantial.
Example 4.2: Consider a k = 3 class example system in which the class
parameters (λj, µj, θj, Rj) are given for classes 1, 2, and 3 by (λ, 3, 0.1, 5), (5λ/3,
5, 1, 2), and (4λ/3, 4, 5, 1), respectively. With these parameters we have λ = ρ,
and the Rµθ rule gives class ordering 321, while the Rµ rule gives 123. As seen in
Figure 4.5, the Rµθ rule performs well for small ρ, while the Rµ rule performs well
for large ρ, which coincides with intuition. For intermediate ρ values, intuition
suggests that there should be more service of class 2 since class 1 customers are
likely to still be available for service at the completion of a class 2 service and also
the instantaneous reward rate of class 2 is larger than that of class 3. Figure 4.5
shows a substantial gap in the range ρ = 1.4 to 2.4 between the suite of priority
policies (Rµ, Rµθ, and PaS) and the rAPI method (with t = 1, m = 105, n = 75).
In particular, when ρ = 1.7, the Rµ rule is 4.26% suboptimal, the Rµθ rule is 9.96%
suboptimal, PaS is 5.10% suboptimal, while the rAPI is 0.04% suboptimal. This
may be suggestive of greater service of class 2 customers by rAPI. In the random
adversary defensive surveillance scenario, even small performance improvements
can have a profound impact on safety, hence a large improvement in this example
represents an even greater impact.
4.4.3 Computational Time for rAPI and the Upper Bound
Table 4.6 summarises the time needed to compute the rAPI heuristic. Please note
that the algorithm was coded in the C programming language and carried out on a
High Performance Computing cluster, with a typical node specification of 2.26Ghz
Intel Xeon E5520 processor. Unsurprisingly, the computational burden grows with
the number of customer classes k. Recall that the number of selected states n used
in the approximate PI step grows roughly linearly in k. Further, as k increases,
the balance of computational effort moves toward the sampling stage of the API
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Figure 4.5: Percentage suboptimality for six heuristics in Example 4.2.
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algorithm and, within the sampling stage, toward the estimation of bias at the
support states. These trends particularly reflect the nature of the growth in the
mean times tpi (n) for a single simulation run during the estimation of the bias
ωpi (n).
The mean computation times for the upper bound in each problem are in the
order of 10 seconds, 400 seconds, and 3000 seconds for systems with 2, 3, and 5
customer classes, respectively. This growth in the computational burden reflects
the growth in the number of MDP subproblems that must be solved through DP
methods to generate the constraints for the linear program in Section 4.3, when
the number of customer classes increases.
Conclusion
In this chapter have further studied the stochastic scheduling problem with cus-
tomer abandonments in Chapter 3, of which the random adversary surveillance
scenario is a special case. The main contribution of the chapter is to develop an
approximate policy iteration (API) method for the problem which aims to improve
the suite of priority policies in Chapter 3. Our numerical results indicate that, in
most cases, the best priority policy from Chapter 3 is nearly optimal in systems
with 2 or 3 customer classes and the security team can adopt an effective service
policy with a simple structure. In the cases where it is not, the API method in-
variably tightens up the gap substantially and provides an improved policy, albeit
of more complex structure and requiring lots of computation time. Consequently,
the suggestion for the security team derived from this chapter is to develop a sin-
gle, deterministic service policy by following the API method, using the priority
policies in Chapter 3 as a starting point. The resulting policy will have a complex
structure which can be heavily state dependent, meaning the security team must
decide which suspect to screen based on exactly how many suspects are present in
each target area. Although this requires lots of computational effort by the secu-
rity team to develop and analyse such a policy, the potential offered by the API
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Proportion
k Case Workload Time Pilot Anchor Support
2
A Light 25 0.07 0.54 0.39
Moderate 26 0.07 0.54 0.39
Heavy 29 0.06 0.54 0.39
B Light 39 0.05 0.43 0.52
Moderate 49 0.04 0.44 0.52
Heavy 73 0.03 0.47 0.50
C Light 69 0.03 0.36 0.61
Moderate 233 0.01 0.45 0.54
Heavy 291 0.01 0.50 0.48
3
A Light 76 0.04 0.30 0.67
Moderate 81 0.03 0.31 0.66
Heavy 87 0.03 0.31 0.65
B Light 127 0.02 0.24 0.74
Moderate 157 0.02 0.27 0.71
Heavy 209 0.02 0.31 0.67
C Light 249 0.01 0.19 0.80
Moderate 806 0.01 0.32 0.68
Heavy 1822 0.00 0.45 0.54
5
A Light 198 0.02 0.17 0.81
Moderate 210 0.02 0.18 0.80
Heavy 224 0.02 0.19 0.79
B Light 338 0.01 0.14 0.84
Moderate 422 0.01 0.18 0.81
Heavy 559 0.01 0.24 0.75
C Light 810 0.01 0.11 0.88
Moderate 2371 0.00 0.29 0.71
Heavy 8786 0.00 0.49 0.51
Table 4.6: Mean computation time (secs) needed to generate the rAPI policy in
each problem of various k class systems. Also shown are the mean proportions of
overall computation time spent on the pilot study, sampling of the anchor set, and
sampling of the support set.
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method to deliver even small improvements in minimising the expected damage
inflicted by the adversary can be of high practical importance in the surveillance
setting. Should no improvements be delivered, it is proposed that the security
team uses the priority policies in Chapter 3.
In principle, it would be possible to extend the main elements of the API
method to more general surveillance problems. The main challenges would arise
in the underlying MDP structure of the problem for performing the policy im-
provement steps and any associated increase in computation time. However, the
framework of the API method, namely the simulation and interpolation method-
ology, presented in this chapter is general and could be adpated to more general




Adversaries Who Choose Where
To Attack
In this chapter we consider the defensive surveillance scenario identified in Chapter
1 in which the adversary acts strategically and can choose which queue to attack.
This surveillance scenario is an extension of the random adversary scenario dis-
cussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Consequently, in this chapter we consider the same
mathematical model with an identical stochastic structure to that of the model
in the random adversary scenario. Whereas in Chapters 3 and 4, the adversary
joined the system according to a fixed probability vector p which was known to
the server, we now consider the case in which p is unknown to the server. In this
case, the server wishes to find a robust service policy which achieves a low expected
damage regardless of the adversary’s choice of p.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1 we formulate a game-
theoretic model for the surveillance problem. In Section 5.2 we discuss how to
obtain the optimal solution to the model. We consider the optimal solution from
both the perspective of the server and the perspective of the adversary. In Section
5.3 we develop a heuristic approach for systems where the optimal solution cannot
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be computed. Our heuristic approach is based on a matrix game formulation of
the model, which utilises insights gained from the method used to compute the
adversary’s optimal policy and the random adversary scenario studied in Chapters
3 and 4. We conclude the chapter with a numerical study in Section 5.4.
5.1 A Game-Theoretic Model
We consider a setting in which a single server must preemptively serve impatient
customers spread across k queues. As in Chapter 3, we may also refer to each
queue as a customer class. Different classes of customers arrive according to in-
dependent Poisson processes, with the arrival rate being λj for class j customers,
1 ≤ j ≤ k. The service time for a class j customer is given by the random vari-
able which follows an exponential distribution with rate µj. A class j customer,
however, will only remain available for service for a random time that follows an
exponential distribution with rate θj, after which the customer will abandon the
system, whether the customer is still waiting in the queue or is already in service.
An adversary is a potential customer possessing the ability to join any of the k
queues. If the adversary joins queue j then he behaves like every other customer
in the queue, carrying an exponential service requirement with rate µj and having
an exponential lifetime with rate θj. The goal of the adversary is to abandon the
queue he joins before being served to completion; if this occurs a fixed amount of
damage dj is inflicted.
The adversary decides which of the k queues to join according to a fixed prob-
ability vector p = (p1, ..., pk) such that queue j is joined with probability pj and∑
j pj = 1. Recall in Chapters 3 and 4, p was known to the server and the goal
was to find a service policy to minimise the expected damage for a given p. In
practice, it is likely that there are many situations in which p is not known to
the server. If p is not known, then it is natural to consider a robust formulation
in which the server seeks a service policy which achieves a low expected damage
regardless of the adversary’s choice of p.
120
The server decides upon a service policy pi to use in the system. In Chapters
3 and 4, it was sufficient to only consider deterministic service policies, which in
every state defined which queue to serve. We now extend the definition of a service
policy pi to allow for randomisation in the actions of the server. A randomised
policy pi maps from the state space to a probability vector q = (q1, ..., qk), such
that whenever the system enters a state, the server chooses queue j to serve with
probability qj. There are an infinite number of service policies the server could
use.
Neither the server, nor the adversary know each other’s choices: the server does
not know which queue the adversary will join and the adversary does not know
which service policy is used. However, they do know each other’s decision spaces.
We assume that the adversary will join the system while it is in its long-run steady
state under the service policy pi. Given that the adversary can be considered as an
arbitrary steady state arrival in his chosen queue, the abandonment probability he
will experience is the steady state abandonment probability of that queue under
the service policy in use pi. Both the server and the adversary possess the ability to
hypothetically determine the abandonment probability of the adversary if he joins
queue j and the server uses policy pi. They both use this information as the basis
upon which to make their decision of which service policy to use and which queue
to join respectively.
The objective of the adversary is to maximise the expected damage he can
inflict on the system by deciding which queue to attack. The objective of the server,
on the other hand, is to determine a randomised service policy which minimises the
expected damage inflicted. In the case where each dj = 1, the expected damage
inflicted is equivalent to the abandonment probability of the adversary. Given the
lack of knowledge of each other’s decision, we model the interaction of the server
and the adversary as a simultaneous move two-person zero-sum (TPZS) game.
In the TPZS game, suppose the server uses policy pi and the adversary joins
queue j. Recall αpij and β
pi
j for, respectively, the rate of class j service completions
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and abandonments under policy pi in steady state. The abandonment probability
of the adversary is the same as every other arbitrary class j customer and is equal to
βpij /λj. The expected damage inflicted by the adversary under policy pi, conditional
on joining queue j, is given by Dpij = djβ
pi
j /λj. Therefore, for a policy pair (pi, j),
the payoff to the adversary is given by Dpij . Now, if the adversary uses probability
vector p, the payoff is equal to the expected damage computed using the law of




j . The server wishes to find a randomised
service policy which minimises this quantity over all of the adversary’s possible
choices of p. The adversary wishes to find p which maximises this quantity over
all possible service policy choices of the server. The value of the game V ∗ represents
the optimal expected damage each player can guarantee himself and is given by









The optimisation problem in (5.1) is first written from the perspective of the
server seeking to find an optimal policy and is second written from the perspective
of the adversary seeking to find an optimal probability vector. Our primary interest
is solving (5.1) from the perspective of the server to determine a performance
guarantee for the server regardless of the adversary’s choice of p.
5.2 The Optimal Policy
In this section we will develop an optimal solution to (5.1) from the perspective
of both the server and the adversary. In both cases, the optimal decision of each
player is independent of the optimal decision of the other. For the server, we will
show that we can find the optimal randomised policy by formulating the problem
as a linear program and solving it through standard methods. Although it is not
our primary interest, for the adversary, we will show that we can find the optimal
probability vector p by formulating the problem as a convex optimisation problem
which can be solved through Kelley’s cutting plane (KCP) method (see Kelley
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(1960)). Considering the problem from the adversary’s perspective motivates a
heuristic approach to the problem for the server, which will be discussed in Section
5.3.
5.2.1 The Server’s Optimal Policy
Firstly, we will consider (5.1) from the perspective of the server. It is possible
to formulate (5.1) as a linear program and hence find the optimal randomised
service policy and associated value of the game through standard LP methods.
The optimal randomised policy of the server is independent of the decision made
by the adversary. Before we do this, firstly recall from Chapter 3 the random
adversary scenario in which p is fixed and known to the server. The optimisation




A deterministic service policy pi which is optimal in (5.2) is said to be a best
response policy to the probability vector p. In Chapter 3 we discussed how this
problem was a special case of a more general stochastic scheduling problem which,
in principle, could be solved through standard DP methods such as value iteration.
It is also possible, in principle, to formulate this problem as a linear program. To
formulate a linear program to compute the server’s optimal policy pi, first recall
the MDP model described in Section 3.1, in which we truncate the state space
and consider a uniformisation. Denote the truncated set of states by S. Let
x(n, j) denote the steady state proportion of time spent in state n whilst serving
in queue j, according to policy pi. The set of x(n, j) over all states and actions
summarises the performance of the system under policy pi. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between the set of x(n, j) and the policy pi, hence they can be used
to define the policy pi. The truncation must be large enough such that x(n, j) is
negligible for states outside the truncation. Let p(n′|n, j) be the probability of a
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transition from state n to n′ whilst serving in queue j under the uniformisation.
Further details regarding the LP formulation of MDPs is given in Puterman (1994).



























x(n, j) = 1 (5.5)
x(n, j) ≥ 0 for j ∈ A(n) and n ∈ S. (5.6)
In the objective function (5.3), the quantity µj
∑
n x(n, j) equals the rate of
class j service completions under policy pi, namely αpij . Hence, the objective func-
tion is equal to
∑
j pjdj(1 − (αpij /λj)), the expected damage Dpi(p). Constraint
(5.4) states that, under any policy, the long-run transition rates into and leaving a
state must be the same. This is a necessary condition for the system to be stable
under policy pi. Constraints (5.5) and (5.6) ensure that x(n, j) defines a proba-
bility distribution and indeed all of the time of the server is fully accounted for.
Together, the constraints ensure a feasible service policy.
We now extend this to the strategic adversary problem (5.1) from the per-
spective of the server as a LP problem. Suppose the server uses a fixed service




j under probability vector p
defines a hyperplane in k − 1 dimensions. This is equivalent to a straight line for
k = 2 queues and a plane for k = 3 queues. The best response of the adversary,
and hence worst case for the server, against this fixed service policy is achieved at
one of the corners of the hyperplane, that is set pj = 1 for some queue j and set
pi = 0 for queue i 6= j. Hence, the best response of the adversary and the largest
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Let the value of the maximum expected damage under pi given by this equation
be z. This is the largest expected damage the server can guarantee himself by using
pi regardless of the adversary’s choice of p. This provides an upper bound for the
optimal expected damage V ∗. The objective of the server is then to find a policy
which minimises the upper bound z. In other words, the server wishes to find
a policy which minimises the expected damage the server can guarantee himself
regardless of the adversary’s choice of p. We can modify the linear program given
for the random adversary problem to define a linear program for (5.1) to find the












≤ z, j = 1, ..., k (5.7)
and contraints (5.4) to (5.6) .
The k constraints (5.7) ensure that the expected damages in each queue are
no greater than z for any choice of p by the adversary. The constraints (5.4) to
(5.6) ensure the server adopts a feasible service policy. Solving this linear program
will give the optimal expected damage V ∗. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between the optimal set of variables x(n, j) and the optimal service policy pi.
The variables x(n, j) map to the optimal randomised service policy by defining
actions for the server in each state as follows: in state n, the server chooses action
j with probability equal to x(n, j)/
∑k
i=1 x(n, i). Further details regarding this
correspondence are given in Puterman (1994).
The computations required to solve this linear program quickly become in-
tractable even for systems of moderate size. This is since the state space grows
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exponentially in the number of queues k. This requires a vast number of variables
and constraints within the linear program, which makes solving the linear program
computationally infeasible. Consequently there is a need to consider heuristic ap-
proaches to (5.1) from the perspective of the server, which are readily computable
and have strong performance.
5.2.2 The Adversary’s Optimal Policy
We will now consider (5.1) from the perspective of the adversary. The optimal
probability vector of the adversary is independent of the service policy used by the
server. If the adversary uses probability vector p, the smallest expected damage
the adversary can guarantee himself is given by the deterministic best response
policy of the server to p. The best response policy is determined by solving the
random adversary problem (5.2). Define the following function
V (p) = min
pi
Dpi(p)
to be the optimal expected damage as a function of p in the random adversary
problem (5.2). The function V (p) represents the smallest expected damage the
adversary can guarantee himself under each choice of p.
In general, for an arbitrary service policy pi, the expected damage Dpi(p) as a
function of p defines a hyperplane in k − 1 dimensions. Subsequently, V (p) can
be seen as the lower envelope of the infinite set of hyperplanes corresponding to
the infinite set of service policies. This implies that V (p) is a concave, continuous
function. Moreover, the hyperplanes of best response policies from the random
adversary problem (5.2) are tangents to V (p) at their respective points p. This
implies that V (p) is a differentiable function.
The adversary wishes to maximise, through his choice of p, the expected dam-
age he can guarantee himself. This is equivalent to maximising the function V (p)
over p. Hence, we can formulate the strategic adversary problem (5.1), from the
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pj ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., k.
The constraint
∑
j pj ≤ 1 allows for the case that the adversary may not attack
the system at all, but in the optimal solution this constraint will always hold with
equality. Solving (5.8) will give an optimal probability vector for the adversary
in (5.1) and its objective value will be equal to the optimal expected damage V ∗.
However, (5.8) cannot be solved directly, as opposed to solving the LP formulation
for the server’s optimal randomised policy. Let the value of the minimum level of
expected damage the adversary can guarantee himself through his choice of p be
given by w. This provides a lower bound for the optimal expected damage V ∗.
We can equivalently write (5.8) as one of the adversary seeking to maximise this








pj ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., k.
The purpose of reformulating (5.8) as (5.9) is that this formulation can be
solved using Kelley’s cutting plane (KCP) method (see Kelley (1960)), which is an
iterative method developed to solve convex optimisation problems. Application
of this method to (5.9) will converge to the optimal probability vector p∗ and
optimal expected damage V ∗. A proof of this result is given in Luenberger &
Ye (2008) under these conditions: (1) The objective function is a continuously
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differentiable, concave function; (2) The constraints are continuously differentiable,
concave functions. Since the optimisation in (5.9) meets these conditions, the KCP
method can be used to compute p∗ and V ∗.
The application of the method is based on the fact that every concave function
can be approximated by a set of piecewise linear functions that are tangents to
the function at a finite subset of points. The concavity property means that this
approximation will lie above the function to be maximised. We can approximate
V (p) as the lower envelope of a set of hyperplanes corresponding to the best
response policies at a finite subset of probability vector points. Suppose we have
a set of m probability vectorsM = {p1, ...,pm}. Suppose also we have a set of m
service policies P = {pi1, ..., pim} such that each element pit corresponds to the best
response policy to the element pt in M for t = 1, ...m. From these, suppose we
can also obtain their corresponding expected damages Dpitj in each queue, hence




j as functions of p. We can approximate
V (p) as follows:
V (p) ≈ min
t
{Dpit(p)}








pj ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., k.
Importantly, this relaxation is a linear program, whose optimal solution gives
an upper bound for the optimal expected damage V ∗. In addition, the expected
damages Dpit(pt) are feasible for the adversary in the original problem, ensuring
a minimum level of expected damage and so provide lower bounds to V ∗. Since
each hyperplane in the approximation is a tangent to V (p) at each respective
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point, the approximation will get better as more hyperplanes are added to the
approximation. Each time a new hyperplane is added, a constraint is added to the
relaxed linear program. Continuation of this process eventually recovers the true
function and both the lower and upper bounds approach V ∗.
We have described the principle underlying the KCP method without actually
describing the application of the method itself. We will now do this. The KCP
method iteratively constructs the approximation of V (p), using solutions of the
relaxed linear program as the probability vector points at which to improve the
approximation. We summarise the algorithm as follows:
1. Set U = ∞ and L = 0 as upper and lower bounds respectively for V ∗ and
let the sets M and P initially be empty.
2. Set iteration counter t = 1 and initialise the probability vector of the adver-
sary pt. Solve the random adversary problem (5.2) for pt to obtain the best
response policy pit for the server. Add pt to M and pit to P .
3. Formulate and solve the linear program (5.10) in which the server is re-
stricted to using the service policies in P . Denote the solution by (pt+1, V ),
where pt+1 is the optimal probability vector of the adversary and V is the
corresponding objective function value.
4. Update the upper bound U = V .
5. If U and L are close enough, then stop.
6. For probability vector pt+1, find the corresponding best response policy pit+1
by solving the random adversary problem (5.2). Update the lower bound
L = max(L,Dpit+1(pt+1)).
7. Add pt+1 to M and pit+1 to P . Increase the iteration counter t = t+ 1 and
go to step 3.
In steps 3 and 4 of the algorithm, (5.10) is a relaxation of (5.9) from the
perspective of the adversary and a restriction from the perspective of the server.
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Hence, the optimal objective function value provides an upper bound to V ∗. This
upper bound will be at least as good as the previous upper bound since an extra
constraint has been added to (5.10), tightening the relaxation. In step 6 of the
algorithm, pt+1 and the corresponding expected damage D
pit+1(pt+1) is feasible
in the original problem (5.9). This means that the adversary can use pt+1 and
guarantee an expected damage at least equal to Dpit+1(pt+1), a lower bound for
V ∗. It is not the case that the lower bound will necessarily improve, hence we set
the lower bound to be the highest known feasible expected damage. The upper
and lower bounds of the algorithm eventually converge to V ∗. Step 5 is a stopping
criterion which terminates the algorithm when the upper and lower bounds become
sufficiently close, namely when |U − L| <  for some small  > 0.
The KCP algorithm is illustrated for k = 2 queues in Figure 5.1. The red
curve represents V (p), which the adversary wishes to maximise through his choice
of p = (p, 1 − p). In the first two iterations of the algorithm, the adversary uses
p = 0 and p = 1 respectively. Hence, the server responds with pi1 and pi2, which
are priority policies. These two policies form an initial approximation of V (p),
which is iteratively improved in the next two iterations through the addition of pi3
and pi4. The improving upper bounds are shown as blue points whereas feasible
lower bounds are shown as green points. After four iterations of the algorithm,
the approximation of V (p) is very good and the upper and lower bounds are close
to V ∗.
The most important part of the KCP method is the ability to repeatedly solve
the random adversary problem (5.2) to generate best response policies for the
server. Whilst this is possible in principle, in practice it was shown in Chap-
ters 3 and 4 that the random adversary problem is computationally challenging.
Best response policies can be found through DP methods for systems of up to
k = 3 queues, meaning that the KCP method is feasible for systems of this size.
However, for larger systems the random adversary problem is computationally in-
tractable, meaning that the KCP method is also computationally intractable for
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the KCP algorithm.
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larger systems of more than three queues.
In general, we are not interested in finding the optimal probability vector of the
adversary. Our interest lies in finding the optimal randomised policy of the server.
In the next section, we will see that the KCP method provides the motivation for
a heuristic approach to (5.1) from the server’s perspective.
5.3 A Matrix Game Formulation
Many TPZS games can be formulated as matrix games. We can conceptually
consider the TPZS game in Section 5.1 as a matrix game. Each row in the matrix
game represents a pure strategy of the adversary, which corresponds to joining
each of the k queues. A mixed strategy for the adversary is given by a probability
vector over his set of pure strategies. In Section 5.1, we stated that the adversary
joined the system according to a fixed probability vector p = (p1, ..., pk), which is
equivalent to a mixed strategy of the adversary in the matrix game. Each column
in the matrix game represents a pure strategy of the server, which corresponds to
the choice of service policy pi. Each entry in the matrix game corresponds to the
payoff of a pure strategy pair (pi, j), namely Dpij . A mixed strategy for the server
is given by a probability vector over his set of pure strategies.
It is impossible to formulate the matrix game equivalent to (5.1) since there
are an infinite number of pure strategies of the server, hence an infinite number
of columns in the matrix. Our heuristic approach is to formulate a finite version
of the matrix game. In the finite matrix game, the adversary will still have k
pure strategies, however, the server will be restricted to a finite number of m
pure strategies corresponding to m service policies in a set P . A mixed strategy
for the server in the finite matrix game is represented by a probability vector
q = (q1, ..., qm) over the policies in P . In practice, the mixed strategy of the server
would be implemented by first selecting a policy from P using q, then using the
selected policy thereafter. The heuristic is a restriction of the conceptual infinite
version of the matrix game equivalent to (5.1), hence its solution provides an upper
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bound to the optimal expected damage V ∗.
Our heuristic approach is motivated by the KCP method. In the KCP method
we restricted the server to a set of service policies and iteratively populated this
set with various deterministic best response policies. The relaxed linear program
(5.10) in the KCP method in which the server was restricted to this set of service
policies is in fact equivalent to the LP formulation of a finite matrix game from
the perspective of the adversary. From this observation, we can view the KCP
method as an iteratively expanding finite matrix game. Hence, in our heuristic
approach, we propose to populate the set of policies P using the KCP method.
The LP formulation of the finite matrix game from the perspective of the server is
given by the dual of (5.10). Solving the dual gives a mixed strategy for the server
over the policies in P . In theory, we know from the KCP method that the value of
the finite matrix game will converge to the optimal expected damage V ∗ as more
policies are added to P .
The KCP method was used in a search problem by Lin & Singham (2015), in
which a searcher wishes to find an object hidden by an adversary. In this work,
the KCP method iteratively solves the problem since the sub-problem equivalent
to the random adversary problem (5.2) has a simple analytical solution. The KCP
method has also been used by McMahan et al. (2003) in a problem of planning a
route for a robot through sensors controlled by an adversary. The algorithm in this
work is referred to as an application of Benders decomposition. The sub-problem
corresponding to (5.2) is an MDP whose optimal solution can be readily computed.
In both of these examples, since the sub-problems do not pose any challenges, the
algorithms are able to deliver optimal solutions. Lin et al. (2014) consider a graph
patrol problem in which a patroller traverses the edges of a graph whose nodes
are potential targets for an attacker. The sub-problem equivalent to (5.2) is an
MDP problem which is computationally intractable in larger systems. The authors
develop an effective algorithm which is a heuristic application of the KCP method
in that instead of using best response policies in the MDP sub-problem, strongly
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performing heuristics are used.
5.3.1 Heuristic Cutting Plane Method
As we have already noted, solving the random adversary sub-problem (5.2) is
computationally intractable for larger systems of more than three queues. Whilst
this prohibits the application of the KCP method exactly in our heuristic approach,
the method provides a structural framework within which to adjust our heuristic
approach. We can adjust our heuristic approach by populating the set of policies
P in the finite matrix game using a heuristic application of the KCP method. We
will refer to this as the heuristic cutting plane (HCP) method. The HCP method
relaxes the necessity to provide best response policies to (5.2) in steps 2 and 5
of the KCP algorithm in return for strongly performing heuristic policies which
can be computed. Lin et al. (2014) develop an analogous heuristic method with
success.
The effectiveness of this heuristic approach depends critically upon the ability
to handle the random adversary problem (5.2). Intuitively, generating near best
response policies in (5.2) will enable the HCP method to closely match the charac-
teristics of the KCP method. In Chapters 3 and 4 we studied this problem in detail
and identified a set of strongly performing priority policies: the Rµθ rule, the Rµ
rule, and the PaS policy. Recall, to determine these priority policies, we set the
rewards Rj based on the mixed strategy of the adversary, namely Rj = djpj/λj.
The best of these priority policies was near-optimal in the majority of problems.
We also developed a heuristic policy based on an approximate policy improvement
method, which we labelled the API policy. This policy provides the capability to
tighten up the suboptimality gap in the relatively few problems where the best
priority policy is not near-optimal.
We summarise the HCP algorithm as follows:
1. Let the set P initially be empty.
2. Set iteration counter t = 1 and add an initial priority policy pit to P .
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3. Formulate and solve the TPZS matrix game (5.10) in which the server is
restricted to using the service policies in P . Denote the solution to this
matrix game by (pt+1, V ).
4. For mixed strategy pt+1, determine the priority policy pit+1 as a heuristic
policy for the random adversary problem (5.2).
5. If pit+1 ∈ P , then skip step 6 and go to step 7.
6. Add pit+1 to P . Increase the iteration counter t = t+ 1 and go to step 3.
7. Formulate and solve the dual of (5.10) to find a mixed strategy q for the
server over the set of policies P . The value of the game V gives the expected
damage of this mixed strategy of the server. Stop.
In step 4 of the algorithm, the priority policy response of the server to mixed
strategy pt+1 is determined by choosing one of the Rµθ rule, the Rµ rule, and the
PaS rule. A selection rule determines which of these priority policies is used in
every iteration of the algorithm, for example use the Rµ rule each time. In steps
2 to 6 of the algorithm, the server populates his policy set P with priority policies
until no new priority policy can be added under the selection rule. The reason for
using priority policies here as heuristic responses is due to the observation that
the chosen priority rule will be either optimal or near-optimal for many of the
mixed strategy choices the server could make, as evidenced in Chapters 3 and 4.
This is especially true when a few elements of p are high, for example pj close to
1, corresponding to much higher rewards/penalties in some queues compared to
others. Priority policies also typically occur naturally as best response policies in
the early iterations of the KCP method, when the KCP method is initialised with
a priority policy best response. Another advantage is the simplicity of priority
policies and the ease with which they can be constructed. The only computational





In the initialisation of the algorithm in step 2, the initial priority policy could
be determined by first selecting a mixed strategy p with pj = 1 for some queue j
and pi = 0 for queue i 6= j. Then choose a priority policy response through the
selection rule. Whichever policy is chosen will prioritise queue j. Alternatively, we
can suppose the server only serves in queue j and ignores all others for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
The expected damages Dj can be calculated by considering a birth-death process
















, 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
The expected damages Dj are equivalent to the expected damages in queue j under
a policy which prioritises that queue. We can determine the initial priority policy
by sorting the Dj in descending order and prioritising according to this order. In
some sense this gives top priority to the queue in which the adversary can inflict
the most damage.
5.3.2 Enhancement to Heuristic Cutting Plane Method
It is possible to enhance the HCP method by replacing step 7 with the following
three steps, giving the HCP+ method:
7a Formulate and solve the TPZS matrix game (5.10) in which the server is
restricted to using the service policies in P . Denote the solution to this
matrix game by (p∗, V ).
7b For mixed strategy p∗, construct the API policy pi∗ (as discussed in Chapter
4) as a heuristic policy for the random adversary problem (5.2). Add pi∗ to
P .
7c Formulate and solve the dual of (5.10) to find a mixed strategy q for the
server over the set of policies P . The value of the game V gives the expected
damage of this mixed strategy of the server. Stop.
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In the replacement steps 7a and 7b, it is no longer possible to add prior-
ity policies to P under the chosen selection rule. Furthermore, for p∗, there is
a suboptimality gap between the expected damages of the best priority policies
currently in P and the optimal expected damage. Consequently, we attempt to
improve upon the expected damages of the policies in P for p∗ by using the API
policy as a strongly performing heuristic. Any improvement will improve the value
of the matrix game. The construction of the API policy is more computationally
intensive, which is why it is only used once in this enhanced algorithm in the
place it is likely to have the largest impact on performance. However, due to
its approximate nature there is no guarantee of improvement. The HCP method
will be significantly faster than the HCP+ method. There is a trade-off between
any performance improvement offered by the HCP+ method and the increased
computation time.
An alternative to the HCP and HCP+ methods is again to populate a policy
set P , but not through an iterative procedure. We could populate P directly
with all k! possible priority policies and solve the finite matrix game consisting
of these policies. We will refer to this as the PA method. The rationale behind
the PA method is that P will give the server policies which provide the best
possible defence of each queue, as well as good coverage across the queues. It
can be seen as a limiting form of the HCP method, since the priority policies
developed during the HCP method will form a subset of the priority policies in
the PA method. Consequently, the expected damage under the PA method will
be less than or equal to the HCP method. However, the HCP method is likely to
be significantly faster than the PA method, especially for systems with more than
3 queues. Comparing the relative performance of these two methods will also give
an indication of any impact in the choice of the priority policy selection rule (the
Rµθ, the Rµ rule, or the PaS policy).
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5.4 Numerical Study
In this section we conduct a set of numerical experiments to assess the performance
of the heuristic approaches to (5.1) developed in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. We begin
by considering an example in a k = 2 queue system in order to illustrate the KCP
method and the heuristic approaches in more detail. We then consider performance
in large sets of randomly generated problems.
Example 5.1: Consider the following example system in which there are k = 2
queues. The parameters of the system are as follows:
(d1, d2) = (1, 1)
(λj, µj, θj) =
 (2, 3, 1) j = 1(3, 4, 0.5) j = 2
The optimal expected damage V ∗ = 0.3903 can be computed by solving the linear
program developed for the server’s optimal randomised policy in Section 5.2.1.
We can also compute V ∗ by applying the KCP method to the problem. The KCP
method iteratively develops a finite matrix game in which the server is restricted
to a set of service policies P containing deterministic best response policies.
Since there are k = 2 queues, a mixed strategy of the adversary is given by
p = (p, 1 − p) and the expected damage hyperplane of policy pi, namely Dpi(p),
is a straight line function of p. Figure 5.2 shows the first 3 iterations of the KCP
method along with both the HCP and HCP+ methods. The red curve shows V (p),
which is maximised at p = 0.441, at which point V (p) = V ∗ = 0.3903. First, we
consider the KCP method. Initially, the adversary sets p = 1 and the server’s best
response policy pi1 is the priority policy 1→ 2. The adversary then sets p = 0 and
the server’s best response policy pi2 is the priority policy 2 → 1. The expected
damages, as functions of p, are shown by the solid black lines in Figure 5.2.
The solution of the finite matrix game (5.10) in which P = {pi1, pi2} is given
by (p3, V ), where p3 = (0.4233, 0.5767) and V = 0.3925 gives an upper bound for
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Figure 5.2: The first 3 iterations of the KCP method along with both the HCP and
HCP+ methods in Example 5.1. The red curve shows V (p). The bold black lines
show the expected damages of the priority policies 1→ 2 and 2→ 1 as functions
of p. These are best response policies in the first 2 iterations of the KCP method
and all priority policies in the HCP method. The dashed line shows the expected
damage of the best response policy in the 3rd iteration of the KCP method. The
bold blue line shows the expected damage of the API policy in the HCP+ method.
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Table 5.1: Value of the finite matrix game V and the percentage above the optimal
expected damage V ∗ as the the size of the policy set P increases through the KCP
method in Example 5.1.
V ∗. The solution is achieved by maximising, with respect to p, the lower envelope
of the straight lines given by the policies in P . The lower envelope serves as an
approximation of the red curve V (p). The best response policy pi3 to p3 is shown
by the dashed line. The expected damage Dpi3(p3) gives a lower bound of 0.3886
for V ∗. Solving the finite matrix game (5.10) in which P = {pi1, pi2, pi3} gives
(p4, V ), where p4 = (0.4361, 0.5639) and the value of the game V = 0.3913 gives
an improved upper bound. The first 8 iterations of the KCP method are shown in
Figure 5.3. When |P| = 8, the value of the finite matrix game is 0.3903 and the
resulting mixed strategy over the policies in P is essentially optimal. Table 5.1
shows the percentage above the optimal expected damage V ∗ of the solution to
the finite matrix game as the size of the policy set P increases through the KCP
method. Figure 5.3 shows that the approximation of V (p) is extremely good after
8 iterations, especially around the maximising p. Table 5.1 further shows that
the rate of convergence of the KCP method is quick, where the value of the finite
matrix game is already 0.56% above V ∗ after two iterations. Also, much of the
improvement in the finite matrix game is achieved in the first few iterations.
We now consider the HCP and HCP+ methods. In the first two iterations of
the HCP method, we used the Rµ rule to add the priority policies 1→ 2 and 2→ 1
to P . The expected damages, as functions of p, are shown by the solid black lines
in Figure 5.2. There are only two priority policies in a k = 2 queue system, hence
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Figure 5.3: The first 8 iterations of the KCP method in Example 5.1. The red
curve shows V (p). The bold black lines show the expected damages of the priority
policies 1 → 2 and 2 → 1 as functions of p. These are best response policies in
the first 2 iterations of the KCP method. The dashed lines are each the expected
damages of the best response policies in iterations 3 to 8 of the KCP method.
Each bold black line and each dashed line is a tangent to V (p). After 5 iterations,
the percentage of the finite matrix game above the optimal expected damage V ∗
is 0.01%.
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the HCP method terminates after two iterations. In this example, the first two
iterations of the HCP method and the KCP method are identical, hence the HCP
method achieves an expected damage 0.56% above optimal. The HCP method is
also identical to the PA method. For the HCP+ method, the solution of the finite
matrix game (5.10) yields mixed strategy p∗ = (0.4233, 0.5767). To construct the
API policy as a heuristic response to p∗, we used the Rµ rule as the initial policy,
along with the parameters t = 1, m = 105, n = 45, and r = 32
45
. The resulting
API policy is shown by the solid blue line in Figure 5.2. As it is not a tangent
to the red curve, it is not a best response policy, however its distance from the
red curve indicates a small optimality gap in the random adversary problem (5.2).
Solving the finite matrix game consisting of the two priority policies and the API
policy, the HCP+ method achieves an expected damage of 0.3911, which is 0.21%
above V ∗. The HCP+ method improves upon the HCP method, albeit at increased
computational expense. In this example, both heuristic approaches are not too far
from the optimal expected damage.
To assess the performance of the heuristics more generally, we now conduct
large sets of numerical experiments in k = 2, 3, and 5 queue systems. Prob-
lems were randomly generated to reflect a wide range of conditions with regard
to (1) the length of customer lifetimes (reflected in the categorisation A, B, C in
(5.11c)–(5.11e) below); and (2) the traffic intensity or workload in the correspond-
ing system without abandonments. There are three categories of traffic—namely
light, moderate, and heavy—as determined by the value of ρ =
∑k
j=1 λj/µj; see
(5.11f)–(5.11h) below. For all nine combinations of A, B, C with the traffic cat-
egorisation light, moderate, heavy, 100 problems were generated at random for
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k = 2, 3, and 5 queue systems. Parameters were sampled as follows:
µj ∼ U [0.2, 5] (all cases); (5.11a)
λj ∼ U [0.2, 5] (all cases); (5.11b)
θj ∼ U [1, 5] (short lifetimes, A); (5.11c)
θj ∼ U [0.1, 0.5] (moderate lifetimes, B); (5.11d)
θj ∼ U [0.01, 0.05] (long lifetimes, C); (5.11e)
ρ ∈ [0.5, 0.7] (light traffic); (5.11f)
ρ ∈ [0.9, 1.1] (moderate traffic); (5.11g)
ρ ∈ [1.3, 1.5] (heavy traffic); (5.11h)
In the parameter generation, µj and λj were sampled according to (5.11a)
and (5.11b) by means of a rejection algorithm until a desired ρ condition (5.11f)–
(5.11h) was met. In addition, in each generated problem we set dj = 1 for each
queue and consequently the objective concerned the abandonment probability of
the adversary.
In each k = 2 problem, we used LP to compute the abandonment probability of
the server’s optimal randomised policy by truncating the state space at Nj = 40 for
each queue j in case A, and Nj = 60 for each queue j in cases B and C, as discussed
in Section 5.2.1. In the HCP and HCP+ methods, we used DP value iteration with
the same truncated state spaces to compute the payoffs for the finite TPZS matrix
game (5.10), which was subsequently solved using LP to obtain the abandonment
probability of each method. Within the HCP+ method, we constructed the API
policy using the Rµ rule as the initial policy, along with the parameters t = 1,
m = 105, n = 45, and r = 32
45
. Table 5.2 reports the numerical results for k = 2
queues.
In each k = 3 problem, we used the KCP method to compute the optimal
expected damage V ∗, since finding the server’s optimal randomised policy through
LP was computationally infeasible. In each iteration of the KCP method, we
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Case Workload HCP HCP+
A Light 90th 0.00 0.00
75th 0.00 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00
Moderate 90th 0.03 0.01
75th 0.01 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00
Heavy 90th 0.10 0.03
75th 0.03 0.01
Median 0.00 0.00
B Light 90th 0.22 0.10
75th 0.10 0.06
Median 0.04 0.02
Moderate 90th 0.98 0.54
75th 0.59 0.27
Median 0.23 0.11
Heavy 90th 1.33 0.72
75th 0.73 0.47
Median 0.33 0.18
C Light 90th 0.23 0.19
75th 0.13 0.12
Median 0.04 0.04
Moderate 90th 3.51 3.03
75th 1.85 1.66
Median 0.94 0.90
Heavy 90th 0.15 0.11
75th 0.06 0.03
Median 0.01 0.01
Table 5.2: Percentage above the optimal expected damage in k = 2 queue systems
of various traffic and abandonment level combinations.
used DP value iteration with the same truncation levels used in the k = 2 queue
problems to compute the payoffs for the finite TPZS matrix game (5.10), which was
subsequently solved using LP. We also used this method to compute the expected
damages of the heuristics HCP, HCP+, and PA. In addition, we recorded the
number of priority policies generated in the HCP method, n(HCP). Within the
HCP+ method, we constructed the API policy using the Rµ rule as the initial
policy, along with the parameters t = 1, m = 105, n = 75, and r = 52
75
. Table 5.3
reports the numerical results for k = 3 queues.
As seen in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the performances of HCP, HCP+, and PA are
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Case Workload HCP HCP+ PA n(HCP)
A Light 90th 0.01 0.00 0.01 3
75th 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
Moderate 90th 0.02 0.01 0.02 3
75th 0.00 0.00 0.00 2
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
Heavy 90th 0.07 0.05 0.07 4
75th 0.02 0.01 0.02 3
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 2
B Light 90th 0.34 0.28 0.29 4
75th 0.20 0.14 0.19 4
Median 0.03 0.02 0.03 3
Moderate 90th 1.27 1.04 1.18 4
75th 0.82 0.61 0.75 4
Median 0.50 0.35 0.43 3
Heavy 90th 1.33 1.03 1.14 4
75th 0.97 0.76 0.80 4
Median 0.60 0.41 0.53 4
C Light 90th 0.35 0.31 0.30 4
75th 0.23 0.21 0.20 4
Median 0.10 0.10 0.09 3
Moderate 90th 4.01 3.43 3.65 4
75th 2.81 2.40 2.65 4
Median 1.73 1.51 1.61 3
Heavy 90th 0.20 0.19 0.20 4
75th 0.07 0.04 0.06 4
Median 0.02 0.01 0.01 4
Table 5.3: Percentage above the optimal expected damage in k = 3 queue systems
of various traffic and abandonment level combinations.
excellent, with the median percentage above the optimal expected damage being
at most 0.6%. There is an exception in the category {C, Moderate}, in which the
performance of each heuristic is less than 1% and 2% above the optimal expected
damage in the k = 2 and k = 3 queue problems respectively. In Table 5.2, the
performance of PA is not reported since it is equivalent to the performance of
HCP. Table 5.3 shows that while PA requires the evaluation of 6 priority policies,
it only performs marginally better than HCP which requires the evaluation of at
most 4 priority policies in terms of the 90th percentile shown. The comparative
performance of HCP and PA also indicates that using the Rµ rule to select priority
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policies within the HCP method does not adversely affect its performance. Both
tables illustrate that HCP+ outperforms HCP, with the median improvement of-
fering at most a 0.16% reduction in the expected damage relative to HCP. This
marginal improvement comes at the expense of increased computational cost. It
is also the case that HCP+ marginally outperforms PA in most cases.
In each k = 5 queue problem, we are unable to compute the optimal expected
damage through either LP or the KCP method. Furthermore, we are unable to
compute the expected damages of the heuristics HCP, HCP+, and PA using DP
value iteration, as we did in the case of k = 2 and k = 3 queues. Instead, for each
heuristic, we use simulation to estimate the payoffs for each policy which comprises
the set P in the finite TPZS matrix game (5.10). We estimate the payoffs using
the mean of 2000 Monte Carlo realisations. Based on these estimates, we solve
the matrix game using LP to obtain an estimate of the expected damage of each
heuristic. Within the HCP+ method, we constructed the API policy using the Rµ




Table 5.4 reports the numerical results for k = 5 queues. It shows the percent-
age improvement of both PA and HCP+ over HCP, shown as ∆(HCP, PA) and
∆(HCP, HCP+) respectively. The column denoted n(HCP) reports the number of
priority policies evaluated in the HCP method. From the table, we see that while
PA requires the evaluation of 120 priority policies, it only performs at most 0.31%
better in terms of the median percentage improvement. The HCP method requires
the evaluation of at most 8 priority policies in terms of the 90th percentiles and
often only requires 6 in terms of the median and 75th percentiles. Hence, HCP
requires approximately 5% of the computation time of PA and achieves a similar
level of performance. Once again, the comparative performance of HCP and PA
indicates that using the Rµ rule to select priority policies within the HCP method
does not adversely affect its performance. HCP+ offers marginal improvements
over HCP, with the median improvement offering at most a 0.11% reduction in
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Case Workload ∆(HCP, PA) ∆(HCP, HCP+) n(HCP)
A Light 90th 0.00 0.02 2
75th 0.00 0.00 2
Median 0.00 0.00 1
Moderate 90th 0.00 0.02 5
75th 0.00 0.00 3
Median 0.00 0.00 1
Heavy 90th 0.02 0.02 7
75th 0.00 0.00 5
Median 0.00 0.00 2
B Light 90th 0.09 0.07 7
75th 0.00 0.00 6
Median 0.00 0.00 5
Moderate 90th 0.30 0.27 7
75th 0.18 0.17 7
Median 0.09 0.06 6
Heavy 90th 0.58 0.23 7
75th 0.31 0.15 7
Median 0.16 0.06 6
C Light 90th 0.35 0.00 7
75th 0.00 0.00 6
Median 0.00 0.00 6
Moderate 90th 0.83 0.27 6
75th 0.54 0.17 6
Median 0.31 0.11 6
Heavy 90th 0.12 0.00 8
75th 0.04 0.00 7
Median 0.03 0.00 6
Table 5.4: Percentage improvement over HCP in k = 5 queue systems of various
traffic and abandonment level combinations.
the expected damage.
Remark. In systems with more than 3 customer classes, we cannot evaluate the
performance of each heuristic with respect to the optimal damage. Subsequently, we
seek a tight lower bound for the optimal expected damage. We can develop a lower
bound based on a modification of the method used to derive an upper bound for the
optimal reward rate in Section 4.3. For a given feasible policy, if xj represents the







is the expected damage the adversary will inflict if he joins queue j. Let z represent
the largest expected damage across all queues, then z is an upper bound for the
optimal expected damage. To compute a lower bound for the optimal expected
damage, we formulate a linear program similar in principle to the linear program
given in Section 5.2.1 for the server’s optimal randomised policy, but allow the xj
to be implied by an infeasible policy. We formulate the following linear program







≤ z, 1 ≤ j ≤ k;
k∑
j=1
xj ≤ 1, xj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ k;
plus additional constraints.
We impose additional constraints on the xj so that their values under the resulting
optimal policy come as close as we can make them to those implied by a feasible
policy. The additional constraints used are those based on sub-systems, derived in
Section 4.3, to which the reader is referred for further details.
However, in practice we have found that the lower bound does not produce
consistent results upon which we can assess the performance of each heuristic in
k = 5 queue systems. Whilst it can be tight in some cases, it is not in others.
Consequently, further investigation is required to improve the lower bound.
We draw upon a number of observations in order to infer the quality of the
heuristics in the k = 5 queue systems. The excellent performance of all heuristics in
k = 2 and k = 3 queue systems suggests that their performance is likely to be also
be excellent in k = 5 queue systems. As observed in our earlier example, since HCP
will often match the early iterations of the KCP method, which improves rapidly
in the early iterations, this suggests the quality of the HCP method. Furthermore,
in the random adversary problem studied in Chapters 3 and 4, we observed that
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the suboptimality gap of the best priority policy in the majority of problems was
not too large. This observation suggests that the PA method, which considers all
priority policies, will always have at least one priority policy which is not too far
from the optimal expected damage for any choice of p by the adversary. This also
infers the strength of the HCP and HCP+ methods.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the defensive surveillance scenario of a strategic
adversary who chooses where to attack. Since the server and the adversary do not
know each others decision, we modelled their interaction as a simultaneous move
two-person zero-sum (TPZS) game. An important feature of this approach is that
it is important for the server to randomise his actions, which can be done within
service policies or between service policies. By considering the TPZS game from the
perspective of the adversary, we developed the heuristic cutting plane (HCP) and
enhanced heuristic cutting plane (HCP+) methods. These methods are heuristic
applications of Kelley’s cutting plane (KCP) method which is theoretically capa-
ble of delivering an optimal surveillance strategy. The methods exploit a strong
connection with the random adversary surveillance scenario and iteratively de-
velop a set of service policies to randomise over. Numerical experiments indicate
the strong performance of this approach. Consequently, our suggestion for the
security team is randomise over the set of deterministic service policies generated
through a computed mixed strategy. In effect, this will require the security team
to select one of the deterministic service policies according to a discrete probability
distribution and then adopt this service policy thereafter, perhaps re-selecting in
the same way every so often.
The methodology used in this chapter is widely applicable to other defender-
attacker problems, namely the use of the random adversary problem as a sub-
problem within the master strategic adversary problem. This method has been
used successfully in other problems in the literature (see McMahan et al. (2003),
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Lin et al. (2014), and Lin & Singham (2015)). This illustrates the general and
flexible nature of the method. The main challenge in extending this approach to
more general problems lies in the associated sub-problem and whether effective




Adversaries Who Choose Where
and When To Attack
In this chapter we consider the defensive surveillance scenario identified in Chapter
1 in which the adversary acts strategically and can choose both which queue to
attack and when to attack that queue. This scenario is an extension of the strategic
scenario studied in Chapter 5. Subsequently, we consider a mathematical model
with a near-identical stochastic structure. The only differences in this chapter are
that we allow for both the case of nonpreemptive service and also allow the service
times in each queue to follow some general probability distribution. We will make
these differences clear when they arise. Whereas in Chapter 5, the adversary was
able to choose which queue to join, we now consider the case in which the adversary
can also choose the time at which he arrives into his chosen queue. In this case,
the server wishes to find a robust service policy which provides a performance
guarantee against any choice of queue and time the adversary could make.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 studies a single queue
system in which the adversary can choose when to attack the queue. Section 6.2
studies a system with multiple queues and control of the system by the security
151
team is decentralised. Section 6.3 studies a system with multiple queues and
control of the system by the security team is centralised. We conclude the chapter
by studying numerical examples in Section 6.4.
6.1 Single Queue
We will begin by formulating an optimisation problem in the context of a single
queue system. The problem will then be generalised later in the chapter to systems
with multiple queues. Given that we consider a single queue system, the adversary
does not have a set of queues to choose from. The adversary chooses the time at
which he joins the queue based on the state of the system. The state consists of two
elements: the volume state and the server state. The volume state represents the
number of customers in the queue and the server state represents which customer
is in service and how long that customer has been in service.
We consider two scenarios which represent the capability of the adversary:
1. The adversary chooses both the volume state and the server state to attack.
We refer to this as the full information scenario.
2. The adversary chooses the volume state to attack, but not the server state.
We refer to this as the partial information scenario
To motivate these scenarios in practice, consider a defensive surveillance sce-
nario in which an adversary targets a train station. Suppose the adversary has
hacked into the security system, or has a spy in the security team. The adversary
makes his way to the train station repeatedly and prepares to initiate an attack.
Before entering the train station, the adversary checks with the spy to learn some
information about the system. In the full information scenario, the spy tells the ad-
versary the volume state and the server state. In the partial information scenario,
the spy can only tell the adversary the volume state. Based on this information
provided by the spy, the adversary decides whether or not to initiate an attack. If
he chooses not to attack, he leaves and will try again another time. If he chooses
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to attack he will enter the train system and join the queue. In practice, the adver-
sary does not monitor the volume state or the server state in real time, instead he
learns about them at the point of initiating an attack and bases his decision upon
this information.
The server decides upon a service policy pi to use in the system, of which there
are an infinite number he could use. A policy is a rule followed by the server to
decide which customer to serve next, each time the server becomes available. The
server can track the arrival times of each customer and is able to define a policy
based on these. The service policy can be randomised and the server can choose
to idle when there are customers present, which we will refer to as strategic idling.
We study both preemptive service and nonpreemptive service. With nonpre-
emptive service, once the service of a customer begins, it only concludes once the
service has been completed or the customer has abandoned. The server chooses a
new customer for service at these points. On the other hand, preemptive service
allows the service of a customer to be stopped at any moment so that the server
can switch to another customer.
For a given scenario, full information scenario or partial information scenario,
the objective of the server is to determine a robust service policy which provides
the best performance guarantee against an adversary.
6.1.1 The Case of Preemptive Service
This section concerns a single queue case with preemptive service. We first assume
that the service times follow an exponential distribution with rate µ. In this
chapter, the abandonment probability of the adversary is heavily policy and state
dependent. To see this, let us compare two service policies: the first-come first-
served (FCFS) policy and the last-come first-served (LCFS) policy. Each time
the server becomes available to start a new service, the FCFS policy selects the
customer with the earliest arrival time into the queue whereas the LCFS policy
selects the most recent arrival.
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Under the FCFS policy, the abandonment probability of the adversary is heav-
ily state dependent. Consider two scenarios: (a) the adversary joins when there
is one customer in the system, (b) he joins when there are 100 customers in the
system. In (a), the abandonment probability will be low since the server is likely
to take the adversary into service before he abandons. In (b), the abandonment
probability will he high since there are 100 customers ahead of the adversary and
the server is unlikely to take him into service before he abandons.
Under the LCFS policy, however, the probability of abandonment is state in-
dependent. The abandonment probability depends entirely on the arrival process
after the adversary has joined the queue, hence the probability in (a) and (b) will
be the same. Since with the LCFS policy, a customer’s abandonment probability
does not depend on the number of customers in the queue when he arrives, it is
intuitive that the LCFS policy is a strong policy against an adversary who chooses
when to attack. We next present a theorem to formalise this idea.
Theorem 6.1. Consider a M/M/1 queue with preemptive service and customer
abandonment. Customers only remain available for service for a random time
that follows an exponential distribution, after which the customer will abandon
the system, whether the customer is still waiting in the queue or is already in
service. The LCFS policy minimises the abandonment probability of an adversary
who chooses which volume state to attack (partial information).
Proof. Let xpii denote the probability of abandonment if a customer arrives when
there are i customers in the system under policy pi. Let ppii denote the steady state
probability that there are i customers already in the system upon arrival under
policy pi. We define A∗ as the long-run fraction of customers who abandon with
any nonidling policy, which is invariant to any nonidling service policy. For any








where the equality holds if pi is nonidling. If the adversary chooses which volume
state to attack, then the worst case is for the adversary to achieve abandonment
probability maxi x
pi






Since the right-hand side of (6.1) is a weighted average of xpii , it follows that a
lower bound for maxi x
pi
i is given by A
∗ for all policies pi. Hence, a lower bound for





xpii ≥ A∗. (6.3)
Under the LCFS policy, xLCFSi is equal for all i ≥ 0. Denote this probability by




xLCFSi pi = x
LCFS,
where equality holds since the LCFS policy is nonidling. Since the abandonment
probability of the LCFS policy achieves the lower bound A∗ given in (6.3), we
can conclude that the LCFS policy minimises the abandonment probability of an
adversary who chooses which volume state to attack.
Corollary 6.1. Consider a M/M/1 queue with preemptive service and customer
abandonment. Customers only remain available for service for a random time
that follows an exponential distribution, after which the customer will abandon
the system, whether the customer is still waiting in the queue or is already in
service. The LCFS policy minimises the abandonment probability of an adversary
who chooses which volume state and server state to attack (full information).
Proof. Since the adversary is more capable in the full information scenario, the
optimal value A∗ in Theorem 6.1 is a lower bound on the optimal value. Since the
LCFS policy achieves the lower bound A∗, it is optimal.
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In the case that the service time distribution is not exponential, then the prob-
lem becomes much more complicated. Preemptive service has two variations. In
the first variation, the service needs to start anew once interrupted; in the second
variation, the previous service effort is retained after service interruption, and the
service resumes when the same customer enters service again. In either of these two
cases, interrupted service often translates to wasted effort, because the customer
that receives partial service may abandon before entering the service again. The
optimal policy remains an open problem, and is outside the scope of this thesis.
6.1.2 The Case of Nonpreemptive Service
This section concerns a single queue case with nonpreemptive service. We first
assume that the service times follow an exponential distribution with rate µ. With
nonpreemptive service, once the service of a customer begins, it only concludes once
the service has been completed or the customer has abandoned. In practice, it is
simpler to implement service nonpreemptively to avoid the complication of service
interruption and resumption. We next show that the LCFS policy provides the
best performance guarantee among all nonidling policies in a single queue system
with exponential service times and nonpreemptive service.
Theorem 6.2. Consider a M/M/1 queue with nonpreemptive service and cus-
tomer abandonment. Customers only remain available for service for a random
time that follows an exponential distribution, after which the customer will aban-
don the system, whether the customer is still waiting in the queue or is already
in service. Among all nonidling policies, the LCFS policy minimises the abandon-
ment probability of an adversary who chooses which volume state to attack (partial
information).
Proof. Let xpii denote the probability of abandonment if a customer arrives when
there are i customers in the system under nonidling policy pi. This probability
does not depend on the server state, because of the memoryless property of the
exponential service distribution. Let pi denote the steady state probability that
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there are i customers already in the system upon arrival for any nonidling service
policy. The long-run fraction of arriving customers who abandon by any nonidling










Denote the arrival rate by λ, the exponential service rate by µ, and the expo-
nential abandonment rate by θ. For all nonidling policies pi, the probability of





The probability xpi0 is equal to the probability that a customer in service abandons
before service is complete. It is a function of the parameters µ and θ which are
independent of the service policy and hence is constant. The probability of arriving















xpii pi = A
∗ − xpi0p0, (6.4)
remains constant under all nonidling policies.
Since an arrival into an empty queue is taken into service immediately whereas
an arrival into a non-empty queue faces some initial wait before potential service,
xpii > x
pi
0 for all i ≥ 1. From this, we see that the adversary will have a greater aban-
donment probability if he joins the queue when it is non-empty. In the worst case,
the adversary maximises the abandonment probability and achieves maxi≥1 xpii .





































1− p0 . (6.6)
The constant given in the right-hand side of (6.6) provides a lower bound for (6.5).
Under the LCFS policy, xLCFSi is equal for all i ≥ 1. Denote this probability by




Since the abandonment probability of the LCFS policy achieves the lower bound
for (6.5), we can conclude that the LCFS policy minimises the abandonment prob-
ability of an adversary who chooses which volume state to attack in the partial
information scenario.
Please note that Theorem 6.2 states that the LCFS policy is optimal among
nonidling policies. If strategic idling is allowed, then the server may not always
want to serve a customer who arrives to an empty system. Instead, the server
can stay idle from time to time, such that a customer who arrives at a nonempty
system also has a probability to enter service right away. An optimal strategy
would use strategic idling so that the abandonment probability of a customer will
be the same regardless of the number of customers in system when he arrives. The
derivation of the optimal policy is outside the scope of this thesis, and remains an
open problem.
Corollary 6.2. Consider a M/M/1 queue with nonpreemptive service and cus-
tomer abandonment. Service times follow an exponential distribution with rate
µ. Customers only remain available for service for a random time that follows
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an exponential distribution with rate θ, after which the customer will abandon the
system, whether the customer is still waiting in the queue or is already in service.
Among all nonidling policies, the LCFS policy minimises the abandonment prob-
ability of an adversary who chooses which volume state and server state to attack
(full information).
Proof. Since the adversary is more capable in the full information scenario, the
optimal value is no smaller than that in Theorem 6.2. The additional service
time of the customer currently in service when the adversary arrives at a chosen
time point follows the same exponential distribution as the additional service time
when the adversary arrives at a random time point. Consequently, using the LCFS
policy, the server can obtain the same abandonment probability as in Theorem 6.2.
Hence the LCFS policy is optimal.
We next relax the assumption on the exponential service distribution, and allow
the service time to follow an arbitrary probability distribution. We next show that
the LCFS policy provides the best performance guarantee in a single queue system
with general service time distributions and nonpreemptive service.
Theorem 6.3. Consider a M/G/1 queue with nonpreemptive service and cus-
tomer abandonment. Customers only remain available for service for a random
time that follows an exponential distribution with rate θ, after which the customer
will abandon the system, whether the customer is still waiting in the queue or is
already in service. Among all nonidling policies, the LCFS policy minimises the
abandonment probability of an adversary who chooses which volume state to attack
(partial information).
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 6.2, apart from the
following small detail. Let Z denote a random variable which represents the service
time of a customer, then xpi0 = 1− E[e−θZ ], which is constant under all nonidling
policies. The probability of arriving into an empty queue is also different to that
quoted in the proof of Theorem 6.2, but also remains constant under all nonidling
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policies.
In the case of generally distributed service times, we do not have a corollary
for the full information scenario. This is because the full and partial information
scenarios are no longer equivalent. If the adversary can choose which server state to
attack, then he prefers a server state which will occupy the server for the longest in
some stochastic sense. To facilitate the discussion, suppose that the service time
distribution possesses the increasing failure rate (IFR) property. This property
asserts that if x time units have already been spent on the service of a customer, the
residual service time is stochastically decreasing in x. This assumption is suitable
if the service of a customer draws increasingly nearer completion as it proceeds.
With IFR service times, the abandonment probability for the adversary arriving at
some chosen time point in the service cycle will not be equal to that when arriving
at some random point. In the full information scenario, the adversary knows
the server state. The adversary knows that he can maximise his abandonment
probability from each initial volume state by joining the queue at the exact instant
a new service is initiated. This choice ensures the longest possible wait for the
adversary before he can potentially be taken into service. However, if the server
knows the adversary will do this, he can use this information to recognise that the
new customer joining the system at this time instant is the adversary. Hence, at
the end of the service cycle, the server will pick out the adversary for service. A
service policy which does this is clearly not LCFS. Taking this further, in response
the adversary may wish to disguise his arrival somehow, perhaps by waiting some
small random time after a new service cycle is initiated before joining the system.
Identifying a robust service policy in the full information scenario with general
IFR service times remains an open problem, and is outside the scope of this thesis.
In practice, the server may or may not know the capability of the adversary.
The adversary may or may not know the volume state or the server state, or
in some cases the adversary may be able to take a guess with some success. If
the adversary is not as capable as assumed in the full information scenario or
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the partial information scenario, then the theorems in this section can provide an
upper bound on the abandonment probability of a less capable adversary.
6.2 Multiple Queues with Decentralised Control
We next generalise the problem to systems with multiple queues. We will con-
sider the case in which service is nonpreemptive and service times are generally
distributed with the IFR property. In a multiple queue system, the adversary
chooses which queue to attack and the time at which he joins that queue based on
the state of the system. As before, the state consists of two elements: the volume
state and the server state. The volume state now refers to the number of customers
in each queue. We will denote the volume state by n = (n1, ..., nk), where nj is
the number of customers in queue j. We consider the partial information scenario,
such that the adversary chooses the volume state to attack, but not the server
state. This scenario may impose too strong an assumption on the capability of
the adversary, however, we study this scenario to develop performance guarantees
for the server in practice. We will study decentralised control in this section, and
centralised control in the next section.
Control of the system by the security team is decentralised. Consider the case
in which the server represents a centralised computer centre which is capable of
comparing a suspect’s biometric data to a large database. Also, each queue rep-
resents a major airport. In decentralised control, the information available to the
server consists of which queues require service. The server does not have informa-
tion regarding the arrival times of customers within each queue. Each time the
centralised server becomes available it is allocated to a queue (an airport), which
is under its own local control. At this point, the server gains access to the arrival
time information of customers within the queue and consequently a customer is
selected for service based on this information. In effect, a feasible service pol-
icy for the server then comprises a two-staged decision: which queue, then which
customer.
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The server does not know the queue and state in which the adversary will
attack the system. If the server uses policy pi and the adversary attacks queue j
in state n, denote the expected damage inflicted by Cpij (n). The objective of the
server is to determine a robust service policy which provides the best performance
guarantee against the best decision the adversary could make. We consider the
case of nonidling service policies. Namely, the server wants to solve the following






In general, it is very difficult to solve (6.7). Firstly, there is no known method
to compute Cpij (n) for any combination of policy pi, queue j, and volume state
n. The best we can do is estimate these expected damages through simulation
for given choices of pi, j, and n. Secondly, the decision spaces of both the server
and adversary are infinite. Hence, estimating the expected damages under all
combinations of pi, j, and n is not possible. Given the inability to solve (6.7),
our objective is to develop a heuristic approach to this problem to obtain a strong
upper bound performance guarantee for (6.7).
The first step in our heuristic approach is to simplify the optimisation problem
in (6.7). We argue that the largest expected damages inflicted by the adversary
occur when the adversary attacks when there are a vast number of customers in
each queue. Our rationale is that the adversary joins the system in amongst a
large number of other customers, since the server will always be kept busy with
demands from other customers in all queues. No other queue will empty during
the lifetime of the adversary and there will always be other customers which the
server could potentially serve ahead of the adversary. We will assume that by vast
we mean that the worst case for the server occurs when the adversary attacks when
the number of customers in each queue approaches infinity, which will be referred
to as the over-crowded state. Although such an over-crowded state would never
be realised in practice, the analysis emerging from this worst case scenario would
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provide a performance guarantee in practice. We will drop the dependence on the
volume state n and write Cpij for the expected damage inflicted when the adversary
joins queue j in the over-crowded state and the server uses policy pi. Let the value
of the best performance guarantee be given by C∗, then the optimisation problem






The simplification from (6.7) to (6.8) does not mean it can be solved. How-
ever, it does make it easier to develop a heuristic approach since this formulation
incorporates the effect of the adversary’s choice of volume state and the problem
which remains is one of the adversary’s choice of queue and the server’s choice of
policy.
6.2.1 Heuristic Policies
In designing a heuristic decentralised policy, recall the strong performance of the
LCFS policy in the case of a single queue. In the two-staged decision required
in a decentralised policy, we propose that once the server has been allocated to a
queue, the queue will exercise the LCFS policy locally ; that is, allocate service to
the customer who most recently joined the queue. Consequently, we will focus on
the first part of the server’s decision of which queue to serve each time the server
becomes available.
We study three heuristic policies. A simple heuristic policy is the Round Robin
(RR) policy, which we define as follows:
Definition 6.1. Under the Round Robin (RR) policy, the server continues to serve
the same customer until either service completion or customer abandonment. Each
time the server needs to select a new customer to serve, allocate the server to a
queue according to a simple schedule. Under this schedule, the server is allocated
to each queue in turn and after which all queues have been visited, the cycle is
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repeated. If the server is allocated to an empty queue, it is skipped and the server
is allocated to the next queue in the schedule. Once allocated to a queue, a customer
is selected for service according to the LCFS policy.
Consider the simple case of a symmetric system in which all queues have the
same arrival rates, customer lifetimes, service times, and damages. Intuitively,
since all queues are identical, a good service policy will treat all queues fairly and
offer the same amount of service in each queue. The RR policy is fair to each
queue, offering each the same amount of service and returning to each queue after
random amounts of time which are equal in distribution. From this observation, it
is intuitive that the RR policy is a strong policy in the symmetric system described.
However, in the case of an asymmetric system where the queues differ in their
characteristics, there is no way to naturally extend the RR policy to account for
the asymmetry.
We introduce two heuristic policies which can be extended to asymmetric sys-
tems. These heuristics reflect an alternative approach to allocating the server.
Instead of allocating according to a schedule, we can randomly allocate the server
to a queue according to a probability vector. The first of these heuristic policies
is the Departure Reselection (DR) policy. We define the DR policy as follows:
Definition 6.2. The Departure Reselection (DR) policy is parametrised by a prob-
ability vector, or reselection vector r = (r1, ..., rk) in which 0 ≤ rj ≤ 1 and∑
j rj = 1. Under the DR policy with reselection vector r, the server continues to
serve the same customer until either service completion or customer abandonment.
Each time the server needs to select a new customer to serve, allocate the server
to a queue according to the reselection vector r. If there are one or more empty
queues, the server is allocated to nonempty queue j with probability proportional
to rj. Once allocated to a queue, a customer is selected for service according to
the LCFS policy.
In the simple symmetric system described previously, setting each rj equal is
another way to achieve a fair policy which we believe would be strong. We also
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define the Service Reselection (SR) policy in an analogous way as follows:
Definition 6.3. The Service Reselection (SR) policy is parametrised by a probabil-
ity vector, or reselection vector r = (r1, ..., rk) in which 0 ≤ rj ≤ 1 and
∑
j rj = 1.
Under the SR policy with reselection vector r, the server continues to serve in the
same queue until a service completion occurs. If the current customer in service
abandons, another customer from within the same queue is selected according to
the LCFS policy. If the queue is now empty and there is no customer from within
the same queue to serve, the server needs to be allocated to a new queue. Each
time the server needs to be allocated to a new queue, allocate according to the res-
election vector r. If there are one or more empty queues, the server is allocated to
nonempty queue j with probability proportional to rj. Once allocated to a queue,
a customer is selected for service according to the LCFS policy.
The DR and SR policies are similar in the way the server is allocated to a queue
according to a reselection vector. However, they differ in when the server becomes
available for re-allocation. The server will be re-allocated far more frequently under
the DR policy than under the SR policy.
The DR and SR policies define two classes of service policies, each parametrised
by the reselection vector r. We will focus on the DR policy from this point, but
point out that all of the subsequent discussion can also be applied to the SR policy
in the same way. We write Vj(r) for the expected damage from the over-crowded
state when the adversary joins queue j under the DR policy with parameter r. If
we restrict the server to only using service policies from the class of DR policies,
we can seek the best performance guarantee for the system from within the class






The best performance guarantee from within the class of DR policies is an
upper bound for the best performance guarantee C∗ over all decentralised policies.
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The optimisation problem given in (6.9) of finding the best performance guarantee
within the class of DR policies corresponds to optimising the reselection vector r.
Let D be the set or domain over which we define the functions Vj : D → R for
j = 1, ..., k. The set D = {r : 0 ≤ rj ≤ 1,
∑
j rj = 1}, namely the unit simplex
in k − 1 dimensions. The optimisation problem given in (6.9) is equivalent to a
global optimisation problem of finding r∗ ∈ D such that maxj Vj(r∗) ≤ maxj Vj(r)
for all r ∈ D.
We must estimate the expected damages Vj(r) for given vectors r ∈ D through
simulation. If we were able to estimate these for every r ∈ D, then we would
be able to solve the global optimisation problem. However, this is not practical.
Simulation is a computationally costly process, hence we can view the estimation
of Vj(r) through simulation as an expensive black box. In practice we wish to
find r˜ ∈ D such that maxj Vj(r˜) is close to maxj Vj(r∗) without requiring too much
estimation using the black box. The next section presents an algorithm to compute
r∗.
6.2.2 Computing the Best DR and SR Policies
We will present a method for solving (6.9) through an intelligent use of the expen-
sive simulation black box which is based on response surfaces. Response surfaces
are approximations of parametrised functions based on response values of the func-
tion. The main advantage of response surfaces in our application are their ability to
provide inexpensive approximations to the simulation black box functions. These
approximations can be used to identify candidate vectors r for estimation using
the expensive black box. We will follow a method in Regis & Shoemaker (2005)
known as the Constrained Optimization using Response Surfaces (CORS) method.
This method was developed in the context of a classic problem of minimising an
expensive black box function, as opposed to the minimax problem posed in (6.9);
however, the adjustment is straightforward. The CORS method was shown to
converge to the global minimum under quite general conditions.
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In the original application of the CORS method in Regis & Shoemaker (2005),
an initial set of points in D are chosen and evaluated and a response surface is
fitted to the data to approximate the expensive black box function to be minimised.
The initial set of points are chosen to be well-spread, for which the authors use
a symmetric latin hypercube design. The response surface used is a radial basis
function approximation. The next point for costly function evaluation is chosen to
be a point which minimises the response surface subject to distance constraints.
These distance constraints ensure that the proposed point is chosen to be at least
some distance from all previously evaluated points. The method is iterative since
it updates the response surface model after each new point is evaluated and then
reselects the next point for function evaluation. One aim is to find points with
good objective function values, which can be done by exploitation of the current
information. Another aim is to improve the response surface and hence future
iterations by exploration of regions for which little information exists. The method
manages the trade-off between exploration and exploitation by allowing the distance
constraint to cycle from high to low values.
We now summarise our application of the CORS method to (6.9), with more
details to follow. To facilitate discussion, we present the method in the context of
the DR policy. The best SR policy can be computed in a similar manner.
1. Select n well-spread initial points ri for i = 1, ..., n. Let R = {r1, ..., rn}.
2. For r ∈ R, simulate the DR policy with reselection vector r, and record the
expected damages in each queue Vj(r) for j = 1, ..., k.
Repeat steps 3 to 6 until some stopping condition is met:
3. Fit k response surface models V˜j for each queue j using the data, j = 1, . . . , k.
We use a radial basis function interpolation for each response surface.







5. Select a candidate point rnew for simulation by solving the following con-






Subject to ||r− ri|| ≥ βδ for all ri ∈ R
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a predetermined constant.
6. Add the candidate point rnew to R, simulate its performance Vj(rnew) for
each queue j, update the data, and go to Step 3.
In step 1, in contrast to selecting initial points in a hypercube through a deter-
ministic design, as was done in Regis & Shoemaker (2005), the well-spread initial
points are selected by generating a set of uniform random samples from the unit
simplex in k−1 dimensions. This is done by sampling from the symmetric Dirich-
let distribution with parameter 1. In Regis & Shoemaker (2005), the convergence
of the method did not depend on the initial points used. Hence, we adopt an
approach which sensibly achieves a set of well-spread points in a unit simplex. In
step 3, each response surface is fitted using a radial basis function interpolation
method. This is the same radial basis function interpolation method described in
Chapter 4 in the context of the API algorithm. We encourage the reader to refer
to Chapter 4 for details.
The maximin point δ is the point in D which is the furthest away from all
previously evaluated points. The distance constraint is implemented using the
maximin point along with the distance parameter β, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The
distance parameter β is set to cycle over a sequence of decreasing values, starting
with a high value close to 1 and ending with β = 0. We represent the cycle sequence
of β values by (β1, β2, ..., βN = 0), where N is the cycle length. The cycling of β
divides the CORS method into a sequence of rounds, where each round consists of
N iterations. The number of rounds can be used as a stopping condition for the
method. The complete CORS method then consists of an initial phase followed
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by a fixed number of further rounds.
Solving the constrained approximate minimax problem (6.10) with β = 1 ex-
plores the set D, whereas solving with β = 0 exploits the current approximations
V˜j(r). A cycle consisting of β values close to one focuses on exploration. This is
not desirable since the method uses all of its costly function evaluations construct-
ing good radial basis function approximations without ever trying to identify a
point with a good objective function value. A cycle consisting of zeros represents
the extreme case of pure exploitation. This may not be desirable if the underlying
radial basis function approximation is not adequate and the method may become
trapped at an undesirable point. We want a cycle sequence which balances be-
tween these two extremes, which explores earlier and exploits later in each round.
Hence, this underpins the rationale of cycling over a sequence of decreasing values.
Ending each round with β = 0 ensures that we periodically solve an approximate
version of the optimisation problem (6.9).
We note that in step 4 when the maximin point is computed we must solve an
optimisation problem. We propose an approximate solution of this optimisation
problem by considering a set of points defined on a fine grid over D. Through eval-
uation of the objective at each point in the fine grid we simply take the largest of
these to identify approximately the maximin point. We adopt a similar approach
in step 5 when we solve (6.10) since we are able to evaluate both the objective
function and the distance constraints at each fine grid point. The point which
satisfies the distance constraints with the lowest objective function is the approx-
imate solution to (6.10). In both cases, a finer grid results in a more accurate
solution at the cost of more computational effort.
At the end of the CORS method we obtain a strong reselection vector r which
should be close to to the optimal reselection vector r∗. However, the CORS method
is restricted to reselection vectors on a grid in D. Below we attempt to improve
the output from the CORS method by finding a reselection vector r off the grid.
Consider a TPZS game between the server and the adversary. The robust opti-
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misation problem of the server is equivalent to the server’s problem in a TPZS
game between the server and adversary. In the TPZS game, pure strategies of the
adversary correspond to joining each of the k queues in the over-crowded state and
pure strategies of the server correspond to decentralised service policies. We can
formulate a finite version of the TPZS game in matrix form in which the server
is restricted to a finite set of service policies. We can use the set of DR policies
developed throughout the CORS method as the server’s set of service policies in
the matrix game. The payoffs in the matrix game are the estimated expected
damages Vj(r) for each queue j and vector r ∈ R. We can formulate the matrix
game from the perspective of the server to obtain a mixed strategy over his set of
DR policies. The value of the matrix game provides a performance guarantee for
the server. This performance guarantee will be at least as good as the one given
by the DR policy with the final reselection vector in the CORS method, which
corresponds to a pure strategy in the matrix game.
It is possible to extend this approach by first solving the matrix game to obtain
a mixed strategy q for the server over his set of pure strategies. Suppose the
server has m pure strategies where m = |R|. We define a new reselection vector
rnew according to the weighted average rnew =
∑m
i=1 qiri. We simulate the DR
policy with reselection vector equal to rnew, estimate the expected damages in
each queue, and add this new service policy to the matrix game. We repeat this
procedure until no further new points can be identified. In adding new service
policies to the matrix game, the server can potentially improve the value of the
game. This procedure allows us to identify reselection vectors which do not lie on
the grid and which may be better than any feasible vector which could be found
on the grid. Consequently, our heuristic approach is to adopt the optimal mixed
strategy from the finite TPZS matrix game resulting from the CORS method
followed by the extension described.
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6.3 Multiple Queues with Centralised Control
In this section, we study centralised control for systems with multiple queues. In
centralised control, the server decides which customer to serve from all customers in
the system. The control of each queue is centralised and not local. The server has
access to more information upon which to base the decision of which customer to
select for service. In the example of the server representing a centralised computer
centre and each queue representing a major airport, the server keeps track of all
of the suspects in each airport. It is possible to compare the arrival times of
customers across queues, whereas in the case of decentralised control it was only
possible to compare the arrival times of customers within queues once the server
was allocated to that queue. Decentralised service policies are still feasible in
the case of centralised control, but given the greater capability of the server in
the centralised control, we would expect the server to achieve better performance
guarantees on the system.
All other aspects of the problem are the same as in the case of decentralised
control. The objective of the server is to determine a robust service policy which
provides the best performance guarantee against the best decision the adversary
could make in the partial information scenario. The optimisation problem for the
server is given by (6.7). The difference we now have is that the server seeks the
robust service policy over the set of centralised service policies.
The key observation when moving from decentralised control to centralised
control is that the server now knows and can compare the arrival times of all cus-
tomers in the system, across queues. Hence, the server can build this information
into the service policy. In a single queue system, we considered the LCFS policy
as the policy which served the most recently arrived customer in the queue. We
can generalise this idea to define the LCFS policy in a multiple queue system. In
a multiple queue system, the server can sort the arrival times of every customer
in the system and the LCFS policy serves the most recently arrived customer into
the system.
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We will first consider the case of a system with multiple symmetric queues. It is
a consequence of Theorem 6.3 that the LCFS policy provides the best performance
guarantee in (6.7).
Corollary 6.3. Consider a system with multiple queues in which service is non-
preemptive and customers can abandon the system. Customers arrive into each
queue according to independent Poisson processes. Service times in each queue
follow an arbitrary probability distribution. Customers only remain available for
service in each queue for random times that follow exponential distributions, after
which customers will abandon the system, whether the customer is still waiting
in the queue or is already in service. The system is symmetric, in that the ser-
vice time distributions, the customer lifetime distributions, and damages inflicted
in each queue are common. The Poisson arrival rates in each queue may differ.
Among all nonidling policies, the LCFS policy minimises the expected damage of
an adversary who chooses which queue and volume state to attack (partial infor-
mation).
Proof. The system with multiple symmetric queues is equivalent to a single queue
with multiple classes of customers, if we label a customer in queue i as a class i
customer. The arrival rate is
∑
i λi for the single queue.
From Theorem 6.3, the LCFS policy is optimal for a single queue model. The
optimal value in a single queue model is the abandonment probability of a customer
that arrives into a nonempty queue under the LCFS policy. Denote this value by
V ∗.
The difference between the M/G/1 queue with multiple classes of customers
we consider here and the M/G/1 queue in Theorem 6.3 is that, in the latter the
adversary can decide to join the queue based on
∑
i ni, while in the former the
adversary can choose based on specific volume state n = (n1, n2, ..., nk). The
adversary chooses the volume state and a class for himself. Since the adversary
has more choices in the M/G/1 queue with multiple classes of customers, the
optimal abandonment probability is at least V ∗. Hence, V ∗ is a lower bound for
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the optimal value.
However, being able to choose the volume state and a class for himself does
not help the adversary, since the service time and lifetime of each customer class is
identical. If the server uses the LCFS policy, the abandonment probability will be
V ∗ for
∑
i ni ≥ 1. If the adversary chooses to arrive in the volume state (0, 0, ..., 0),
then the abandonment probability is less than V ∗.
For the M/G/1 queue with multiple customer classes, since the LCFS policy
achieves V ∗, which is a lower bound for the optimal value, the LCFS policy is
optimal. Hence, the LCFS is optimal for the system with multiple symmetric
queues.
Whilst the LCFS policy provides the best performance guarantee in symmetric
systems, we would not expect this to be the case in general when the characteristics
of each queue are different. Because (6.7) is very difficult to solve, our objective
is to develop a heuristic approach to this problem to obtain a strong upper bound
performance guarantee for the system. We will evaluate our heuristic based on
its performance when an adversary arrives in an over-crowded state, since the
adversary will achieve the maximal abandonment probability for any service policy.
6.3.1 Last Come First Served with Probabilistic Skipping
Motivated by the strong performance of the LCFS policy, we propose a heuristic
based on the spirit of the LCFS policy. Under the LCFS policy, from the over-
crowded state, denote the expected damage if the adversary joins queue j by
CLCFSj . These expected damages will be unequal in each queue and the worst-case
expected damage will be achieved if the adversary joins queue ω which satisfies
ω = argmaxj C
LCFS
j . Intuitively, we can reduce the expected damage in queue
ω by instead using a policy which provides more service in this queue than the
LCFS policy. This would be provided at the expense of less service in the other
queues, increasing the expected damage if the adversary attacks the other queues.
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However, the net effect would be to reduce the largest of these expected damages,
hence a better performance guarantee for the server.
We can use this observation as the motivation for a heuristic policy designed
to achieve this reduction in expected damage relative to the LCFS policy. We will
refer to this heuristic policy as Last Come First Served with Probabilistic Skipping
(LCFS-PS). We define the LCFS-PS policy as follows:
Definition 6.4. The Last Come First Served with Probabilistic Skipping (LCFS-
PS) policy is parametrised by a vector of probabilities, or skipping vector s =
(s1, ..., sk) in which 0 ≤ sj ≤ 1 and sω = 1. Under the LCFS-PS policy with
skipping vector s, the server continues to serve the same customer until either
service completion or customer abandonment. Each time the server needs to select
a new customer to serve, identify the most recent arrival in each queue and order
them by their arrival times into a list. Starting with the most recent arrival in this
list, allocate the service to the customer with probability sj or skip it and move
to the next customer with probability 1− sj, if the customer comes from queue j.
The process is repeated if all customers in the list are skipped, until the service is
allocated.
Note that each nonempty queue has only one customer who is eligible to receive
service, the most recently arrived customer. None of the other customers in the
same queue will be served, whether the first customer is skipped or not. If the
most recent arrival in the sorted list is skipped, the second customer considered
may not be the second most recent arrival into the entire system, rather it is the
most recent arrival into one of the other queues. In the skipping vector, setting
sω = 1 ensures that customers from the queue with the highest expected damage
under the LCFS policy will not be skipped, as they would not be under the LCFS
policy. For the other queues, setting sj ≤ 1 for j 6= ω, ensures that sometimes
service is not provided in these queues, even if they contain the most recent arrival,
and instead is provided in queue ω. The result of this procedure is to reduce the
expected damage achieved by the adversary if he joins queue ω under the LCFS
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policy at the expense of higher expected damages in the other queues, with the net
effect being to reduce the maximal expected damage the adversary could inflict
over all queues.
The LCFS-PS policy defines a class of service policies, parametrised by the
skipping vector s. The extreme case of s with sj = 1 for j = 1 to k represents
the LCFS policy, hence the LCFS policy belongs to the class of LCFS-PS policies.
We write Wj(s) for the expected damage from the over-crowded state when the
adversary joins queue j under the LCFS-PS policy with parameter s. If we restrict
the server to only using service policies from the class of LCFS-PS policies, we can
seek the best performance guarantee for the system from within the class of LCFS-






The best performance guarantee from within the class of LCFS-PS policies is an
upper bound for the best performance guarantee over all centralised policies. The
optimisation problem given in (6.11) of finding the best performance guarantee
within the class of LCFS-PS policies corresponds to optimising the skipping vector
s.
Problem (6.11) is analogous to the problem of optimising the reselection vector
for the DR and SR policies in (6.9) in the case of decentralised control. Our
approach to solving (6.11) is analogous to the approach taken to solve (6.9). One
difference with the LCFS-PS policy is that the the domain D over which we define
the functions Wj : D → R for j = 1, ..., k are given by D = {s : s ∈ [0, 1]k with
sw = 1}, namely the unit hypercube in k − 1 dimensions. Another key difference
is that estimating the expected damages Wj(s) for given vectors s ∈ D through
simulation is a far more challenging task for the LCFS-PS policy. Other than this,
we will use the same approach of the CORS method for optimising the skipping
vector of the LCFS-PS policy.
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6.3.2 Simulation Model for LCFS-PS Policy
Estimating the expected damages in each queue under the LCFS-PS policy, namely
Wj(s), through simulation is not straightforward. To replicate the system expe-
rienced by the adversary, firstly we must create an over-crowded state for the
adversary to arrive into. Secondly, upon arrival the server must have been serv-
ing according to LCFS-PS policy in an over-crowded state for some time to the
extent that the service process is in equilibrium. This is required to ensure that
the adversary arrives correctly at a random point in the service cycle. The main
difficulty in simulating the LCFS-PS policy is the need to allocate the server based
on the arrival time of customers. This difficulty is enhanced with an over-crowded
state.
We will first give a broad description of the simulation model before focusing
on specific details. In the simulation model, we denote the adversary by customer
A who arrives into the system at time 0. Customers who arrive before time 0 are
referred to as old customers, while customers who arrive after time 0 are referred
to as new customers. At time 0 there are m old customers in the system who
arrived before time 0 and did not yet abandon. We want to evaluate the LCFS-PS
policy in the over-crowded state, so we will take m → ∞. In the time interval
(−∞, 0], the server uses the LCFS-PS policy. At time 0, the service process is
in equilibrium and customer A arrives into one of the queues at some random
point during the service cycle. In particular, the server will be engaged in service
in a particular queue, with some additional service time remaining. After the
arrival of customer A, other new customers also arrive into the system according
to independent Poisson processes. After time 0, each time the server becomes
available he applies the LCFS-PS policy to select a customer. The simulation
continues until customer A is either taken into service or abandons the queue.
Within the simulation, we maintain a state vector for the new customers (in-
cluding customer A). The state vector includes the arrival time, abandonment
time, service requirement, and queue of each customer. We use the state vector
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when allocating the server according to the LCFS-PS policy after time 0. Before
time 0 and at times when the server skips over all new customers under LCFS-
PS, the server is allocated to old customers. It turns out that we do not need to
maintain a state vector for old customers, and below we explain why.
Consider the k queues without the service process. Each queue can be viewed as
an M/M/∞ queue, if we interpret the lifetimes until abandonment as the service
times. Let Nj denote the number of customers in queue j in steady state for
j = 1 to k. The random variables N1, ..., Nk are independent, with Nj having a
Poisson distribution with mean λj/θj. One way to see that Nj follows a Poisson
distribution is to reset the clock time to 0 at steady state. A queue j customer
that arrived at time t ≤ 0 would still be in the queue at time 0 if his lifetime is
greater than −t, the probability of which is eθjt for t ≤ 0. Therefore, we can think
of customers in queue j at time 0 as the number of events arriving according to
a nonhomogeneous Poisson process in (−∞, 0], with intensity function λjeθjt for








Let there be m old customers in the system at time 0. The joint probability
distribution of N1, ..., Nk, conditional on
∑
j Nj = m, follows a multinomial distri-
bution. Write Nj,m(t) for the random variable representing the number of queue
j old customers at time t ≥ 0, conditional on there being m customers at time 0.
Taking the marginals of the multinomial joint distribution at t = 0, we infer that




In addition, conditional on Nj,m(0) = nj,m(0), the random variable Nj,m(t) follows
a binomial distribution with parameters nj,m(0) and e
−θjt. The random variable
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Conditional on Nj,m(t) = nj,m(t), the joint distribution of the arrival times of the
old customers in queue j at time t is the order statistics of nj,m(t) independent
random variables with density function θje
θj t for t ≤ 0. This is the exponential
distribution with rate θj, when we stand at time 0 and look backwards in time.
Suppose there are m old customers at time 0. Write Aj,m(t) for the event
that the most recent old customer is in queue j at time t. Let Nm(t) be the
joint distribution of the Nj,m(t), with nm(t) a realisation of this joint distribution.
The probability of Aj,m(t), conditional on nm(t), is derived from the fact that the
minimum of a set of exponential random variables is also exponential. We are
interested in the probability that the minimum of these is from queue j. Hence,
we have
P{Aj,m(t)|Nm(t) = nm(t)} = θjnj,m(t)∑k
i=1 θini,m(t)
.











Since Nj,m(t) follows a binomial distribution with parameters m and qj, using the

































almost surely, as m→∞. Since the sequence of random variables
θjNj,m(t)∑k
i=1 θiNi,m(t)
, m = 1, 2, . . .














































Further to the probability that the most recent customer being in queue j at time
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t being given by (6.14), we are also interested in the identity of the second most
recent customer and so forth. Suppose, at time t, we sort all old customers by their
arrival times and try to identify each customer, then as m→∞, each customer is
independently from queue j with probability given by (6.14).
In the simulation model we let the server start to work at a time before 0 long
enough so that the server will go through many service cycles before customer
A arrives at time 0. The actual time used depends on the customer lifetime
and service time distributions. Each time the server needs to select a customer
according to the LCFS-PS policy, we use the probabilities in (6.14) with t =
0 to create a temporary ordered list to make this allocation. The ordered list
corresponds to the order in which the most recent old customers in each queue
arrived, with the most recent in the system being first. We can use the probabilities
in (6.14) with t = 0 for all time points t < 0, since there is no difference between
the overcrowded state at t = 0 and t < 0. Further, although these probabilities
were derived by considering the system without the service process, since m→∞,
including the service process would not change the ordered list based on (6.14).
After the server has been allocated to a customer, we generate the time at
which the server will next become available as the minimum of the lifetime and
service time of the customer in service and move the clock time to this point.
We repeat this process of allocation under the LCFS-PS policy and advance the
simulation clock until the clock reaches time 0. At this point we record the time
at which the server will next become available for service. At time 0, customer
A arrives into one of the queues. We add customer A to a state vector of new
customers and generate new customers who arrive before the abandonment time
of customer A and add these to the state vector of new customers. From the time
at which the server is next available, the server uses the LCFS-PS policy, until
either customer A abandons or enters service.
We point out here that a simulation model for the DR and SR policies adopts
the same structure as described here. However, the DR and SR simulation models
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are significantly simpler to implement. At all times, we can allocate the server to
a queue simply using a probability vector, without the need to use ordered lists.
After time 0, we only need to maintain a state vector of customers in the same
queue as customer A in order to appropriately select the correct customer if the
server is allocated to this queue. At no point does the server skip a customer or do
we need to create an ordered list of old customers. These aspects of the simulation
models make them comparatively simpler.
Recall that our goal was to estimate the expected damages Wj(s) for j =
1, ..., k. For a fixed queue j, let W ij (s) be an estimate of the expected damage from
replication i of the simulation model if the adversary joins queue j. We estimate
Wj(s) as the sample mean of a fixed number of replications of the simulation
model and repeat this process for j = 1, ..., k. To obtain the estimates from a
single replication for a fixed queue j, we consider 10,000 realisations of the system
and record the proportion of the realisations in which customer A is taken into
service. These proportions estimate the probability of the adversary entering into
service. Denote these proportions by ej. Let Zj be a random variable representing
the service time in queue j. Once in service, the probability of completing service
is given by E[e−θjZj ]. The estimate of the expected damage in a single replication






6.3.3 Computing the Best LCFS-PS Policy
Recall the CORS method described in Section 6.2.2 for optimising the reselection
vector for the DR policy. We can apply the CORS method in a similar way to find
the best skipping vector for the LCFS-PS policy. We summarise our application
of the CORS method for the LCFS-PS policy as follows:
1. Select n well-spread initial points si for i = 1, ..., n using a lattice point set
method. Let S = {s1, ..., sn}.
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2. For s ∈ S, simulate the LCFS-PS policy with skipping vector s, and record
the expected damages in each queue Wj(s) for j = 1, ..., k.
Repeat steps 3 to 6 until some stopping condition is met:
3. Fit k response surface models W˜j for each queue j using the data, j =
1, . . . , k. We use a radial basis function interpolation for each response sur-
face.






5. Select a candidate point snew for simulation by solving the following con-






Subject to ||s− si|| ≥ βδ for all si ∈ S
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a predetermined constant.
6. Add the candidate point snew to S, simulate its performance Wj(snew) for
each queue j, update the data, and go to Step 3.
In step 1, the well-spread initial points are selected using a lattice point set
method. This is the same lattice point set method described in Chapter 4 in the
context of the API algorithm. We encourage the reader to refer to Chapter 4 for
details. All other aspects of the method are the same as described in Section 6.2.2.
Once again, as we did for the DR and SR policies, we can potentially improve
upon the performance guarantee offered by the LCFS-PS with the final skipping
vector in the CORS method. We can formulate a finite TPZS matrix game in which
pure strategies of the server correspond to the set of LCFS-PS policies developed
in the CORS method. The procedure for adding more pure strategies to the
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matrix game which may not lie on the grid used in the CORS method is described
in Section 6.2.2. Overall, our heuristic approach is to adopt the optimal mixed
strategy from the finite TPZS matrix game resulting from the CORS method
followed by the iterative extension in Section 6.2.2. The value of the resulting
matrix game provides a performance guarantee for the server.
6.4 Numerical Examples
In this section we consider a set of numerical examples to assess the relative per-
formance of the heuristic approaches to (6.7) developed in Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.2
and Sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3. We begin by considering an example in a k = 3 queue
system in order to illustrate the CORS method in more detail.
Example 6.1: Consider the following example system in which there are k = 3
queues. Service is nonpreemptive and the service time distributions in each queue
follow independent Gamma distributions. The shape and rate parameters, aj and
bj respectively, characterise the service time distribution in queue j, hence expected
service times are given by aj/bj. The parameters of the system are as follows:
(d1, d2, d3) = (1, 1, 1)
(λj, aj, bj, θj) =

(4, 3, 20, 4) j = 1
(3, 1, 10, 0.5) j = 2
(2, 2, 14, 1.5) j = 3
We will demonstrate the application of the CORS method for finding the best
skipping vector for the LCFS-PS heuristic, discussed in Section 6.3.3. Firstly, we
use the simulation method discussed in Section 6.3.2 to estimate the expected
damages in each queue from an over-crowded state under the LCFS policy. This
corresponds to the LCFS-PS policy with skipping vector s = (s1 = 1, s2 = 1, s3 =
1). Since the damages in each queue are equal to one, the expected damages
are equivalent to the abandonment probabilities of the adversary. The vector of
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estimated abandonment probabilities in each queue under the LCFS policy is given
by (W1(s),W2(s),W3(s)) = (0.6635, 0.1556, 0.3863). The estimated abandonment
probability the server can guarantee by using the LCFS policy is 0.6635. Since
the solution of ω = argmaxjWj(s) is given by ω = 1, we set s1 = 1 in all skipping
vectors of the LCFS-PS heuristic. Hence, we seek to find the best skipping vector
over the domain D = {s : s ∈ [0, 1]2 with s1 = 1}, which is equivalent to optimising
the elements s2 and s3.
In step 1 of the CORS method, we select n = 5 initial skipping vectors using the
lattice point set method described in Chapter 4. In the lattice point set method,
we generate skipping vectors s = (1, s2, s3), where (s2, s3) are given by ((zj mod
5)/5) for 0 ≤ j ≤ 4 and z = (2, 3). We set the distance parameter β to cycle
over the sequence (β1, β2, β3, β4) = (0.95, 0.25, 0.03, 0). We also set the number of
rounds to be 5, where each round consists of 4 iterations. In defining a grid over
which we solve the optimisation problems, we take each of s2 and s3 in the range
from 0 to 1 inclusive, at intervals of 0.01. Hence, the grid consists of 10,201 points.
Figure 6.1 shows the points (s2, s3) from the set of skipping vectors s in S
developed through the CORS method at the end of the initial phase and at the
end of each round. Figure 6.2 shows the radial basis function approximations W˜j
for each queue 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 at the end of the CORS method, after all 5 rounds.
In Figure 6.1, the skipping vectors identified throughout round 1 indicate good
approximations from the initial phase which were further refined in round 1. The
method made larger refinements in unexplored regions in further rounds and small
refinements in the previously explored regions. We see that at the end of each
round, in which the method exploits the current approximations, the skipping
vectors identified all lie in a small region where the main density of points are
situated, with s2 slightly smaller than 0.2 and s3 slightly larger than 0.3. From
Figure 6.2 we see that in this region, the approximations W˜j are nearly equal. The
interpolating nature of the approximations, together with the number of points
simulated in the main density, ensure accurate approximations and lead to a firm
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belief that the best skipping vector lies in this small region.





















































Figure 6.1: Points (s2, s3) from the set of skipping vectors s in S developed in
the initial phase and each round of the CORS method for the LCFS-PS policy in
Example 6.1.
The final skipping vector identified by the method was (s2, s3) = (0.18, 0.33)
and the corresponding estimated abandonment probabilities were (W1(s),W2(s),W3(s)) =
(0.6134, 0.5838, 0.6124). The estimated abandonment probability the server can
guarantee by using the LCFS-PS policy with this skipping vector is 0.6134. We
can potentially find a better skipping vector which does not lie on the grid by
formulating a finite TPZS matrix game, as discussed in Section 6.3.3. The skip-
ping vector derived from the solution of the finite matrix game was (s2, s3) =
(0.1655, 0.3311) and the corresponding estimated abandonment probabilities were






































Figure 6.2: Approximations W˜j for each queue 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 at the end of 5 rounds
of the CORS method in Example 6.1. Also shown are the points (s2, s3) from the
set of skipping vectors s in S developed in the CORS method.
mated abandonment probability of 0.6133 with this skipping vector. In fact, using
the optimal mixed strategy for the server in the finite matrix game consisting of
all LCFS-PS policies developed, the server can achieve an estimated abandonment
probability of 0.6132. This is an improvement of 7.6% over the LCFS policy. If
we formulate the matrix game following the initial phase of the method, we can
guarantee an estimated abandonment probability of 0.6211, which shows that the
subsequent rounds of the CORS method deliver an improvement of 1.3% over this
alternative.
We will now consider wider sets of numerical examples for k = 3 queues, within
which we will estimate the performance of a number of heuristic policies. Specif-
ically, we will consider the following heuristics which were discussed throughout
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the chapter: LCFS, LCFS-PS, DR, SR, and RR. In addition, we will estimate
the performance of a heuristic we will label as PA. The PA heuristic formulates a
finite TPZS matrix game in which the server’s pure strategies correspond to the
k policies which prioritise each queue. Prioritisation can be achieved by setting a
reselection vector r in the DR policy with a single element equal to one and all
other elements equal to zero. The PA heuristic is analogous to the heuristic policy
developed and shown to perform well in the surveillance problem in Chapter 5,
which we also labelled PA.
We are unable to identify optimal service policies, or indeed the corresponding
best performance guarantees, in both cases of decentralised and centralised con-
trol. There is also no known lower bound for the best performance guarantees of
optimal policies. Consequently, we will focus on a comparison between the per-
formance of each of our heuristic policies. When referring to the performance of a
given heuristic, this corresponds to the estimated expected damage which can be
guaranteed by the heuristic. Whilst the LCFS-PS, DR, and SR heuristics repre-
sent classes of service policies and individual policies within these classes provide
performance guarantees, we are interested in the best performance guarantee we
are able to achieve within each class. Subsequently, as discussed in Sections 6.2.2
and 6.3.3, for the LCFS-PS, DR, and SR heuristics, we develop policies using the
CORS method and an iterative extension and the performance guarantee is the
value of the resulting finite TPZS matrix game. For the policies LCFS and RR,
the performance guarantees are simply the largest expected damages among the
queues under each policy. As discussed above, the performance guarantee of the
PA policy corresponds to the value of the associated finite TPZS matrix game.
In what follows, we make the following choices in our application of the CORS
method for the LCFS-PS, DR, and SR heuristics. Firstly, for the LCFS-PS heuris-
tic, we will apply the CORS method in the same manner as in the preceding ex-
ample system. That is, we fix ω by simulating the LCFS policy. For simplicity,
suppose ω = 1. We then generate n = 5 initial skipping vectors s = (1, s2, s3)
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using the lattice point set method described in Chapter 4, where (s2, s3) are given
by ((zj mod 5)/5) for 0 ≤ j ≤ 4 and z = (2, 3). We set the distance parameter β
to cycle over the sequence (β1, β2, β3, β4) = (0.95, 0.25, 0.03, 0) and set the number
of rounds to be 5, where each round consists of 4 iterations. In defining a grid over
which we solve the optimisation problems, we take each of s2 and s3 in the range
from 0 to 1 inclusive, at intervals of 0.01. For both the DR and SR heuristics, we
use the same number of rounds and β cycle. However, in contrast, we generate
n = 5 initial reselection vectors r = (1−r2−r3, r2, r3) by sampling the parameters
r2 and r3 uniformly from the unit simplex in k− 1 dimensions. In defining a grid,
we take each of r2 and r3 in the range from 0 to 1 inclusive, at intervals of 0.01,
and apply the constraint r2 + r3 ≤ 1.
We study three sets of examples with a similar design, with each set containing
nine scenarios reflecting different service time and lifetime conditions. In all of
our examples, service is nonpreemptive and the service time distributions in each
queue follow independent Gamma distributions. In describing the parameters of
the example systems, we denote the arrival rates in each queue by the vector
λ = (λ1, λ2, λ3), the abandonment rates in each queue by the vector θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3),
and the damages in each queue by the vector d = (d1, d2, d3). The service time
distribution in queue j is characterised by the shape and rate parameter pair
(aj, bj), hence we denote the service time distribution in each queue by the vector
g = ((a1, b1), (a2, b2), (a3, b3)).
In the first set of examples, there are three cases for the service time distribution
vector g (labelled case 1 to 3) and three cases for the abandonment rate vector θ
(labelled case A to C). Every combination of service time case and abandonment
rate case leads to nine distinct scenarios, labelled A1 to C3. The parameters in
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this set of examples are as follows:
λ = (4, 2, 3) (all scenarios); (6.16)
d = (1, 1, 1) (all scenarios); (6.17)
g = ((3, 20), (1, 10), (2, 14)) (service case 1); (6.18)
g = ((3, 10), (1, 5), (2, 7)) (service case 2); (6.19)
g = ((3, 5), (2, 5), (4, 7)) (service case 3); (6.20)
θ = (4, 2, 3) (abandonment case A);
θ = (2, 1, 3/2) (abandonment case B);
θ = (2/3, 1/3, 1/2) (abandonment case C);
We refer to this set of examples as the (2:1) set, since this reflects the ratio of the
largest to smallest abandonment rates in the vector θ for all scenarios. This ratio
is used as an intuitive measure of asymmetry between the queues in the system. In
each scenario in the (2:1) set, the queue with the shortest expected service times
also has the smallest arrival rate and longest lifetimes. Conversely, the queue with
the longest expected service times also has the largest arrival rate and shortest
lifetimes. In selecting these parameters, we attempt to reflect relative conditions
which may occur in a practical surveillance setting. For example, one area such
as a corridor through which suspects pass quickly, making them more difficult to
screen, compared to another area such as a lobby through which suspects pass
slowly, making them easier to screen. The estimated performance guarantees of
each heuristic in the (2:1) set of examples are reported in Table 6.1.
In our second set of examples, we use the same arrival rate and damage vectors
and the same cases for the service time distribution vector. We alter the abandon-
ment rate vectors θ in our definition of the abandonment cases A to C. Again, we
create nine distinct scenarios, A1 to C3. We refer to this set of examples as the
(4:1) set, once again to reflect the ratio of the largest to smallest abandonment
rates in the vector θ for all scenarios. The parameters in the (4:1) set of examples
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Scenario LCFS LCFS-PS DR SR RR PA
A1 0.6444 0.6208 0.7047 0.7272 0.7510 0.8292
3.67 -9.35 -12.85 -16.55 -28.69
A2 0.8325 0.8099 0.8515 0.8692 0.8908 0.8988
2.71 -2.28 -4.40 -7.00 -7.97
A3 0.9407 0.9276 0.9435 0.9528 0.9636 0.9567
1.39 -0.30 -1.28 -2.43 -1.70
B1 0.4918 0.4617 0.5653 0.5800 0.6185 0.7718
6.12 -14.94 -17.92 -25.76 -56.91
B2 0.7316 0.6971 0.7555 0.7698 0.8087 0.8405
4.71 -3.27 -5.22 -10.54 -14.89
B3 0.8892 0.8649 0.8880 0.8978 0.9230 0.9127
2.74 0.14 -0.96 -3.79 -2.64
C1 0.3170 0.2885 0.3800 0.3847 0.4558 0.7117
8.98 -19.89 -21.37 -43.79 -124.56
C2 0.6364 0.6126 0.6371 0.6406 0.7162 0.7641
3.75 -0.11 -0.65 -12.53 -20.06
C3 0.8334 0.8173 0.8207 0.8223 0.8703 0.8463
1.92 1.52 1.33 -4.43 -1.55
Table 6.1: Estimated abandonment probability under each heuristic in the (2:1)
set of examples. We use the LCFS policy as a reference and show the percentage
improvement of each heuristic over the LCFS policy in italics.
are given by (6.16) to (6.20), together with the following abandonment cases:
θ = (4, 1, 2) (abandonment case A);
θ = (2, 1/2, 1) (abandonment case B);
θ = (2/3, 1/6, 1/3) (abandonment case C);
The (4:1) set represents example systems which have greater asymmetry between
the queues than the (2:1) set examples. The estimated performance guarantees of
each heuristic in the (4:1) set of examples are reported in Table 6.2.
In our final set of examples, once again we create nine distinct scenarios, A1
to C3, using the same parameters as used in the (2:1) and (4:1) example sets.
Once again, we alter the abandonment rate vectors θ in our definition of the
abandonment cases A to C. We refer to this set of examples as the (8:1) set, once
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Scenario LCFS LCFS-PS DR SR RR PA
A1 0.6563 0.6156 0.6760 0.6925 0.7607 0.8119
6.20 -3.01 -5.51 -15.92 -23.70
A2 0.8456 0.8071 0.8367 0.8495 0.8995 0.8849
4.56 1.05 -0.46 -6.37 -4.65
A3 0.9486 0.9255 0.9356 0.9423 0.9684 0.9476
2.44 1.38 0.67 -2.09 0.11
B1 0.5036 0.4521 0.5335 0.5443 0.6260 0.7572
10.22 -5.96 -8.09 -24.31 -50.37
B2 0.7476 0.6904 0.7367 0.7470 0.8175 0.8247
7.65 1.46 0.08 -9.35 -10.31
B3 0.9001 0.8601 0.8772 0.8840 0.9292 0.9002
4.44 2.55 1.79 -3.23 -0.01
C1 0.3265 0.2756 0.3547 0.3582 0.4596 0.7042
15.59 -8.64 -9.70 -40.77 -115.68
C2 0.6475 0.6102 0.6274 0.6298 0.7216 0.7526
5.77 3.11 2.74 -11.43 -16.23
C3 0.8402 0.8146 0.8167 0.8174 0.8746 0.8368
3.04 2.79 2.71 -4.10 0.40
Table 6.2: Estimated abandonment probability under each heuristic in the (4:1)
set of examples. We use the LCFS policy as a reference and show the percentage
improvement of each heuristic over the LCFS policy in italics.
again to reflect the ratio of the largest to smallest abandonment rates in the vector
θ for all scenarios. The parameters in the (8:1) set of examples are given by (6.16)
to (6.20), together with the following abandonment cases:
θ = (4, 1/2, 3/2) (abandonment case A);
θ = (2, 1/4, 3/4) (abandonment case B);
θ = (2/3, 1/12, 3/12) (abandonment case C);
The (8:1) set represents example systems which have greater asymmetry between
the queues than the (4:1) and (2:1) set examples. The estimated performance
guarantees of each heuristic in the (8:1) set of examples are reported in Table 6.3.
Observing the results in Tables 6.1 to 6.3, we see that the LCFS-PS heuristic
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Scenario LCFS LCFS-PS DR SR RR PA
A1 0.6635 0.6130 0.6625 0.6751 0.7657 0.8020
7.61 0.16 -1.74 -15.40 -20.86
A2 0.8532 0.8059 0.8306 0.8399 0.9045 0.8766
5.54 2.65 1.55 -6.02 -2.75
A3 0.9531 0.9245 0.9324 0.9373 0.9712 0.9428
2.99 2.17 1.66 -1.90 1.08
B1 0.5101 0.4473 0.5182 0.5270 0.6302 0.7492
12.33 -1.58 -3.31 -23.53 -46.85
B2 0.7562 0.6877 0.7289 0.7373 0.8228 0.8155
9.05 3.60 2.49 -8.81 -7.85
B3 0.9056 0.8582 0.8730 0.8785 0.9326 0.8933
5.24 3.60 3.00 -2.97 1.36
C1 0.3317 0.2693 0.3432 0.3462 0.4618 0.7002
18.82 -3.48 -4.38 -39.21 -111.10
C2 0.6533 0.6093 0.6247 0.6265 0.7244 0.7462
6.74 4.38 4.11 -10.89 -14.22
C3 0.8432 0.8133 0.8152 0.8159 0.8769 0.8318
3.55 3.32 3.23 -4.00 1.35
Table 6.3: Estimated abandonment probability under each heuristic in the (8:1)
set of examples. We use the LCFS policy as a reference and show the percentage
improvement of each heuristic over the LCFS policy in italics.
achieves the best performance guarantee in every example scenario. This is not
surprising given that we developed the heuristic to improve upon the LCFS pol-
icy, which it significantly does. The observed improvement over the LCFS policy
is expected in the asymmetric scenarios studied, since the LCFS policy is only
optimal in symmetric systems. Moreover, we would expect centralised service poli-
cies to outperform decentralised service policies, which underpins the superiority
of LCFS-PS over DR and SR. The superiority of the centralised LCFS policy over
the decentralised DR and SR heuristics in many cases strengthens this observa-
tion. However, the DR and SR heuristics outperform the LCFS policy in some
scenarios, in part due to the weakness of the LCFS policy and in part due to the
strength of the DR and SR heuristics in those scenarios.
If the only feasible service policies in the system were decentralised policies,
we see that the DR heuristic achieves the smallest performance guarantee in every
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example scenario, outperforming SR, RR, and PA. The superior performance of DR
compared to SR indicates that it is better for the server to potentially switch queues
at the conclusion of each attempted service rather than remain in the same queue
and attempt to complete a service there. The observed improvement of DR and SR
over the RR policy is expected in the asymmetric scenarios studied, since the RR
policy is only suitable for entirely symmetric systems. The poor performance of the
PA heuristic illustrates a fundamental difference between the surveillance problems
in this chapter and in Chapter 5. In this chapter, the PA heuristic performs poorly
when the adversary can choose when and where to attack, whereas in Chapter 5 an
analogous heuristic to PA performs well when the adversary can only choose where
to attack. In Chapter 5, the adversary arrives into a steady state system, so the
priority policies within PA still serve all queues during the lifetime of the adversary.
Here, we look at the overly-crowded state, so the priority policies within PA only
serve one queue. Hence, if the adversary selects any other queue, his abandonment
probability is 1. This underlines the poor performance of PA here.
The performance guarantee of the LCFS policy increases in each scenario from
the (2:1) set of examples to the (8:1) set of examples. In each scenario, the per-
formance guarantee is derived from the adversary attacking the first queue. In-
creasing the amount of asymmetry from (2:1) to (8:1), θ1 is the same across the
sets, whereas the abandonment rates in the other queues are smaller. Conse-
quently, under the LCFS policy, the server spends more time serving in the other
queues in the examples with greater asymmetry, which leads to a higher abandon-
ment probability in the first queue. In contrast, the performance guarantee of the
LCFS-PS heuristic decreases from (2:1) to (8:1). This is due to the greater amount
of asymmetry increasing the amount to which the LCFS-PS heuristic can reduce
the abandonment probability in the first queue at the expense of increasing the
abandonment probabilities in the other queues. The RR policy exhibits similar
behaviour to the LCFS policy and similarly, the DR and SR heuristics exhibit
similar behaviour to the LCFS-PS heuristic. More asymmetry between the queues
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increases the effectiveness of the DR and SR heuristics.
In conclusion, while it is simple to adopt the LCFS policy in a centralised
system and the RR policy in a decentralised system, these policies can perform
relatively poorly compared to carefully designed heuristics. Comparison of the
LCFS-PS heuristic with the LCFS policy in a centralised system and the DR
heuristic with the RR policy in a decentralised system, illustrate the large im-
provements which can be made in performance. We recommend the LCFS-PS
heuristic for centralised control systems and the DR heuristic for decentralised
control systems. Furthermore, in making these recommendations, through our
application of the CORS method and formulation as a finite TPZS matrix game,
we are confident that we obtain a guaranteed performance close to the the best
performance guarantee possible within the respective classes of the LCFS-PS and
DR policies. If it was possible to upgrade the security system from decentralised
control to centralised control, the comparative performance of the LCFS-PS and
DR heuristics indicates the performance improvement which could be obtained.
This improvement could then be used to decide whether it was worth upgrading,
given such an upgrade may require a costly investment.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the defensive surveillance scenario of a strategic
adversary who chooses both where and when to attack the system. The server
wishes to find a robust service policy which provides a performance guarantee
against any choice of queue and time the adversary could make. In practice, the
adversary may not be as capable as we assume in the chapter, hence the analysis
provides an upper bound on the abandonment probability of a less capable ad-
versary. In considering variations of the problem consisting of a single queue, we
proved that the last-come first-served policy (LCFS) is optimal for the security
team. In adopting the LCFS policy, the security team would track the arrival
times of suspects into the public area and screen the suspect who arrived most
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recently. The strength of the LCFS policy resides in the fact that in ensures the
abandonment probability of the adversary depends entirely on the arrival process
after he joins the queue. This highlights the importance of considering which cus-
tomer to serve when the adversary has knowledge of the state of the system, whilst
the LCFS policy seeks to remove the value of this information for the adversary.
A consequence of this analysis is that the LCFS policy is also optimal in a system
with multiple symmetric queues. In such a system, the security team should screen
the most recent arrival across all of the public areas.
In systems with multiple asymmetric queues, we developed heuristic policies
based on the strength of the LCFS policy which provide upper bound performance
guarantees for the server. Within the approaches developed, an important feature
is that the server randomises his actions. We developed the Departure Reselection
(DR) and last-come first-served with probabilistic skipping (LCFS-PS) policies,
each parametrised by vectors. In adopting the DR policy, the security team first
randomly selects an area to screen according to a probability distribution, then
screens a suspect according to LCFS. In adopting the LCFS-PS policy, the security
team orders the most recent arrivals across all areas, then selects a suspect to
screen based on a possible sequence of random decisions governed by a probability
rule. In both cases, we found the best performance guarantees for the server
from within the policy classes by optimising their parameter vectors. This was
acheived through a method which intelligently uses simulation within a response
surface method for global optimisation problems. Sets of numerical experiments
demonstrate the superior performance of the heuristic approach based on LCFS-
PS over approaches based on DR and other policies. Consequently, our suggestion
for the security team is to adopt the approach based on LCFS-PS in some cases,
otherwise adopt the approach based on DR in other cases.
It is unclear whether the methodology in this chapter could be extended to
other defender-attacker problems. Our methodology centred around the consid-
eration of simpler single queue problems to gain insights into the more complex
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multiple queue problems. It would seem this would be a valuable approach in other
problems which share similar characteristics, notably the insights gained from the
LCFS policy in queueing system models where an adversary acts on state informa-
tion. There are a number of open problems arising from this chapter, for example
the consideration of strategic idling in the service policy. It would also be valuable
to derive a lower bound on the optimal policy in the asymmetric systems to gain




Our motivation in this thesis was that of how authorities can engage in defensive
efforts against the many threats faced in the modern world from adversarial agents.
In particular, we considered the use of technology in the defensive surveillance of
public areas which are the open, exposed targets of adversarial attacks. Our
broad research question asked the following: How should a surveillance resource
be utilised in real time to minimise the impact of adversarial threats?
We developed an underpinning surveillance scenario to reflect our motivation.
A security team continuously monitors multiple public areas and applies a screen-
ing process to people within the areas. However, suspects have lifetimes within
the areas, after which they leave the area if they have not yet been screened. The
capability of the security team is such that only one suspect can be screened at any
given time, hence the loss of suspects is inevitable. Each public area is a target for
an adversary who wishes to enter an area, conduct an illicit activity, and leave be-
fore being screened. The security team does not know when the adversary is in an
area, which area he is in, or which suspect he is and can only detect the adversary
through complete screening. The purpose of surveillance is ultimately to detect the
adversary before he is able to achieve his goal. This translates our broad research
question into the operational problem of identifying a real time decision-making
rule for the screening process of the security team to minimise the the probability
of the adversary evading detection or the damage he can inflict.
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Our approach to the operational problem was to model the surveillance scenario
as a multiclass queueing system with customer abandonments. A single server
corresponds to the security team, whereby service by the server corresponds to
screening by the security team. Customers in the queueing system correspond to
suspects, whereby the event of suspects leaving at the conclusion of their lifetimes
corresponds to the abandonment of customers from the queueing system. We allow
the stochastic distributions of elements of each queue in the queueing system to
differ to represent public areas with different characteristics. The adversary is
modelled as a potential customer, able to arrive into any queue. The operational
problem in our model was to develop control policies within the queueing system
which minimise the abandonment probability of the adversary. Control policies
from our model are directly equivalent to real time decision-making rules for the
screening process of the security team. Hence, the insights gained from our model
lead to insights in the security team’s operational problem.
Based on the underpinning surveillance scenario and associated multiclass
queueing system model, we considered three different surveillance scenarios which
apply to a number of potential scenarios which may occur in real-world security
operations. We distinguish between the scenarios based on the capability of the
adversary and the knowledge of the server regarding the adversary. In Chapters 3
and 4 we considered the scenario of a random adversary. In Chapter 5 we consid-
ered the scenario of a strategic adversary who chooses where to attack. Finally, in
Chapter 6 we considered the scenario of a strategic adversary who chooses where
and when to attack. The adversary is increasingly more capable as we progress
through the thesis, representing an increasing threat for the security team. Al-
though sharing many common features, each scenario is inherently different and so
the operational strategies suggested for each are different. This illustrates the im-
portance in security operations to first identify the prevailing scenario encountered
before deploying an operational defensive surveillance strategy.
The research shares a similar motivation to a number of other defender-attacker
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problems, which we discuss in the literature review of Chapter 2; see for example
Lin et al. (2013). However, we believe that the defensive surveillance scenarios
and the modelling approach used are novel and have not been previously studied.
Consequently, the research makes a novel contribution to the wide ranging body
of literature of defender-attacker problems. The closest known work is that of Lin
et al. (2009), which is the work upon which we base our underpinning surveillance
scenario. However, in this work, the focus is on a single public area, whereas the
major features of our research are those of multiple public areas and the capability
of the adversary to act as a decision-making agent. The random adversary scenario
in Chapters 3 and 4 is a special case of a more general stochastic scheduling problem
which, together with other variants, has been studied extensively in recent years
see Glazebrook et al. (2004), Atar et al. (2010), Ayesta et al. (2011), Down et al.
(2011), Verloop (2014) and Larran˜aga et al. (2014), as well as Harrison & Zeevi
(2004), Kim & Ward (2012), and Ata & Tongarlak (2013)). We develop new results
and approaches for this problem which complement the existing literature. We are
also the first to make clear the connection with random adversary surveillance
scenario, which is a further contribution to the literature.
It is a common feature of each surveillance scenario in each chapter of the thesis
that often we can only compute the optimal service policy in systems with a small
number of queues or in special cases. Consequently, our focus is on the development
of strongly performing heuristic service policies which can be computed by the
security team. In the stochastic scheduling problem with customer abandonments
in Chapter 3 (of which the random adversary scenario is a special case), we focus
on priority service policies. A priority policy known as the Rµ rule is shown in the
literature to perform well in overloaded systems. To complement the Rµ rule in the
light traffic case, the main contribution of Chapter 3 is to present another priority
service policy known as the Rµθ rule and prove that it is asymptotically optimal
as customer abandonment rates approach zero in light traffic systems. Extensions
of this result are discussed for other model classes of interest, namely a multiserver
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version of our system and in Klimov Networks. Further to this we develop a priority
policy known as the pairwise swapping (PaS) policy. We consider the same problem
in Chapter 4, whereby the main contribution is to develop an approximate policy
iteration (API) method for the problem which aims to improve the suite of priority
policies in Chapter 3. Our numerical results indicate that, in most cases, the best
priority policy from Chapter 3 is nearly optimal in systems with 2 or 3 customer
classes and we have an effective service policy of simple structure. In the cases
where it is not, the API method invariably tightens up the gap substantially and
provides an improved policy, albeit of more complex structure and requiring lots
of computation time. In our motivating random adversary defensive surveillance
application, even small improvements in performance can be of high practical
importance. A paper based on the combined work of Chapters 3 and 4 has been
published in INFORMS Journal on Computing; see James et al. (2016).
In Chapter 5, since the server and the adversary do not know each others de-
cision, we model their interaction as a simultaneous move two-person zero-sum
(TPZS) game. By considering the TPZS game from the perspective of the adver-
sary, for which Kelley’s cutting plane (KCP) method applied to a suitably defined
convex optimisation problem delivers an optimal solution, we develop the heuris-
tic cutting plane (HCP) and enhanced heuristic cutting plane (HCP+) methods.
These methods are a heuristic application of the KCP method in which we define
a set of service policies for the server and iteratively populate this set using the
heuristic service policies developed for the random adversary problem. This ex-
ploits the strong connection between the random adversary scenario and strategic
adversary scenario in Chapter 5. Our suggestion for the security team is to ran-
domise over this set of service policies according to a mixed strategy. Numerical
experiments indicate the strong performance of this approach.
Whilst there is a strong connection between the random adversary scenario
and the strategic adversary scenario in Chapter 5, the scenario studied in Chapter
6 is very different. This is due to the fact that the adversary no longer attacks
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the system in steady state and can time his attack. The first contribution of this
chapter is to prove that the last-come first-served (LCFS) policy is optimal in a
number of variations of the problem consisting of a single queue. The strength
of the LCFS policy is based on the fact that the abandonment probability of the
adversary depends entirely on the arrival process after he joins the queue. In
practice, the adversary may not be as capable as we assume, hence our analysis
provides an upper bound on the abandonment probability of a less capable adver-
sary. The scenario studied in Chapter 6 is something of a worst case scenario for
the server. In multiple queue systems, we prove that the LCFS policy applied to
multiple queues is optimal in the special case of a symmetric system. This follows
from our analysis of single queue systems. In asymmetric systems, we use these
insights to develop heuristic policies based on the strength of the LCFS policy.
We develop the Departure Reselection (DR), Service Reselection (SR), and last-
come first-served with probabilistic skipping (LCFS-PS) policies, which are each
parametrised by vectors. In each case, we find the best performance guarantees
for the server from within the classes of DR, SR, and LCFS-PS policies by opti-
mising their parameter vectors through a method based on the work by Regis &
Shoemaker (2005) which intelligently utilises simulation within a response surface
method for global optimisation problems. Sets of numerical examples demonstrate
the superior performance of the heuristic approach based on LCFS-PS over the
approaches based on DR and SR, and other simpler policies. Our suggestion for
the security team is to adopt the heuristic approach based on LCFS-PS in some
cases, otherwise adopt the heuristic approach based on DR in other cases.
When we compare the findings of each chapter, we see that our answers to the
general research question are quite different in each surveillance scenario. When
the server knows the decision of the adversary, at least in a probabilistic sense,
and the adversary can only choose which queue to attack, it is often very effective
for the server to use a single, deterministic, priority service policy, as seen in the
Rµ and Rµθ rules. When the server does not know the decision of the adversary,
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it becomes important for the server to randomise. This can be via a randomised
policy or by randomising over a set of deterministic service policies, which each
provide good defence against various decisions the adversary may make, as seen
in the HCP method. When the adversary can also time his attack, it is important
for the server to consider which customer to serve in addition to which queue to
serve, as seen in the LCFS policy. The customer served is not a concern in the
scenarios in which the adversary attacks the system in steady state. Serving the
most recently arrived customers into the system seeks to remove the advantage of
the adversary knowing the state of the system. When the server does not know
where or when the adversary will attack, it is also good for the server to randomise
his actions, both within service policies and across a set of service policies, as seen
in the heuristics based on the DR and LCFS-PS policies.
We recognise the limitations of the research. The surveillance scenarios we
have considered are limited by the model assumptions that have been imposed on
them. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 we assume that service times follow an exponential
distribution and that service is provided preemptively. In Chapter 6 we study the
case in which service times follow arbitrary probability distributions and service is
provided nonpreemptively. In real security operations, the model of the screening
process may require any combination of these assumptions. Application of the
general service time, nonpreemptive setup to the scenarios in Chapters 3, 4, and
5 would require further research. Such further research would be valuable as it
would allow the security team to directly compare their performance in each of
the three surveillance scenarios, indicating the increased value to the adversary of
greater capability.
Throughout the thesis we make the assumption that the lifetimes of customers
are exponentially distributed. It would be more realistic to assume an arbitrary
probability distribution for lifetimes and this would be a challenging direction of
future research. Moreover, we assume that when the adversary joins a queue,
his lifetime is distributed in the same way as the other customers in the queue.
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In the absence of any information regarding the lifetime of an adversary, this
assumption seems a sensible one to make. However, an interesting direction for
future research would be to suppose the adversary’s lifetime is independent from
the system and is the same regardless of which queue he attacks. This problem
would be significantly more difficult since, for example if the adversary arrives
in steady state, his abandonment probability would no longer be equal to the
steady state abandonment probability experienced by any arbitrary customer in
that queue.
There are a few aspects of the research which were identified as being outside
the scope of the thesis in Chapter 6, for example consideration of strategic idling
in the case of nonpreemptive service. These open problems would be an immediate
and interesting direction for future research. Other directions for future research
involve extending the surveillance scenarios and associated models to make them
more realistic or changing them into related scenarios. For example, the server
may need to take some time to switch from one queue or customer to another.
Also, the screening may not be perfect and there may be some form of overlooking,
wherein suspects are not identified with a certain probability. The Klimov Network
model in Section 3.4.1 is one example of this type of scenario. Another direction
could be to consider surveillance scenarios with multiple servers, perhaps where
each server is only responsible for a subset of areas. One obvious limitation of the
research is the fact that we study time-homogeneous systems, whereas real security
operations may concern public areas with time-varying characteristics. We suggest
that a time-varying problem may be initially approached by approximating it with
a number of variations of our time-homogeneous problems in which the security
team changes their operational strategies to suit in line with our suggestions.
While our broad research motivation was concerned with the defensive efforts
of authorities against adversarial agents, our focus has been on the operational
aspects of the defensive surveillance part of these efforts. In this thesis, we believe
we have studied some interesting and novel defensive surveillance scenarios and
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have developed some valuable models, insights, and methods which could inform
real security operations. Furthermore, as we have discussed, we believe that our
research can be used as the motivation and a basis for a wide range of further
avenues of future research. Hopefully this will lead to a greater understanding and
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